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ABSTRACT
ASSESSING CREDIBILITY IN SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY JUDGMENT
Joshua D. Baker
Jonathan Baron
Subjective probability judgments (SPJs) are an essential component of decision making
under uncertainty. Yet, research shows that SPJs are vulnerable to a variety of errors
and biases. From a practical perspective, this exposes decision makers to risk: if SPJs
are (reasonably) valid, then expectations and choices will be rational; if they are not,
then expectations may be erroneous and choices suboptimal. However, existing methods
for evaluating SPJs depend on information that is typically not available to decision
makers (e.g., ground truth; correspondence criteria). To address this issue, I develop a
method for evaluating SPJs based on a construct I call credibility. At the conceptual
level, credibility describes the relationship between an individual’s SPJs and the most
defensible beliefs that one could hold, given all available information. Thus, coefficients
describing credibility (i.e., “credibility estimates”) ought to reflect an individual’s
tendencies towards error and bias in judgment. To determine whether empirical models
of credibility can capture this information, this dissertation examines the reliability,
validity, and utility of credibility estimates derived from a model that I call the linear
credibility framework. In Chapter 1, I introduce the linear credibility framework and
demonstrate its potential for validity and utility in a proof-of-concept simulation. In
Chapter 2, I apply the linear credibility framework to SPJs from three empirical sources
and examine the reliability and validity of credibility estimates as predictors of
vi

judgmental accuracy (among other measures of “good” judgment). In Chapter 3, I use
credibility estimates from the same three sources to recalibrate and improve SPJs (i.e.,
increase accuracy) out-of-sample. In Chapter 4, I discuss the robustness of empirical
models of credibility and present two studies in which I use exploratory research methods
to (a) tailor the linear credibility framework to the data at hand; and (b) boost
performance. Across nine studies, I conclude that the linear credibility framework is a
robust (albeit imperfect) model of credibility that can provide reliable, valid, and useful
estimates of credibility. Because the linear credibility framework is an intentionally weak
model, I argue that these results represent a lower-bound for the performance of
empirical models of credibility, more generally.
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INTRODUCTION

When the probabilities of uncertain events are unknown, subjective probability
judgments (SPJs) play an important role in decision making. In medicine, for example,
doctors rely on SPJs to identify the most likely cause of a patient’s symptoms and
prescribe an effective treatment. In finance, investors rely on SPJs to predict the most
favorable stocks and build a profitable portfolio. And in military intelligence, analysts
rely on SPJs to anticipate threats and protect our national interest. Indeed, in any domain
characterized by incomplete information, decision makers have little choice but to rely on
intuitive, empirical, or otherwise bottom-up assessments of uncertainty. When expressed
as SPJs, these assessments are assumed to reflect an individual’s degree of belief in
uncertain events (Ramsey, 1926) and should — in principle— provide the same “type” or
“class” of information as mathematical probabilities. According to most modern theories
of choice (e.g., Savage 1954), therefore, SPJs are an integral component of decision
making under uncertainty and can be incorporated into a decision maker’s rational
calculus in cases where she must form (cognitive or behavioral) expectations in the
absence of well-defined probabilities (Baron, 2008; Elster, 1986).
Critically, however, research on judgment under uncertainty has demonstrated
that SPJs are an imperfect source of probabilistic information. In medicine, Eddy (1982)
has shown that physicians tend to overestimate the likelihood of rare diseases (e.g., breast
cancer), given positive test results (e.g., a positive mammogram). In finance, Barber &
Odean (2001) have demonstrated that amateur investors tend to be overconfident in their
1

stock choices. And in military intelligence, Mandel & Barnes (2014) have shown that
analysts tend to be underconfident, despite their high level of expertise. Indeed, after
more than a century of descriptive research, studies of judgment under uncertainty have
widely concluded that SPJs (a) are sensitive to context cues (e.g., Windschitl & Weber,
1999; Wallsten, Fillenbaum, & Cox, 1986) and modes of elicitation (Morgan, 2014); (b)
are often formulated on the basis of risky (albeit efficient) heuristics (Kahneman, 2011;
Kahneman, 2003; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974); (c) frequently fail to weight and
incorporate evidence appropriately (e.g., Christensen-Szalanski & Bushyhead, 1981;
Doherty, Mynatt, Tweney, & Schiavo, 1979; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973); (d) tend
towards overconfidence in estimates of both binary and continuous criteria (e.g., Soll &
Klayman, 2004; Soll, 1996); and (e) under certain conditions, violate the laws of
mathematical probability (e.g., Birnbaum & Schmidt, 2008; Tversky & Fox, 1995;
Tversky & Kahneman, 1983).
From a practical perspective, therefore, decision making under uncertainty
presents a dilemma. On the one hand, SPJs represent a simple, inexpensive, and widelyavailable source of information about the probability of uncertain events. Indeed, in cases
where a decision maker is concerned with one-off, unprecedented, or otherwise “unique”
events, SPJs are likely to be her only source of probabilistic information, as it is
impossible to draw inferences about the relative frequency of an event that will only
occur once (for a seminal discussion of this topic, see: Ellsberg, 1961). On the other
hand, research on judgment under uncertainty has demonstrated that SPJs are vulnerable
to a variety of errors and biases (for an overview, see: Kahneman, 2011; Tversky &
2

Kahneman, 1974). In some cases, researchers have argued that these vulnerabilities are
immaterial, as errors in judgment need not lead to errors decision making — and, in
support of this position, Gigerenzer and colleagues have made a strong case for the
“ecological rationality” of heuristic modes of judgment (e.g., Todd & Gigerenzer, 2007;
see also: Brunswik, 1955). From a normative perspective, however, the simple fact of the
matter is that suboptimal SPJs expose a decision maker to risk.
To put this in perspective, consider the neoclassical concept of rationality.
According to this view — and therefore according to most normative theories of choice
(e.g., Expected Utility Theory: von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1945; Bernoulli, 1738) —
the goal of a rational decision maker is to maximize her expected utility (EU). In the face
of uncertainty, however, a decision maker does not have access to (precise) mathematical
probabilities and therefore cannot calculate EU directly. As discussed above, decision
makers can compensate for this lack of “true” or “objective” probability information by
substituting SPJs (i.e., intuitive, empirical, or otherwise bottom-up estimates of
probability) into their rational calculus (Savage, 1954). In doing so, however, a decision
maker runs the risk that the results of this calculus — i.e., her subjective expected utilities
(SEU) — will fail to preserve the rank-order of her most strongly preferred alternatives
(as measured by “objective” expected utilities) and cause her to choose suboptimally. In
the interest of preventing this, real-world decision makers have an incentive to ensure that
their SEUs are a valid as possible — especially in cases where errors in decision making
are likely to be pervasive or costly. Because a decision maker’s utilities are unlikely to
change between the calculation of EU and SEU, however, this incentive can be stated
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more simply. Namely, decision makers have an incentive to ensure that their beliefs about
an event’s likelihood (i.e., their SPJs) are valid representations of an event’s “true”
probability, as dictated by the (perhaps latent) causal and/or stochastic structure of the
decision environment. If they are, then a decision maker’s expectations and choices will
be rational; if they are not, then she runs the risk that her expectations will be erroneous
and her choices suboptimal.
Despite the inherent risk of decision making under uncertainty, however, research
in the decision sciences has yet to develop practical tools for evaluating SPJs. In large
part, this is because research on judgment under uncertainty can only provide direct
insight into the validity of an SPJ when an event’s “true” or “objective” probability is
available for comparison — or, at the very least, when strong claims about such values
can be made (for seminar arguments to this effect, see: Savage, 1954; Ramsey, 1926). In
some cases, this difficulty can be ameliorated by assessing the validity of SPJs indirectly
— such as by examining the coherence of SPJs with truthful propositions (e.g., logical
constraints, axioms, established facts); or the correspondence of SPJs with the outside
world (e.g., historical tendencies, observed outcomes) (Dunwoody, 2009; Hammond,
2007). However, because these types of information are rarely available outside the lab,
standards of this sort are of limited use to real-world decision makers when attempting to
identify their best course of action, ex ante.
To address this issue, the present research will develop a method for evaluating
SPJs based on their relative epistemic defensibility— a construct I call credibility. As a
foundation for this research, I will leverage the empirical literature on forecast
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aggregation (for an overview, see: Armstrong, 2001) to argue that high-quality
approximations of “true” or “objective” probabilities (i.e., estimated optima) can often be
identified with an ecologically realistic amount of data. By using these quasi-normative
criteria as a standard for “good” judgment, I will then argue that decision makers can use
simple statistical methods to identify an individual’s relative tendencies towards error and
bias in judgment. These tendencies— captured by mathematical coefficients that describe
the relationship between an individual’s SPJs and estimated optima (i.e., captured by
empirical credibility estimates)— are the essence of what I call credibility. In practice, of
course, the information provided by an empirical model of credibility will be constrained
by (a) the latent agreement between a decision maker’s estimated optima and “objective
probabilities;” and (b) the descriptive fit of the model used to relate estimated optima to
an individual’s SPJs. However, as long as neither of these constraints is prohibitive, there
is a reasonable theoretical basis for expecting that information about credibility will
provide decision makers with insight into the “quality” or relative validity of an
individual’s SPJs.
To determine whether this information can be extracted from real-world
judgments, the purpose of this dissertation will be to examine the reliability, validity, and
utility of empirical models of credibility. Because credibility is a concept rather than a
specific scale or measure, however, I will not stake my claim in any one method for
estimating credibility. Instead, I will attempt to build a case for examining credibility, in
general. To do so, I will propose a specific model of credibility that I call the linear
credibility framework and examine its performance across a wide variety of decision
5

environments. By design, the linear credibility framework will be a relatively weak
model that is (a) minimally reliant on ex post data; and (b) among the most rigid and/or
least informative that a decision maker might apply. Though this approach will limit the
validity of the results presented in this dissertation, it will also help to mitigate concerns
about the robustness of credibility information across heterogeneous (and often noisy or
sparse) decision environments. Thus, while the “best” method for estimating credibility
may vary from one case to another, the performance of the linear credibility framework
can likely be treated as a lower bound for the performance of empirical models of
credibility, more generally.

Roadmap
In this dissertation, I will demonstrate that (a) simple statistical models fit to
ecologically realistic amounts of data can be used to model credibility; and (b) that the
information contained in these models can be used to identify an individual’s relative
tendencies towards error and bias in subjective probability judgment (i.e., the “quality” or
relative validity of her SPJs). To frame this contribution, I will begin with a brief
discussion of credibility at the conceptual level, and its relationship to the notion of
epistemic defensibility. In Chapter 1, I will then introduce the linear credibility
framework and explore the applicability of this model to complex decision environments
in a proof-of-concept simulation. In Chapter 2, I will apply the linear credibility
framework to SPJs drawn from three empirical sources and examine the reliability and
validity of linear credibility estimates (decomposed into components of bias, expertise,
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and consistency) as predictors of performance in subjective probability judgment. In
Chapter 3, I will use linear credibility estimates from the same three sources to recalibrate
and improve SPJs (i.e., increase accuracy and reduce errors and biases) in an out-ofsample prediction task. Finally, in Chapter 4, I will discuss the robustness to empirical
models of credibility and present two studies in which I use exploratory research methods
to (a) tailor the linear credibility framework to the data at hand; and (b) boost empirical
performance.

A Conceptual Discussion of Credibility
To be useful to real-world decision makers, methods for evaluating SPJs must
bridge the gap between top-down, ex post definitions of “good” judgment (e.g., “good”
judgment is that which allows a decision maker to maximize expected utility), and the
bottom-up, ex ante decision environments in which choices usually occur (e.g., deciding
whether to undergo a risky medical procedure). In service of this goal, I will examine the
performance of empirical models of credibility— a construct that is intended to describe
the “quality” or relative validity of an individual’s SPJs.
Because credibility is built upon the notion of SPJ “quality,” however, defining
credibility requires that I first define “good” judgment. From a normative perspective, I
have already touched-upon this definition: according to rational theories of choice (e.g.,
Expected Utility Theory: von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1945), SPJs are typically defined
as “good” or “rational” to the extent that they help decision makers (a) form valid
expectations about the consequences of their actions; and/or (b) select the behaviors that
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are best suited to reaching their goals (Baron, 2008; Elster, 1986; see also: Arkes et al.,
2016). In practice, however, these standards can be difficult to apply because they
essentially boil down to “an SPJ is ‘good’ to the extent that it resembles an ‘objective’
probability,” and decision makers typically do not have access to these values for
comparison. When applying this standard prescriptively, therefore, it is useful to recall
that normative theories of choice rely on probabilities because they are central to the
mathematical definition of expectation. From the perspective of a real-world decision
maker, this means that the absence of (precise, mathematical) probability information is
problem with the operationalization of normative theories of choice— not a problem
with the theories themselves. Thus, if a decision maker (or a decision scientist) is willing
to divorce the concept of expectation from its mathematical expression, then he or she
can begin to get some traction on the idea of an “objective” probability, even in cases
where it is an abuse of the mathematical term.
For the purposes of this dissertation, therefore, I will define an “objective”
probability as an expression of the “true” likelihood of an uncertain event, as dictated by
the (perhaps latent) causal and/or stochastic structure of the decision environment. Or, in
slightly simpler terms, an “objective” probability is the likelihood that a rational actor
would ascribe to an event, given complete information about the true state of nature. In
practice, of course, it is unlikely that a decision maker would be able to observe such a
likelihood. However, the prevailing neoclassical assumption is that uncertain events are
fundamentally characterizable objects that could, in principle, be described by a number
that contains the same information as a mathematical probability (i.e., a number that
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describes the long-run relative frequency that one would observe if counterfactual
instances of the event ran to infinity). Though practically and philosophically fraught, the
value of this definition is purely conceptual. Namely, it makes clear the assumptions that
(a) there is a true answer to the question (e.g.) “what is the probability that Candidate X
will win the presidential election?” and (b) that it makes sense for a decision maker to
think about this “true answer” (and therefore, plan her future behaviors) as if it were a
mathematical probability — even if it can never be expressed as a relative frequency.
Thus, while it may often be difficult to identify “objective” probabilities, it is reasonable
to assume that such a criterion exists, and that SPJs can be regarded as “better” or
“worse” to the extent that they agree with this standard.
In practice, of course, the problem with defining an SPJ’s validity in terms of
“agreement with the truth” is that decision makers generally don’t know what the truth is.
In some cases, this may be because the “true state of nature” is not adequately reflected in
the full scope of information that is observable at a given time (i.e., the diagnostic cues
necessary for estimating an event’s “true” probability are absent, weak, and/or biased); in
others, it may be because a judge does not have access to the full scope of extant
information. In either scenario, however, real-world decision makers are unlikely to have
access to complete and unbiased information about the events that bear on their decisions.
Thus, while a conceptual definition of “objective” probability is useful in that it makes
clear the sort of information that a “good” judgment should provide, it is still unlikely to
serve as a useful criterion by which to evaluate SPJs.
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Critically, however, if a rational actor were privy to the full scope of extant
information, he or she could use inferential statistical procedures (e.g., Bayes’ rule; see:
Edwards & Fasolo, 2001) to identify the most epistemically defensible belief that an
individual could hold, given the information in the decision environment. Though it is
possible that the corresponding SPJ would depart from the event’s “true” probability
(especially if the pool of extant information were biased in some way), this judgment
would be “optimal” in the sense that it maximizes “agreement with the truth” to the
greatest extent that evidence and reason allow. From a conceptual perspective, therefore,
this kind of “optimal” judgment represents a ceiling on the validity of real-world
judgments and can be used as a reference point for examining the “quality” or relative
validity of other judgments (i.e., the absence of errors and biases, relative to this reference
point). Thus, if “optimal” judgments can be estimated empirically, then the resulting
estimated optima would be a desirable benchmark by which to evaluate SPJs.
Fortunately, research in the decision sciences has identified a variety of methods
for calculating (or eliciting) estimated optima. Indeed, depending on the situation, a
decision maker might opt to us (a) Bayesian updating (see: Edwards & Fasolo, 2001); (b)
belief aggregation or crowdsourcing (e.g., Mellers, Ungar, Baron, Ramos, Gürçay,
Fincher, Scott, Moore, Atanasov, Swift, Murray, Stone, & Tetlock, 2014; see also:
Armstrong, 2001); (c) prediction markets (e.g., Atanasov, Rescober, Stone, Swift,
Servan-Schreiber, Tetlock, Ungar, & Mellers, 2017; Cowgill & Zitzewitz, 2015; Spann &
Skiera, 2003); (d) actuarial or statistical models (e.g., Meehl, 1959; Goldberg, 1968; see
also: Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989); (e) machine learning algorithms (Breiman, 1996;
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Freund & Schapire, 1996; see also: Kaelbling, Littman, & Moore, 1996); or (f) statistical
optimizations, combinations, or ensembles of any of the above (e.g., Baron, Mellers,
Tetlock, Stone, & Ungar, 2014; Grushka-Cockayne, Jose, & Lichtendal Jr., 2017;
Flowerdew, 2014; see also: Sawyer, 1966) — all of which I discuss in greater detail in
Chapter 1. Regardless of how a decision maker arrives at these judgments, however, the
implication is the same. If the judgments produced by these methods can be generally
assumed to be “better” (i.e., less biased and/or prone to error) than the judgments one
wishes to evaluate, then decision makers can use these estimated optima as an
informative reference point by which to evaluate the relative degree of error and/or bias
associated with SPJs.
For the purposes of this dissertation, therefore, I will define credibility as a
conceptual construct that relates an individual’s SPJs (i.e., “what she said”) to the most
epistemically defensible judgments that one could have provided, given the information
in the decision environment (i.e. “optimal” judgments, or what she “would have said” if
she had had access to more or better information). In practice, of course, empirical
models of credibility are unlikely to capture this relationship perfectly and their validity
will be limited by factors such as (a) the descriptive fit of the model relating an
individual’s SPJs to estimated optima; (b) the stability and generalizability of this
model’s fit; and (c) the latent validities that relate estimated optima to “optimal”
judgments; and “optimal” judgments to “objective probabilities.” Assuming that none of
these factors is egregiously lacking, however, a well-specified model of credibility ought
to provide decision makers with (a) descriptive insight into individual i’s “quality” (i.e.,
11

relative validity) as a source of probabilistic information; and (b) a statistical procedure
for shrinking individual i’s judgments towards estimated optima (i.e., recalibrating
individual i's judgments to account for observed errors and biases), even when estimated
optima are no longer available (for more information about why the latter is valuable, see
the section titled “Why Examine Credibility?” in Chapter 1).
For the remainder of this dissertation, I will examine the extent to which empirical
models of credibility can deliver these types of information.
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CHAPTER 1

LINEAR REGRESSION CAN PROVIDE VALID AND USEFUL ESTIMATES OF
CREDIBILITY IN SIMULATED DATA

Abstract:
As a conceptual construct, credibility is intended to provide two types of information: (a)
a description of an individual’s “quality” as a source of probabilistic information; and (b)
a statistical procedure for recalibrating her subjective probability judgments (SPJs). The
goal of this dissertation is to determine whether empirical models of credibility can
provide these types of information. To establish a preliminary lower-bound for the
performance of empirical models of credibility, this chapter will examine the
performance of an intentionally weak model of credibility that I call the linear credibility
framework. Across two analyses, I examine the validity and utility of credibility estimates
derived from 3150 simulated forecasters. These analyses demonstrate that linear
credibility estimates are (a) predictive of “true” levels of credibility; and (b) can be used
to improve the accuracy of SPJs out-of-sample. Based on these results, I conclude that
examining credibility may often be beneficial and cost-effective.

Introduction
As a conceptual construct, credibility describes the relationship between person
i’s subjective probability judgments (SPJs) and the most epistemically defensible beliefs
that one could hold, given the information in the decision environment (i.e. “optimal”
judgments, which are empirically approximated by estimated optima; for a detailed
discussion of these terms, see the introduction to this dissertation). Though necessarily
less informative than a model that relates an individual’s SPJs to “true” or “objective”
probabilities, models of credibility are intended to provide insight into an individual’s
relative tendency towards error and bias in judgment. When used to describe the
performance of a specific judge (or to compare the performance of several judges),
however, it is often useful to frame this relationship in terms of the absence of errors and
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biases. Thus, it is also reasonable to interpret credibility estimates as empirical measures
of “skill” or “proficiency” in subjective probability judgment. Depending on how this
relationship is framed, therefore, a well-specified model of credibility ought to provide
one of two types of information: either (a) a description of an individual i’s “quality”
(i.e., relative validity) as a source of probabilistic information; or (b) a statistical
procedure for recalibrating an individual i's SPJs by “undoing” or “correcting for”
historical tendencies towards error and bias.
As described in the introduction to the dissertation, the goal of the present
research is to determine whether empirical models of credibility can deliver these types
of information. To accomplish this goal, however, it is first necessary to operationalize
credibility as an empirical construct. Depending on (a) a decision maker’s goals; and (b)
the pragmatic constraints of the decision environment (e.g., access to computational
resources; the scope and validity of available information), there are a variety of ways
that a decision maker might do this. In one case, a decision maker might model
credibility by fitting a power function to the relationship between an individual’s SPJs
and estimated optima derived from an online crowdsourcing platform. In another, a
decision maker might get better results by fitting a series of splines to estimated optima
derived from an online prediction market. And in a third case, a decision maker might
find that the most parsimonious model of credibility is one that fits a hierarchical linear
regression to actuarial estimates of risk. Indeed, because credibility is a broad, conceptual
construct rather than a specific set of empirical procedures, there are endless variations in
how credibility might be modeled. Setting aside the specifics, however, operationalizing
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credibility requires a decision maker to commit to two empirical procedures: (a) a method
for modeling, calculating, or identifying estimated optima (i.e., empirical approximations
of “optimal” judgments); and (b) a method for relating estimated optima to an
individual’s SPJs.

Methods for Identifying Estimated Optima
Over the course of the past century, decision scientists have developed a wide
variety of methods for eliciting, combining, and optimizing SPJs (for an overview, see:
Armstrong, 2001). In large part, these methods were developed to aid in organizational
decision making, where individual decision makers (e.g., managers, policy-makers,
government officials) are responsible for synthesizing “optimal” judgments from the
beliefs and opinions of their associates (e.g., colleagues, analysts, subject-matter experts).
Depending on (a) the field from which a method was drawn (e.g., forecasting vs. risk
assessment); and (b) the technology that was available at the time (e.g., basic computing
vs. modern machine learning), each of these methods takes a slightly different approach
to the combination and/or optimization of noisy, disparate, and sometimes correlated
beliefs. In all cases, however, the purpose of these methods is to help decision makers
identify the “best” possible SPJ (or distribution of SPJs), given the information that is
available at the time (e.g., Budescu & Rantilla, 2000; Clemen & Winkler, 1999;
Wallsten, Budescu, Erev, & Diederich, 1997). For the purposes of estimating credibility,
therefore, the decision science literature provides a variety of ready-made methods for
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identifying estimated optima (for a comprehensive summary/review of these methods,
see: e.g., Armstrong, 2001; Clemen & Winkler, 1999).
Among these methods, perhaps the most well-known is Bayesian updating. As a
mathematical procedure, Bayes’ rule can be used to calculate the probability of an event
A, given information about an event (or state of the world) B, that bears on its outcome.
When used several times in succession, Bayes’ rule can be used to “update” one’s beliefs
about the likelihood of event A, given new information about the conditions under which
A might occur. Thus, Bayesian updating is widely regarded as a normative method for
belief formation (i.e., combining information about uncertain events to arrive at an SPJ)
(Edwards & Fasolo, 2001) and Bayesian probability estimates are often used as a
benchmark of “rational” judgement (see also: Laming, 2010; Edwards, Lindman, &
Savage, 1963). Under ideal conditions, therefore, Bayesian updating represents a strongly
defensible approach to identifying estimated optima.
Critically, however, Bayesian updating relies on (at least approximate) knowledge
of (a) the baserates with which events A and B occur; and (b) the degree to which event B
lends support to event A. Thus, in many cases, decision makers do not have access to the
necessary information to arrive at estimated optima via Bayesian updating. To
circumvent this problem in real-world decision making, practitioners often have little
choice but to rely on some form of intersubjective agreement (i.e., “pooled” or
“common” knowledge) to identify estimated optima. Fortunately, research on
probabilistic forecasting has demonstrated that even elementary applications of
“crowdsourcing,” or the large-scale belief aggregation can produce surprisingly accurate
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estimated optima. Indeed, the general conclusion from this line of work is that one of the
most robust methods for identifying “optimal” SPJs is to take a simple, unweighted
average of beliefs across individuals (e.g., Armstrong, 2001; Rantilla & Budescu, 1999;
Clemen, 1989; Wallsten et al., 1997; Genest & Zidek, 1986). In some cases, researchers
have demonstrated that the accuracy of this type of unweighted linear opinion pool can
be improved by weighting SPJs according to an individual’s (e.g.) statistical dependence
with other judges (e.g., Hora & Kardeş, 2015); tendency towards probabilistic coherence
(e.g., Karvetski, Olson, Mandel, & Twardy, 2013); and other measures of judgmental
performance. In most cases, however, comparisons of weighted vs. unweighted
aggregates have shown that weighting procedures rarely improve the accuracy of
unweighted averages by more than 20% (Armstrong, 2001).
In addition to simple SPJ aggregation (or, as is sometimes common, the
combination of subjective probability distributions; for reviews, see: Gneighting &
Ranjan, 2013; Jacobs, 1995), researchers in the decision sciences have also developed a
variety of methods for debiasing crowdsourced aggregates. In most cases, these
techniques are intended to correct for biases that emerge in the aggregation process (e.g.,
as the result of correlated beliefs across forecasters), though there is at least one case
where researchers have attempted to debias SPJs at the individual level (Turner, Steyvers,
Merkle, Budescu, & Wallsten, 2014).1 Though far from exhaustive, examples of such

1

While similar, in spirit, to the recalibration analyses I conduct in Chapters 1 and 3, it is worth noting that
Turner et al. (2014) rely on an approach to recalibration that is considerably less feasible for real-world
decision makers. For additional arguments to this effect, see the section below titled “Why examine
credibility?”
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optimization techniques include those proposed by Chen, Fine, & Huberman (2004), who
correct for public knowledge biases among small groups of judges; Budescu & Yu
(2007), who account for latent correlations among judges and informational cues (for a
conceptually similar procedure in a different context, see: Basili & Pratelli, 2014);
Budescu & Chen (2014), who weight individual’s judgments according to their historical
accuracy, relative to the “crowd;” and Baron, Mellers, Tetlock, Stone, & Ungar (2014),
who statistically correct for individuals’ tendency to shrink their SPJs towards 0.50 when
missing key pieces of information (resulting in underconfident crowd aggregates; for
related methods, see: Cross, Ramos, Mellers, Tetlock, & Scott, 2018; Satopää, Baron,
Foster, Mellers, Tetlock, & Ungar, 2014).
In a conceptually similar vein, the decision science literature also highlights an
economic method for identifying estimated optima: large-scale prediction markets. In
general, prediction markets allow participants to buy and sell fixed-payout contracts
related to the outcome of an uncertain event. Drawing on economic theory, observers of
these markets typically assume that free-market forces will drive the price of such
contracts towards a (per dollar) value that closely approximates the event’s underlying
probability (Atanasov, Rescober, Stone, Swift, Servan-Schreiber, Tetlock, Ungar, &
Mellers, 2017; Cowgill & Zitzewitz, 2015; Spann & Skiera, 2003). Beginning with the
research of Hayek (1945), studies of prediction markets have shown that free-market
structures can be used to aggregate information across a diverse group of individuals, and
that the resulting “SPJs” (i.e., prices) are often more accurate than both expert judgments
(e.g., Gürkaynak & Wolfers, 2006; Plott & Chen, 2002; Pennock, Lawrence, Nielson, &
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Giles, 2001) and simple linear averages (e.g., Rothschild, 2009; Berg, Forsythe, Nelson,
& Rietz, 2001). Consequently, while prediction markets are less common than surveystyle aggregation, they tend to be a robust method for eliciting estimated optima
(Atanasov et al. 2017).
Finally, thanks to recent advances in computer technology, research in the
decision sciences has begun to explore methods for optimizing SPJs though purely
statistical means. For example, work in areas such as risk assessment, medicine, and
finance have demonstrated that machine learning algorithms can be used to estimate the
likelihood of uncertain events such as groundwater contamination (e.g., Sajedi-Hosseini,
Malekian, Choubin, Rahmati, Cipullo, Coulon, & Pradhan, 2018); medical outcomes
(e.g., Choo, Uhmn, Kim, Han, Kim, Kim, & Lee, 2018); and financial crashes (Chatzis,
Siakoulis, Petropoulos, Stavroulakis, & Vlachgiannakis 2018). Furthermore, research in
the rapidly expanding literatures on model aggregation (for an introduction, see: Hoeting,
Madigan, Raftery, & Volinsky, 1999), model ensembling (e.g., Grushka-Cockayne, Jose,
& Lichtendahl Jr., 2017; Flowerdew, 2014), and the synthesis of clinical and actuarial
judgments (e.g., Nagar, 2013; Blattberg & Hoch, 1990; Peterson & Pitz, 1986; for an
overview, see: Sawyer, 1966) suggests that there is a degree of truth to the neoclassical
adage that (with enough information) “all uncertainties can be reduced to risks”
(Ellsberg, 1961, p. 645; emphasis in the original; attributed by the source to Ramsay,
1926). Indeed, while the relative level of performance demonstrated by these approaches
depends on a variety of factors (e.g., the outcome being predicted; the exact model or
procedure that was used), the general conclusion from these lines of work is that highly
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accurate SPJs can be extracted from extremely noisy decision environments, given the
right tools and types of information (e.g., Kruppa, Ziegler, & König, 2012; Gerds, Cai, &
Schumacher, 2008).

Methods for Relating Estimated Optima to an Individual’s SPJs
From a statistical perspective, credibility describes the relationship between two
sets of judgments. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that credibility might be best
described by a statistic that measures covariation (e.g., Pearson correlation), agreement
(e.g., intraclass correlation), or correspondence (i.e., accuracy; e.g., mean absolute error;
strictly proper scoring rules). Indeed, these sorts of measures are frequently used in the
social, ecological, and behavioral sciences to describe the relationship between noisy sets
of judgments. In studies of coding and classification, for example (e.g., automated object
recognition: da Silva & Garcia, 2006; content analysis: Shannon, Hsieh, & Shannon,
2005; behavioral coding: Funder & Sneed, 1993), researchers often rely on measures of
inter-rater agreement to determine whether there is consensus among various sources of
judgment (e.g., one judge vs. all others; machine classifications vs. human judgments;
etc.). Similarly, in domains such as meteorology (e.g., Wang, Ding, Fu, Kang, Jin,
Shukla, & Doblas-Reyes, 2005), public health (e.g., Hrust, Klaic, Krizan, Antonic, &
Hercog, 2009) and climate science (e.g., Massonnet, Bellprat, Guemas, & Doblas-Reyes,
2016), correlations between predictive models and empirical measurements are often
used as evidence for model validity. And finally, in research on ecological judgment (see:
Brunswik, 1955), expertise (e.g., Tetlock, 2005; Olsen, 1997; Ebbesen & Konecni, 1975),
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and clinical assessment (see: Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989), decision scientists have
often used measures of correspondence to assess the accuracy of intuitive judgments.
In practice, however, measures of covariation, agreement, and correspondence
only capture the “big picture” when it comes to credibility. In other words, while these
types of measures can provide insight into an individual’s “quality” (i.e., relative validity)
as a source of probabilistic information (relative to estimated optima), they generally
cannot provide a detailed description of how and why an individual’s judgments tend to
err. Thus, in many cases, a decision maker may gain more insight by using a curve with a
known functional form (e.g., a line, power-function, spline, sinusoid, etc.) to estimate
credibility. Though it is likely that the most descriptive functional form will vary from
one context to another, a curve-fitting approach to credibility estimation is valuable
because it provides a concrete, mathematical expression of the relationship between an
individual’s SPJs and estimated optima. Thus, to the extent that an empirical model of
credibility is well-specified (i.e., statistically appropriate and reasonably descriptive),
modeling credibility as a functional relationship can provide decision makers with (a) a
quantitative basis for estimating an individual’s tendencies towards errors and bias in
judgment (or, at the very least, a quantitative basis for forming expectations about her
accuracy); and (b) a statistical procedure for shrinking her SPJs towards estimated
optima, thereby reducing errors and biases.
For an empirical model of credibility to provide these types of information,
however, it is necessary for that model to provide a reasonably descriptive fit to the data.
Thus, examining credibility will often require decision makers to conduct some degree of
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statistical exploration to determine which of several models provides the best fit to their
data (for a more in-depth discussion of this topic, see: Chapter 4). Depending on the
context, this could mean that the “best” model of credibility might range from a simple
line to a highly parameterized and/or deeply nested hierarchical regression. As a result,
this means that (a) the costs of examining credibility (i.e., the time, data, and
computational resources necessary to estimate the model) might vary widely across
decision environments; and (b) that the benefits of extracting credibility information
might not outweigh the costs.
Fortunately, there are at least two reasons to be optimistic about the robustness —
and therefore, value — of simple models of credibility. First, existing research suggests
that source credibility in expert judgment (i.e., the line of work that inspired the use of
the term credibility in this dissertation) can be usefully conceptualized in terms of simple
statistical models. For example, Birnbaum & Stegner (1979) suggest that source
credibility can be reasonably operationalized in terms of linear regression, where:

“The expertise of a source refers to the perceived correlation between the source’s
report and the outcomes of empirical verification…the bias of the source refers to
factors that are perceived to influence the expected algebraic difference between
the source’s report and the true state of nature…[and] the distinction between
expertise and bias is like the distinction between regression slope and intercept.”
(Birnbaum & Stegner, 1979, p. 48; emphasis in the original).

Though it is unclear whether Birnbaum & Stegner (1979) intend for this analogy
to be interpreted as an argument for linear regression as model of source credibility, they
then go on to use linear regression as a basis for formulating (and testing) hypotheses
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about the effects of bias and expertise on the interpretation of a source’s “reports,” given
various theories about how judges (i.e., those asked to interpret the source’s “reports”)
weight and combine information. Consequently, while linear regression has not been
used to model credibility in previous research per se, there appears to be at least basic
consensus (as provided by the peer review process) that something as simple as a linear
equation can be used to describe the “quality” of an individual’s judgments.
Perhaps more importantly, however, the second reason to be optimistic about the
robustness of simple models of credibility is that simple statistical models tend to be
robust, in general. Indeed, as long as the relationship between two variables is
(essentially) monotonic, basic descriptive techniques such as linear regression can often
provide a reasonable summary of their covariation— even in cases where the “true”
relationship is known to be non-linear. Furthermore, a large body of research on clinical
vs. actuarial judgment has demonstrated that (a) standard linear regression; and (b) even
intentionally agnostic/atheoretical models (e.g., equal-weights regression) can be used to
combine noisy and poorly-behaved data to arrive at surprisingly accurate judgments
(Dawes, 1979; Meehl, 1954). Thus, decision makers are likely to see benefits from even
the most rudimentary models of credibility and— when their resource-constraints
allow— can use any variety of (more sophisticated) techniques to identify a model that
suits their needs. In general, therefore, while it is unlikely that (e.g.) linear regression will
be the “best” way to examine credibility, there is reason to expect that (with a little
exploration) simple statistical tools can be used to extract a useful degree of information
about credibility.
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Why Examine Credibility?
Given that the decision science literature provides a variety of techniques for
identifying estimated optima (i.e., judgments that are typically expected to be more
accurate than an individual’s SPJs), it is natural to wonder why decision makers would be
interested in examining credibility. In general, the answer to this question is threefold:

1. First, while the methods discussed above may help decision makers identify
highly accurate SPJs, they typically do not provide any information about the
“quality” (i.e., relative validity) of an individual’s judgments. Consequently,
in cases where a decision maker is interested in assessing the “skill” or
“proficiency” of an individual judge— perhaps for the purposes of
accountability, performance evaluation, or targeted interventions (e.g.,
training or debiasing)— he or she can only do so by examining (something
like) credibility.

2. Second, a non-trivial proportion of the methods described above rely on costly
information-gathering strategies. Thus, while estimated optima from an online
prediction market might be considerably more accurate than the judgments
provided by a handful of individuals, “crowdsourcing” these types of
estimated optima typically requires (a) a significant up-front investment (e.g.,
recruitment efforts, website coding, data-handling protocols); and (b) non28

trivial ongoing expenditures (e.g., participant retention efforts; participant
compensation).

3. Finally, many of the methods described above depend on (a)
uncharacteristically rich data-sets; (b) information that is generally not
available in real-world decision environments; and/or (c) information that a
decision maker can only observe ex post. Thus, even in cases where it is
feasible to rely on “crowdsourced” aggregation methods, many such
approaches are most effective when they can be optimized against external
criteria (e.g., historical baserates; observed outcomes). In general, therefore,
many of the methods discussed above are of limited use to real-world decision
makers.

Of course, because credibility estimation relies on the identification of estimated
optima, the latter two conditions also limit the applicability of empirical models of
credibility. Critically, however, if a model of credibility is well-specified (i.e., if it
provides genuine insight into an individual’s tendencies towards error and bias in
judgment), then the relationship captured in one set of judgments ought to generalize to
other SPJs made by the same judge in the same domain. In principle, therefore, it should
be possible for a decision maker to use an ecologically realistic amount of data to (a)
identify a small set of estimated optima; and (b) use these judgments to build an
empirical snapshot of credibility. Though far from foolproof, the curve captured in this
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snapshot should allow decision makers to “estimate” or “reproduce” estimated optima
from an individual’s noisy SPJs— or, more realistically, to shrink her SPJs towards
estimated optima when estimated optima are no longer available. Thus, if fit to a suitably
representative sample of data, empirical models of credibility should allow a decision
maker to “correct-for” or “undo” (at least some degree of) an individual’s historical
tendencies towards error and bias in judgment. To test whether empirical models of
credibility can deliver on this promise, I will carry out this exact sort of recalibration
analysis in the chapters that follow.

The Linear Credibility Framework
Because decision making is not a single task with a single set of constraints (e.g.,
risks; error tolerances; costs and benefits), it is difficult to make the case that decision
makers would benefit from examining credibility, in general. As a starting-point for this
conversation, however, it is instructive to consider that— at a bare minimum— an
empirical model of credibility must provide decision makers with a positive expected
utility to be deployed. In other words, to make the case for a specific model of credibility,
it is necessary to convince a decision maker that deploying it is “cost-effective” in the
sense that it is expected to provide a large informational “return” on his or her statistical
(and perhaps logistical) “investment.” In operational terms, this provides three criteria for
a (minimally) well-specified model of credibility. Specifically, to be worth examining, an
empirical model of credibility must: (i) be applicable to the decision environment at hand
(i.e., must not rely on ecologically unrealistic amounts of types of data); (ii) produce
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generally reliable, valid, and useful estimates; and (iii) provide a generally favorable costbenefit ratio.
Given these criteria, one way to make a case for the value of credibility
information, in general is to “stack the deck” against my own research and examine the
performance of a model whose cost-benefit ratio is intentionally low. If, despite these
adverse conditions, the value of the information provided by such a model still outweighs
its costs, then it is largely untenable to argue that a decision maker should not examine
credibility. Critically, however, because the “costs” of examining credibility are largely
determined by factors that are within a decision maker’s control (e.g., the complexity of
one’s statistical model; the resource-intensiveness of one’s method for identifying
estimated optima), examining the performance of an arbitrarily costly model (vs. an
arbitrarily weak model) is unlikely to be informative. Indeed, because decision makers
have an inherent incentive to minimize costs, the most representative model of credibility
is likely to be the simplest (i.e., “cheapest”) model that will serve a decision maker’s
goals. Thus, to make a case for the value of examining credibility in general, the most
informative model I can test is the simplest, least costly, and least-likely to be informative
model that a decision maker might reasonably apply.
Following from this line of reasoning, the research presented in this dissertation
will test the performance of a credibility model that uses (a) the aggregation method
developed by Baron et al. (2014) to identify estimated optima; and (b) a simple, maineffects-only approach to linear regression to relate estimated optima to an individual’s
SPJs. For simplicity, I will refer to this model as the linear credibility framework, and to
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the measures it produces (i.e., the empirical estimates of this model’s intercept, slope, and
standard error) as linear credibility estimates. In practice, this model is among the
simplest that a decision maker could devise. However, thanks to the estimated optima
used in this model, it is not necessarily an unrealistic one in terms of either (a) the types
and amount of data that are necessary to deploy it; or (b) the expected validity of its
estimated optima.
Indeed, in simulation studies, Baron et al.’s (2014) aggregation method (and
others like it: e.g., Satopää et al., 2014) have been shown to produce remarkably precise
crowd forecasts. In Baron et al.’s (2014) study, this was accomplished by statistically
correcting for the effects of individual-level regression on simple crowd averages: i.e.,
the empirical tendency for individuals to shrink their estimates towards 0.50 when
missing key pieces of information. By adjusting for this tendency, Baron et al.’s model
(drawn from a sample of 100 simulated judgments) was able to produce fitted-values
(i.e., estimated optima) that were never more than 0.005 units away from the simulation’s
“true” probability values, as measured on the probability scale. Thus, while unlikely to
capture nuanced differences in credibility, the linear credibility framework is likely to
provide an informative lower-bound for the performance of empirical models of
credibility.

What to Expect from the Linear Credibility Framework
Due to its simplicity, the linear credibility framework is unlikely to be an
especially descriptive (or ecologically valid) model of credibility. Indeed, from a
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theoretical perspective, the linear credibility framework presents a variety of weaknesses
that decision makers may be reluctant to ignore. In most cases, for example, decision
makers have little basis for speculating about the nature of the relationship between an
individual’s judgments and the corresponding estimated optima (i.e., in general, there is
little reason to expect one functional form to be more likely than another). Furthermore, if
such a relationship exists, there is no strong reason to believe that it will be stable or
generalizable. And finally, even if such a relationship is stable, there is no strong reason
to think that it can be estimated from an ecologically realistic sample of data. Thus, even
if the theory of credibility is sound, the value of examining it with simple statistical tools
may not be.
Despite these challenges, however, the linear credibility framework presents a
useful starting place for examining the performance of empirical models of credibility.
Specifically, because the “true” relationship between an individual’s judgments and
estimated optima is unlikely to be linear, any benefits that I uncover by adopting this
approach can be treated as an empirical lower bound for the performance of more
sophisticated (or, at the very least, better-specified) models of credibility. Thus, while I
generally do not expect the linear credibility framework to provide veridical, face-value,
or even particularly accurate measures of credibility, it is my hope that these measures
will serve as useful predictors of “skill” or “proficiency” in subjective probability
judgment— and thus, be useful to decision makers.

Estimating an Individual’s Credibility Function
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To estimate an individual’s credibility, I will regress a small sample of her SPJs
on a corresponding set of optimized crowd aggregates, calculated using the method
developed by Baron et al. (2014; see below for details). For simplicity, I will call this
regression a credibility function, as it describes the relationship between an individual’s
judgments (i.e., what she “said”) and a set of model judgements or estimated optima (i.e.,
what an observer might infer she “should have said,” or “would be justified in believing,”
given access to additional information). In an ideal scenario, both sets of judgments
would contain the same information, and an individual’s credibility function would
closely approximate identity. Thus, if fit on a suitably representative sample of data, the
various features of this model (and their departures from identity) should correspond to
the essential features of the individual’s credibility as a judge of subjective probability.
From an operational perspective, this provides us with three predictions about a
maximally credible judge. If an individual’s judgments contain the same information as
estimated optima, then his or her credibility function should have an intercept of zero, a
slope of one, and a standard error of zero. Or, to extend the analogy provided by
Birnbaum & Stegner (1979), the judgments of a maximally credible judge should not
exhibit any algebraic bias, relative to estimated optima; should indicate expertise in the
sense that they are appropriately scaled, relative to estimated optima (an thus, exhibit a
perfect correlation); and should be consistent in the sense that their relationship to
estimated optima is both stable and descriptive at the judge × domain level. For the
purposes of the present research, therefore, an individual i will be said to be more
consistent in subjective probability judgment to the extent that the standard error of her
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credibility function ( ) is close to zero; less biased to the extent that the estimated
intercept ( ) is close to zero; and more expert to the extent that the estimated slope ( )
is close to 1.2
As the term credibility implies, each of these measures is intended to represent a
different aspect of the extent to which an individual’s judgments should be taken at face
value. Due to the properties of the probability scale, however, several statistical
transformations will be necessary to ensure that estimates of bias can be meaningfully
interpreted. Specifically, because the probability scale is bounded at 0 and 1, linear
regression is (a) an inappropriate descriptive model for probabilistic data; and (b)
unlikely to provide face-valid estimates of bias because its intercept reflects an
unrepresentative case — namely, the difference between an individual’s SPJs and
estimated optima when estimated optima are equal to (a probability of) zero. In addition,
there are many cases where SPJs are coded to reflect an individual’s beliefs about the
(subjectively) more likely outcome of a binary event. When dealing with such data, it is
impossible for SPJs to fall below 0.5 and therefore nonsensical to discuss the case where
estimated optima are equal to zero.
To resolve these issues, it will be necessary to (a) ensure that all SPJs are coded
on a 0-1 scale (i.e., that they reflect an individual’s beliefs about the likelihood of a given
outcome rather than the most likely outcome of a binary event); and (b) estimate bias,
expertise, and consistency after converting all SPJs (and estimated optima) to log-odds.

2

Note that the use of the terms bias and expertise in this research are borrowed from the existing literature
on source credibility (e.g., Birnbaum & Stegner, 1979).
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By applying these transformations, SPJs ranging from 0-1 probability can be mapped
onto a continuous, unbounded scale with a log-odds of zero corresponding to a
probability of 0.5. As such, estimating credibility in log-odds space confers several
advantages. First, linear regression is now an appropriate model for describing log-odds
data; and second, the intercept of such a regression now describes the difference between
an individual’s SPJs and estimated optima at a value corresponding to a probability of 0.5
— i.e., the average value along the 0-1 probability scale. As such, estimates of bias
derived from linear regression in log-odds space can be directly (and intuitively)
interpreted as face-valid descriptions of the expected arithmetic difference between an
individual’s judgments and the corresponding estimated optimum, and estimates of
expertise and consistency can be interpreted in the same manner as before (with the single
exception that all three components of credibility are now measured on the log-odds
scale).
Despite these advantages, however, it is still an empirical question whether linear
regression can serve as an adequate model of credibility. Indeed, because the linear
credibility framework is built on several rather fragile assumptions (e.g., stability;
linearity; the validity of estimated optima), it is essential to demonstrate that linear
regression can provide valid and/or informative estimates of credibility. As a proof-ofconcept, therefore, I will begin with a series of simulations. Following the procedures
described below, I will first evaluate the validity3 of credibility estimates in simulated

3

I will not examine the reliability of credibility estimates in Study 1 because reliability is strongly
influenced by the a priori error parameters used in simulation. Because the ranges of these errors are
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data, and then examine the degree to which credibility-based recalibration can be used to
improve (i.e., increase the accuracy and/or validity of) simulated judgments.

Study 1: Linear Credibility Estimation with Simulated Data
To determine whether the linear credibility framework can provide useful and/or
valid estimates of credibility in complex decision environments, I conducted a series of
simulations. In each simulation, I generated 100 sets of “subjective probability
judgments” by applying four types of error to a set of known (i.e., a priori) probability
values. Across simulations, I varied the magnitude of these errors according to a [10 × 5
× 9 × 7] factorial design (see below). In total, this yielded 3150 unique simulations, each
of which utilized a different combination of error parameters. For simplicity, I will refer
to each simulation as a “forecaster,” as each combination of error parameters was
intended to simulate the SPJs of a unique individual in a given decision environment.
The purpose of these simulations was to examine the typical performance of the
linear credibility framework across all 3150 forecasters. For simplicity, I will break my
discussion of this study’s results into two analyses, each of which examines a different
aspect of the credibility estimation procedure and answers different questions about its
effects.

arbitrary, it is likely that some or all of the simulated decision environments in Study 1 are unrealistically
noisy. In such environments, it is uninteresting to note that credibility estimates are unreliable, as all
information in the environment is unreliable. Thus, I will postpone my examinations of reliability until
Chapter 2.
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1. In Analysis 1a, I examined the validity of bootstrapped credibility estimates ( ,
, and

) as measures of the a priori error parameters used in simulation. Given

the complexity of Study 1’s decision environment, it was unlikely that linear
credibility estimates would recover an individual’s “true” credibility values in this
analysis (i.e., it was unlikely that linear credibility estimates would be especially
accurate or face-valid measures of bias, expertise, and consistency). In principle,
however, the strength of the covariation between each pair of variables (i.e.,
and a priori bias;

and a priori expertise;

and a priori noise, respectively)

should provide a preliminary indication of the linear credibility framework’s
robustness. Thus, the purpose of Analysis 1a was to shed light on the extent to
which simple statistical models can be used to model credibility.

2. In Analysis 1b, I used credibility information to recalibrate each forecaster’s SPJs,
out-of-sample. To do so, I leveraged the mathematical relationship captured by
each forecaster’s credibility function as a means of “correcting-for” or “undoing”
the errors and biases it purportedly describes. If this procedure can be used to
systematically improve the accuracy of a forecaster’s SPJs out-of-sample, then it
is reasonable to conclude that the linear credibility framework captured genuine
information about individual-level tendencies towards error and bias. Thus, the
purpose of Analysis 1b was to shed light on the strength and practical value of the
information provided by the linear credibility framework.
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Taken together, these two analyses were intended to provide a preliminary,
empirical basis for determining whether linear regression can provide valid and/or useful
estimates of credibility, even in decision environments where it is too simple to measure
errors and biases veridically.

Method
Design. To simulate the judgments of 3150 hypothetical forecasters, four types of
error were applied to a set of known (i.e., a priori) probabilities according to a [10 × 5 ×
9 × 7] factorial design: noise = {0, 1, …, 9}, which corresponded to the standard
deviation of a normally distributed, additive, random shock applied to each judgment;
regression = {0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1}, which corresponded to a multiplicative constant c
describing each forecaster’s tendency to shrink his or her judgments toward 0.50 in the
face of incomplete information; bias = {-1.0, -0.75, …, 1}, which corresponded to a
systematic, additive error in the numerical expression of a forecaster’s beliefs in log-odds
space; and expertise = {0.25, 0.50, …, 1.75}, which corresponded to the validity of a
forecaster’s judgments as a predictor of aggregate judgments in log-odds space,
expressed as a multiplicative constant.

Procedure. In each of the 3150 simulations, I began by generating a set of
optimized aggregate judgments (i.e., estimated optima) from a noisy “crowd” of 100
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simulated forecasters. To do so, I followed the exact procedure4 developed by Baron et
al. in their 2014 paper:

1. Generate 100 “signals,” corresponding to a set of “optimal” probability
judgments, given the information in the decision environment (for a discussion of
the assumptions underlying this assertion, see: Baron et al., 2014). For the
purposes of simulation, these judgments correspond to values ranging from 0.500
to 0.995 in increments of 0.005.

2. Transform these values to log-odds using the standard logit link function. These
values now range from 0 to 5.29.5

3. Replicate this vector of signals 100 times, yielding a 100-by-100 matrix. Each
column of this matrix is identical to the original vector of signals, and each row
comprises 100 instances of a given signal value.

4. Add noise to each row (i.e., to each signal value). The basic noise vector in each
case consists of 100 normal quantiles ranging from 0.005 to 0.995 in increments
of 0.01. This vector is normally distributed, and ranges from -2.58 to 2.58. For

4
Note, the steps for generating estimated optima in this section are largely paraphrased from Baron et al.
(2014).
5
This transformation is necessary to ensure that the credibility estimation procedure does not violate the
assumption of symmetric errors. Because probabilities are strictly bounded by 0 and 1, estimating
credibility in probability space would limit the size of allowable errors at the extremes (likely resulting in a
violation of the assumption of symmetry). This problem can be solved by estimating credibility in log-odds
space, where non-certain probability values are mapped onto the real numbers (Baron et al., 2014; Satopää
et al., 2014).
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each simulation, this vector is multiplied by the noise parameter (i.e., a constant
ranging from 0 to 9, which represents the standard deviation of the noise
distribution for each simulation) and added to each row of the signal matrix. The
entries in this matrix now represent the noisy judgments of 100 forecasters in logodds space, prior to any regression (see: Baron et al., 2014).

5. Multiply the entire matrix by a constant c, representing the amount of regression.
For different simulations, c takes values of {0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, and 1.0},6 where a
value of 1.0 corresponds to no regression.
6. Transform these judgments7 back to probabilities.

7. Aggregate the judgments in each row by averaging.

8. Find the squared deviation of the mean of each row from its corresponding signal
value.

9. Use the following extremization function to estimate the optimal transformation
constant a, that minimizes the sum of these squared deviations (this is done to

6
Baron et al. (2014) list the values of c as {0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, and 0.8} (p. 138, emphasis added). However,
the inclusion of zero is likely a typo, as this would yield a matrix in which all predictions are zero. Given
that Baron et al. later discuss a condition in which judgments are subjected to “no regression,” (p. 139), we
assume that Baron et al. intended to present the values of c as {0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, and 1}. This assertion is
corroborated by their R code (p. 144).
7
Baron et al. (2014) lists this step as “Transform these aggregates back to probabilities” (p. 138, emphasis
added). However, both their procedure and their R code suggest that this may be a typo, as the judgments in
the 100-by-100 matrix are not aggregated until step 7.
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optimally correct for judgmental regression. For a detailed discussion of
regression and its origins, see Baron et al., 2014).

( )=

(

)

,

(1)

Where p is one of the aggregate probability judgments calculated in step 7,
and ( ) is an optimized aggregate.

10. As an additional step not discussed in Baron et al. (2014), apply this optimal
transformation to the aggregate probabilities calculated in step 7, and re-transform
to log-odds to arrive at a set of estimated optima.

I take the estimates calculated in step 10 to represent the optimized wisdom of a
noisy and heterogeneous “crowd” of 100 forecasters, given parameters for noise and
regression in the decision environment. For each simulation (i.e., for each forecaster),
these values were used as the near-objective criteria against which I assessed credibility.
For each forecaster, I then generated a calibration sample for his or her credibility
function according to the following procedure:

11. Generate a vector of 100 “signals” and transform to log-odds, as in steps 1 and 2
above.
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12. Adjust each judgment in this vector by a random additive shock, drawn from a
normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation equal to the noise
parameter of the relevant simulation.

13. Multiply each judgment by a constant corresponding to the forecaster’s expertise.

14. Adjust each judgment by an additive constant, corresponding to the forecaster’s
bias.8

15. And finally, multiply each judgment by a constant corresponding to the
forecaster’s degree of regression.

For each forecaster i, these calibration data were then regressed on the
corresponding estimated optima calculated in step 10, yielding a credibility function with
estimated coefficients corresponding to bias (
corresponding to consistency (
( )=

∗

∗

∗

) and expertise (

∗

), and a standard error

):
+

∗ ∗

+ ,

ε ~ N(0,

∗

),

(2)

Where i is a forecaster; the asterisk symbol (*) indicates that an estimate
was derived from a forecaster’s calibration sample;

∗

is a vector of log-

odds transformed judgments that correspond to forecaster i’s beliefs about

8

Note that the effect of bias was intentionally applied after the effect of expertise to preserve the
independence of the two effects on a forecaster’s final judgments. From a psychological perspective, this
type of bias corresponds to a systematic error in response formation rather than in perception.
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the events associated with the original vector of signals; ( ) corresponds
to the vector of estimated optima calculated in step 9; and

∗

,

∗

, and

∗

are the estimated parameters of participant i’s credibility function, as
defined above.

After estimating credibility, I then generated 100 additional samples of judgments
(i.e., 100 “prediction samples”) for each forecaster and used bootstrap estimation
procedures to evaluate the typical performance of the linear credibility framework:

16. Using the process outlined in steps 11 through 15, generate one-hundred
prediction samples for each forecaster i.9

17. For each forecaster, fit a new credibility function to the judgments in each
prediction sample n and record the resulting credibility estimates (i.e.,
and

,

,

).

18. For each forecaster, recalibrate judgments in each prediction sample n according
to the linear relationship captured by his or her original credibility function,

9

Note that while each of these 100 predictions samples is not technically a “subset” of a forecaster’s SPJs,
they can be thought of as a subset of the SPJs that a given set of simulation parameters can plausibly
produce. As such, this step is designed to simulate the conventional bootstrapping procedure of random
sampling within a set of observations (with replacement across trials).
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estimated prior to step 16 (i.e., “plug” a forecaster’s vector of judgments

into

Eq. 2 to estimate ( )). 10

19. After recalibration, record the impact of step 18 by comparing the accuracy of
judgments before and after recalibration (for a specific list of outcome measures,
see Analysis 1b).

20. After completing steps 16-19 for all forecasters, average across the sampling
distributions generated in steps 17 and 19 to calculate (a) bootstrapped credibility
estimates for each forecaster (for use in Analysis 1a); and (b) bootstrapped
summary-statistics representing the typical effects of recalibration for each
forecaster (for use in Analysis 1b).

Results
Fit of estimated optima. Similar to the results of Baron et al. (2014), the
estimated optima calculated in each simulation demonstrated a remarkable
correspondence to the original 100-item vector of signals generated in step 1 (prior to retransforming these estimates to log-odds). Across all 3150 simulations, the mean sum of
squared deviations between estimated optima and the original vector of signals was 4.43
* 10-5 (Mdn. = 9.34 × 10-6; SD = 8.96 × 10-5; Max = 4.17 × 10-4). Given this fit, I

10

Note, only one credibility function was estimated for each forecaster, and all 100 samples were
recalibrated using the same parameters, ∗ and ∗ (see: Eq. 2). This was done to ensure that all instances of
recalibration were conducted on out-of-sample judgments without having to partition each sample into a
calibration sample and a hold-out sample.
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concluded that these estimated optima would serve as a suitable standard for estimating
credibility.

Analysis 1a: validity of credibility estimates. In most cases, bias, expertise, and
consistency are unlikely to be independent components of credibility. Indeed, in Study 1,
the additive effects of noise and bias were explicitly moderated by the multiplicative
effects of regression and expertise. As a result, linear regression is unlikely to be a
perfect tool for modeling credibility and should not be expected to produce credibility
estimates (i.e., estimated coefficients corresponding to the credibility function’s intercept,
slope, and standard error) that closely approximate the a priori error parameters (bias,
expertise, and noise) used in simulation.
As a practical matter, however, linear credibility estimates (i.e.,

∗

,

∗

, and

∗

)

do not need to be scalar measures of “skill” or “proficiency” to be useful. Instead,
because uncertain decision environments provide so little basis for defining “good”
judgment, credibility estimates are useful to the extent that they allow decision makers to
distinguish between “better” vs. “worse” judges of subjective probability. In general,
therefore, the utility of the linear credibility framework is defined by its ability to predict
“skill” or “proficiency” in subjective probability judgment, rather than its ability to
measure the same. In Study 1, I evaluated this predictive validity by examining the extent
to which bootstrapped credibility estimates were correlated with and/or uniquely
predicted by the complementary error parameters used in simulation (i.e., a forecaster’s
“true” degree of credibility). Table 1 shows simple correlations between these two sets of
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variables, and Tables 2-4 show the results of exploratory linear regressions where
simulation parameters were used to predict bootstrapped measures of bias, expertise, and
consistency, respectively.

Table 1
[Simulated data]: Simple correlations between simulation parameters and bootstrapped
estimates of credibility.
Simulation Parameter
(Manipulated)
Credibility Estimate
(Measured)

Noise

Regression

Bias

Expertise

Bootstrapped Alpha:
(Bias)

0.54***

0.00

-0.33***

0.00

Bootstrapped Beta:
(Expertise)

-0.12***

-0.42***

0.00

-0.49***

Bootstrapped Sigma:
(Consistency)

-0.33***

0.02

0.00

0.00

Significance levels: * p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001
Note: because credibility estimates are intended to describe the linear transformations
required to “undo” the errors applied to judgments in simulation, negative correlations
are to be expected between credibility estimates and complementary simulation
parameters.

Table 2
[Simulated data]: Predictors of bootstrapped alpha (i.e., bias; ).
Simulation Parameters
Est.
(Manipulated)
Coefficient
SE
t-value

p-value

(Intercept)

0.55

0.03

18.82

<.001***

Noise

0.11

0.00

38.96

<.001***

Regression

0.00

0.03

0.11

0.92
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Bias

-0.32

0.01

-24.21

<.001***

Expertise

0.00

0.02

0.00

1.00

Significance levels: * p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001
Note: because credibility estimates are intended to describe the linear transformations
required to “undo” the errors applied to judgments in simulation, negative relationships
are to be expected between credibility estimates and complementary simulation
parameters.

Table 3
[Simulated data]: Predictors of bootstrapped beta (i.e., expertise; ).
Simulation Parameters
Est.
(Manipulated)
Coefficient
SE
t-value

p-value

(Intercept)

0.26

0.00

60.23

<.001***

Noise

0.00

0.00

-9.00

<.001***

Regression

-0.14

0.00

-31.24

<.001***

Bias

0.00

0.00

-0.08

0.94

Expertise

-0.09

0.00

-36.07

<.001***

Significance levels: * p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001
Note: because credibility estimates are intended to describe the linear transformations
required to “undo” the errors applied to judgments in simulation, negative relationships
are to be expected between credibility estimates and complementary simulation
parameters.

Table 4
[Simulated data]: Predictors of bootstrapped sigma (i.e., consistency;
Simulation Parameters
Est.
(Manipulated)
Coefficient
SE
t-value

).
p-value

(Intercept)

3.24 × 10-2

0.00

39.14

<.001***

Noise

-1.64 × 10-3

0.00

-19.68

<.001***
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Regression

1.07 × 10-3

0.00

1.26

0.21

Bias

8.88 × 10-6

0.00

0.02

0.98

Expertise

-7.39 × 10-5

0.00

-0.16

0.89

Significance levels: * p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001
Note: because credibility estimates are intended to describe the linear transformations
required to “undo” the errors applied to judgments in simulation, negative relationships
are to be expected between credibility estimates and complementary simulation
parameters.

Discussion. The results of Analysis 1a demonstrate that a simple, main-effectsonly approach to linear regression (i.e., the linear credibility framework) can provide
decision makers with useful information about who is likely to be a “better” vs. “worse”
judge of subjective probability. Specifically, Tables 1-4 indicate that the linear credibility
framework can produce estimates that are predictive of “skill” or “proficiency” in
subjective probability judgment, and that all covary with the expected simulation
parameters. In practice, the strengths of these relationships were insufficient to conclude
that credibility estimates should be interpreted as face-value measures of credibility.
However, because Study 1’s decision environment was considerably more complex than
the method used to model it (i.e., Analysis 1a’s simulated decision environment imposed
two- and three-way interactions between a priori error parameters, whereas credibility
was estimated with a main-effects-only model), the existence of these relationships
suggests a robust predictive validity between linear credibility estimates and the
constructs they are intended to represent.
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When examined in terms of simple correlations (Table 1), these predictive
relationships can be seen in (a) the unique covariation between a priori bias and
estimated bias ( ); (b) the unique covariation between a priori expertise and estimated
expertise ( ); and (c) the moderate, appropriately-signed relationship between estimated
consistency ( ) and a priori noise. In the corresponding regression analyses (Tables 2-4),
similar relationships can be observed in the separable effects of a priori bias and a priori
expertise in the prediction of estimated bias ( ) and estimated expertise ( ),
respectively (Tables 2 and 3); and the fact that estimated consistency ( ) is uniquely
predicted by a priori noise (Table 4).
Taken together, these effects suggest that linear regression can provide useful
information about an individual’s relative degree of bias, expertise, and consistency in
subjective probability judgment. Strictly speaking, of course, the strength and separability
of these effects was diminished by the fact that the linear credibility framework was too
simple to capture the interactive features of Study 1’s decision environment. However,
the presence of systematic, sensible relationships between linear credibility estimates and
the complementary simulation parameters (i.e.,
expertise;

and a priori bias;

and a priori

and a priori noise, respectively) suggests that the linear credibility

framework is likely to be a robust— albeit oversimplified— tool for examining the
validity of SPJs.

Analysis 1b: empirical effects of recalibration. To assess the practical value of
the linear credibility framework, I examined the impact of credibility-based recalibration,
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both within- and between-subjects. To do this, I recorded a variety of outcome measures
after each instance of recalibration (step 19, above), most of which pertained to the
absolute difference between a forecaster’s judgments and the corresponding estimated
optima. For simplicity, I will call this difference absolute judgment error, or AJE. In each
prediction sample (for each forecaster), I recorded the following summaries of AJE:


The proportion of individual judgments for which recalibration improved
(reduced) AJE;



The mean pairwise difference in AJE due to recalibration;11



The effect-size (Cohen’s d) associated with pairwise changes in AJE due
to recalibration;



And a binary indicator of whether recalibration improved (reduced) the
sample’s mean AJE.12

At the conclusion of all 3150 simulations, these values were averaged across each
forecaster’s 100 prediction samples, yielding four summary-statistics per forecaster. The
four statistics were as follows, each of which represents a different aspect of the typical13
or expected effect of recalibration on a given forecaster’s judgments:

11

Note that this measure (i.e., the mean difference) is mathematically equivalent to the difference in mean
AJE, due to recalibration. Thus, I will only discuss the former and not the latter when presenting results.
12
In all cases, binary indicators were coded as “1” if the stated event occurred, and “0” if it did not.
13
I will use the word “typical” in this chapter to indicate bootstrapped averages, calculated over each
forecaster’s 100 prediction samples. This is done to prevent confusion in instances where “typical” values
are bootstrapped averages of sample-level means.
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The typical proportion of forecaster i's judgments for which recalibration
improved (reduced) AJE.



The typical pairwise change in forecaster i's AJE due to recalibration;



The typical effect-size (Cohen’s d) of recalibration on forecaster i's AJE;



And proportion of prediction samples in which recalibration improved
(reduced) forecaster i's mean AJE.

These summary-statistics were then tabulated across all 3150 forecasters and
served as the primary dependent variables (DVs) for the tests that follow. Figures 1-4
show the empirical distributions of these DVs across forecasters, and Figure 5 shows a
visual comparison of mean AJEs before and after recalibration. Table 5 provides
descriptive statistics for each of the distributions represented in Figures 1-4, and Table 6
shows the results of Wilcoxon signed-rank tests examining the null hypothesis that the
median of each distribution does not differ from chance (represented by the red dotted
lines in Figures 1-4).

Figure 1
[Simulated data]: Typical proportion of judgments for which recalibration improved
(reduced) AJE.
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Figure 2
[Simulated data]: Typical pairwise change in AJE (pre – post), due to recalibration.

Note: positive values indicate an improvement (reduction) in AJE.

Figure 3
[Simulated data]: Typical effect-size (Cohen’s d) of recalibration on AJE.
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Note: positive values indicate an improvement (reduction) in AJE.

Figure 4
[Simulated data]: Proportion of samples in which recalibration improved (reduced)
mean AJE.

Figure 5
[Simulated data]: Mean AJE, before and after recalibration.
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Note: smaller values indicate more accurate judgements (smaller errors), on average.

Table 5
[Simulated data]: Typical effects of credibility-based recalibration, summarized across
forecasters.
Between-Subjects Summary Statistics
Outcome Measure
Typical proportion of judgments for
which recalibration improved AJE.
Typical pairwise change in AJE
(pre - post), due to recalibration.
Typical effect (Cohen's d) of
recalibration on AJE.
Proportion of samples in which
recalibration improved mean AJE.

Mean

Mdn.

SD

Min.

Max.

79%

78%

12%

0%

100%

16.25
× 10-2

16.13
× 10-2

7.71
× 10-2

-0.32
× 10-2

40.50
× 10-2

0.90

0.78

0.63

-2.19

6.37

100%

100%

5%

0%

100%

Table 6
[Simulated data]: Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, assessing whether credibility-based
recalibration typically improved (reduced) AJE beyond chance.
55

Outcome Measure

H0

Typical proportion of judgments for
which recalibration improved AJE.

Mdn. = 0.5

Prop. Mass
> H0
100%

Typical pairwise change in AJE
(pre - post), due to recalibration.

Mdn. = 0

Typical effect (Cohen's d) of
recalibration on AJE.
Proportion of samples in which
recalibration improved mean AJE.

Stat. (V)

p-value

4.96 ×
106

<.001***

100%

4.96 ×
106

<.001***

Mdn. = 0

100%

4.96 ×
106

<.001***

Mdn. = 0.5

100%

4.96 ×
106

<.001***

Significance levels: * p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001

Discussion. The results of Analysis 1b demonstrate that credibility-based
recalibration can be used to increase the accuracy of SPJs across a wide variety of
decision environments. Across 3150 forecasters, the typical effect of credibility-based
recalibration was to significantly improve (reduce) AJE, regardless of whether this
outcome was defined in terms of (a) the typical proportion of judgments for which AJE
improved; (b) the typical pairwise change in AJE; (c) the typical effect-size (Cohen’s d)
associated with pairwise changes in AJE; or (d) the proportion of samples in which mean
AJE improved. Indeed, as can be seen in Figures 1-4, there were very few cases in which
the effects of recalibration were negative, with less than 0.5% of observations falling
below chance in each distribution (see also: Table 6).
In addition to being widely beneficial, the results of Analysis 1b also indicate that
the expected effect-size of credibility-based recalibration is likely to be substantial. When
considered on a study-wide level, Analysis 1b suggests that decision makers who employ
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credibility-based recalibration under Study-1-like conditions can expect an average of
79% of an individual’s judgments to improve; for the AJE of each judgment to improve
by an average of 16.25 points on the probability scale; for mean AJE to improve in 100%
of samples; and for AJE to improve by an average of 0.9 standard deviations, overall (for
additional descriptive statistics, see: Table 5). In practice, of course, the generalizability
of these results will depend on the degree to which the decision environments simulated
in Study 1 are representative of the real world. However, because the positive effects of
credibility-based recalibration were observed across a broad range of simulated
environments, Analysis 1b suggests that the linear credibility framework may serve as a
widely applicable tool for improving SPJs.

General Discussion
In Study 1, I employed a simulation procedure that purposefully failed to model
noise, regression, bias, and expertise as independent effects on judgment. As a result
(and as expected), the linear credibility framework produced suboptimal results in two
ways: (a) the bootstrapped credibility estimates examined in Analysis 1a did not uniquely
covary their complementary simulation parameters; and (b) the strength of the
covariation between each pair of variables (

and a priori bias;

and a priori expertise;

and a priori noise, respectively) did not suggest that linear credibility estimates were
pure, face-valid measures of bias, expertise, or consistency. Nevertheless, the results of
Study 1 demonstrate that linear regression can provide both valid and useful estimates of
credibility.
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In Analysis 1a, the predictive validity of linear credibility estimates was
established by observing that estimated bias ( ), estimated expertise ( ), and estimated
consistency ( ) systematically covaried with the complementary error parameters used in
simulation. Though the strength of the covariation between each pair was only moderate,
the presence (and relative independence) of these relationships demonstrate the
robustness of the linear credibility framework as a tool for examining credibility. Despite
an intentionally too-complex decision environment, the results of Analysis 1a indicate
that the bare-bones assumptions of the linear credibility framework were sufficient to
identify valid, first-order approximations of credibility in simulated data. As a result, it
stands to reason that linear credibility estimates might help decision makers evaluate the
validity of SPJs (or sources of SPJs) across a wide variety of ecological conditions.
In Analysis 1b, the utility of the linear credibility framework was demonstrated by
using credibility information to recalibrate SPJs. Across 3150 simulated forecasters,
credibility-based recalibration significantly reduced absolute judgment error (AJE) in
nearly all cases. This effect was evident across four outcome measures, each of which
represented a different approach to summarizing AJE. Indeed, regardless of whether one
chose to look at the average proportion of judgments improved, the average pairwise
improvement in judgments, or the average improvement in mean AJE, the results of
Analysis 1b were unanimous in demonstrating that credibility-based recalibration can be
used to improve SPJs. In addition, Analysis 1b demonstrated that the expected effects of
credibility-based recalibration can be substantial. Though it remains to be seen whether
the effect-sizes observed in Study 1 are representative of the real world, the sheer breadth
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of decision environments examined in Study 1 provides grounds for optimism that
credibility-based recalibration might serve as a general tool for improving SPJs.

Conclusions
The results of Study 1 demonstrate that a main-effects-only approach to linear
regression can be used to model credibility in simulated data. It is evident from this study
that the linear credibility framework is unlikely to provide face-valid measures of bias,
expertise, and consistency in complex, ecologically-representative decision environments.
However, it is also clear that the linear credibility framework can provide decision
makers with: (a) general information about individual-level errors and biases in
subjective probability judgment; and (b) concrete indicators of who is likely to be a
“better” vs. “worse” judge of subjective probability. As a proof-of-concept, therefore, the
results of Study 1 suggest that it is plausible for simple statistical models to provide
decision makers with insight about a judge’s “quality” (i.e., relative validity) as a source
of probabilistic information— even in the absence of an objective standard. Thus,
practical applications of the linear credibility framework should be explored.
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INTERLUDE

CREDIBILITY ESTIMATION WITH EMPIRICAL DATA: A
METHODOLOGICAL OVERVIEW OF STUDIES 2A-2C AND 3A-3C

For the remainder of this dissertation, I will discuss the applicability of the linear
credibility framework to three sets of real-world data. As in Study 1, the purpose of this
research will be to (a) determine whether simple, linear models of credibility can be used
to identify meaningful indicators of “skill” or “proficiency” in subjective probability
judgment; and (b) to test whether this information can be used to improve the accuracy of
subjective probability judgments (SJPs) out-of-sample. Because these aims represent two
sides of the same coin — i.e., because both depend on the extent to which empirical
models of credibility can capture information about errors and biases in human judgment
— both can be probed with similar analytic procedures. Much like Chapter 1, therefore,
the research in Chapters 2 and 3 will involve a single, general procedure but will be
presented as a series of discrete analyses for the sake of clarity.
To help the reader navigate these chapters, this interlude will be dedicated to a
methodological overview of the studies presented in Chapters 2 and 3 — namely, Studies
2a-2c and 3a-3c. In the sections that follow, I will begin with a brief discussion of the
structure and organization of the research presented in Chapters 2 and 3. After this, I will
describe the general method used for Studies 2a-2c and 3a-3c, including detailed
descriptions of the data-sets I analyzed and the protocols used to collect them. Finally, I
will provide a detailed description of the General Procedure used for Studies 2a-2c and
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will conclude with a brief, conceptual discussion of the ways in which these studies differ
from Study 1. After discussing these topics, I will proceed to Chapter 2, where I examine
the reliability and validity of linear credibility estimates derived from empirical data.

On the Structure and Organization of Chapters 2 and 3
In Chapters 2 and 3, research findings will be organized according to three main
criteria: the broad research question to which they pertain (a criterion that also
corresponds to the chapter in which they appear); the data-set from which they were
drawn; and the narrow, empirical question that they address. To help readers orient
themselves to these criteria, section headings in Chapters 2 and 3 will include a threelevel naming convention that encodes all three types of information:

1. At the first level, broad research questions will be indicated by Arabic numerals.
Because broad research questions are separated into chapters, this level can also
be understood as a signifier of chapter, with all results and discussions related to
Chapter 2 (reliability and validity of credibility estimates) being indicated by the
number “2” and all results and discussions related to Chapter 3 (the typical effects
of credibility-based recalibration) being indicated by the number “3.”

2. At the second level, data-sets will be indicated by lowercase English letters. With
the help of this information, research within chapters will be organized into
studies (i.e., treatments that use specific data-sets to address a broad research
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question), each of which will be designated by a two-character combination of
one Arabic numeral and one English letter (e.g., “2b”). In Chapters 2 and 3,
studies will be conducted across three empirical data-sets (i.e., data-sets “a,” “b,”
and “c”), each of which I describe in the “Source” sections of the General
Method, below.

3. At the third level, empirical research questions will be indicated by lowercase
Roman numerals. With the help of this information, studies in Chapters 2 and 3
will be subdivided into analyses (i.e., discrete empirical investigations that
leverage a specific data-set to address a broad research question), each of which
will be designated by a three-component combination of an Arabic numeral, an
English letter, and a Roman numeral (e.g., “2b.iii”). Because the numerical
designation of each analysis is arbitrary, the title of each analysis will also contain
(a) a plain English description of the empirical question at hand; and (b) a brief,
descriptive parenthetical. In all cases where an analysis (or study) is referenced
out of context, this parenthetical will be included to remind the reader of the
treatment’s substantive content.

Taken together, the three components of this naming convention (and the
accompanying parenthetical) can be used to remind the reader which study or analysis is
currently being discussed. Consider, for example, the designation “2c.i.” Based on this
heading, a reader can infer that this section pertains to the first analysis (“i”) of the
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reliability and/or validity (“2”) of credibility estimates derived from data-set “c.” Or, in
simpler terms, this section refers to the first analysis of Study 2c, which — as the title of
the analysis indicates — is concerned with a narrow, empirical question: Under what
conditions are credibility estimates reliable? (PHL reliability). For the reader’s
convenience, this title also includes the parenthetical designation “(PHL reliability),”
which indicates that the analysis concerns the reliability of the “PHL” data-set — a
descriptive shorthand that links the arbitrary designation “c” to its substantive content
(here, judgments from the Philadelphia air temperature study; for more information on
data-sets, see below).

General Method for Studies 2a-2c and 3a-3c
Data. Data for Studies 2a-2c and 3a-3c were drawn from three sources: (a) the
Good Judgment Project, which gathered over a million SPJs during the course of four
year-long geopolitical forecasting tournaments; (b) an online forecasting tournament that
asked participants to make predictions about the outcomes of games in the 2017 NCAA
Division-I Men’s Basketball Championship (i.e., the 2017 “March Madness”
tournament); and (c) a brief, online survey that asked participants to express their beliefs
about the likelihood of various air temperatures in Philadelphia during the months of
January and July.

Source A: The Good Judgment Project.
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Overview. The Good Judgment Project (GJP) consisted of four year-long
forecasting tournaments sponsored by the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects
Activity (i.e., IARPA; the research and development wing of the U.S. Intelligence
Community). In each tournament, amateur forecasters were recruited from sources such
as professional societies, university alumni associations, research centers, science blogs,
popular media sources (e.g., magazines and news websites), and by word of mouth. To
participate, forecasters were required to have a bachelor’s degree and to complete a series
of psychological and political knowledge tests. After fulfilling these requirements,
participants were randomly assigned to experimental conditions that varied by teaming
(individuals vs. collaborative groups), training (training in probabilistic reasoning vs. no
training), forecast elicitation method (survey vs. prediction market), and several other
factors (for a complete summary of the Good Judgment Project’s protocol, see: Mellers,
Stone, Atanasov, Rohrbaugh, Metz, Ungar, Bishop, Horowitz, Merkle, & Tetlock, 2015;
Mellers, Ungar, Baron, Ramos, Gürçay, Fincher, Scott, Moore, Atanasov, Swift, Murray,
Stone, & Tetlock, 2014).
After being assigned to conditions, forecasters were given access to an online
portal where they could (a) view and respond to geopolitical forecasting questions; (b)
interact with teammates (if applicable); and (c) view a variety of leaderboards displaying
the most accurate forecasters (or teams) in each condition. An example question from the
fourth year of the tournament was “Will Syria’s president Bashar al-Assad vacate office
before 10 June, 2015?” In the survey conditions, forecasters responded to this sort of
question with numerical probabilities, where a response of 1.0 indicated certainty in the
69

answer “yes.” While questions remained open, participants were encouraged to update
their predictions as often as they desired. When a question resolved (i.e., when an
outcome was observed), the accuracy of a forecaster’s judgment was assessed using the
Brier score — a strictly proper scoring rule that incentivizes forecasters to provide their
true beliefs (Brier, 1950). For additional details about the design, procedures, and
findings of the Good Judgment Project, see: Mellers, Stone, Murray, Minster, Rohrbaugh,
Bishop, Chen, Baker, Hou, Horowitz, Ungar, & Tetlock (2015b); Mellers et al., 2015a;
Mellers et al., 2014. For related research, see: Cross, Ramos, Mellers, Tetlock & Scott
(2018); Friedman, Baker, Mellers, Tetlock, & Zeckhauser (2018); Mellers, Baker, Chen,
Mandel, & Tetlock (2017); Atanasov, Rescober, Stone, Swift, Servan-Schreiber, Tetlock,
Ungar, & Mellers (2017); Baron, Mellers, Tetlock, Stone, & Ungar (2014); and Satopää,
Baron, Foster, Mellers, Tetlock, & Ungar, (2014).

Sample. In Studies 2a-2c and 3a-3c, I used a sample of judgments drawn from all
four years of the Good Judgment Project. This sample was nearly identical to that used by
Friedman et al. (2018) and includes all forecasts from individuals who addressed at least
25 forecasting questions in a given year.14 All told, this sample consisted of 444,164
numerical forecasts drawn from 1,832 individuals over four years of GJP tournaments
and includes forecasts for only those questions with binary outcomes, comprising 380

14

The one difference between this sample and the sample used by Friedman et al. (2018) is that Friedman
et al.’s sample included separate SPJs for the probability that an event will occur and its complement. The
present sample excludes these complements, thereby halving the number of observations.
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questions. Within this sample, 53% of forecasters were trained in probabilistic reasoning,
44% were assigned to work in collaborative teams, and 4% were superforecasters — a
title given to the top 2% of forecasters from each tournament year (as measured by
average Brier score; for a detailed summary of superforecasters’ remarkable performance
in the GJP, see: Mellers et al., 2017; Tetlock & Gardner, 2016; Mellers et al., 2015b).
The average age of forecasters in this sample was 39.2 (Mdn. = 34.0; SD = 13.4), 85% of
forecasters were male, and 57% of forecasters had some level of advanced degree. For
clarity, all references to these data (i.e., figures, tables, and references to studies/analyses)
will be accompanied by the designation GJP.

Source B: March Madness data.
Sample. Beginning in late February 2017, participants were recruited to
participate in an online study in which they could earn up to $85 for making predictions
about the outcomes of basketball games in the 2017 NCAA Division-I Men’s Basketball
Championship (i.e., the “March Madness” tournament). Students at the University of
Pennsylvania were alerted to this study through a series of flyers, some of which were
posted in public places around campus, and other of which were delivered directly to
student organizations (e.g., fraternities, sororities, sports teams, clubs). Based on the large
number of non-student responses, it is evident that interest in this study soon spread to
other members of the community (e.g., students’ friends, coworkers, and family
members) via word of mouth. As a result, participants in this study were largely — but
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not exclusively — students from the University of Pennsylvania and individuals from the
surrounding Philadelphia area.
Among the 140 participants who provided demographic information in this study
(total number of participants = 143), the mean age was 24.3 (Mdn. = 23.0; SD = 5.6) and
44% of participants self-reported as having completed “some undergraduate” education
(0% reported no college education; 24% reported an associate’s or bachelor’s degree;
13% reported “some post-baccalaureate” education; and 19% reported an advanced
degree). In addition, 49% of participants self-identified as female (51% male; 0%
other/neither) and 50% self-identified as “white or Caucasian” (20% black or African
American; 12% East Asian; 7% Hispanic or Latinx; 5% South Asian; 5% Other; 1%
Middle Eastern; 0% Native American; 0% Pacific Islander; 0% Other Indigenous
People). All participants who completed this study were paid a baseline of $20 and were
given the opportunity to win an additional $15 for correctly predicting the outcome of a
randomly selected game. To incentivize accuracy, the three participants with the best
Brier scores (i.e., the most accurate forecasts) at the end of the study also received
performance bonuses of $50, $25, and $10 respectively. For clarity, all references to
these data (i.e., figures, tables, and references to studies/analyses) will be accompanied
by the designation MM.

Materials. From March 4th to April 3rd, 2017, participants completed 10 online
surveys. The first survey — which was sent to participants immediately after registering
— included additional information about the study, informed consent, and a short section
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asking for details related to online payment (first name, last name, and email address).
The second survey was sent to participants several days prior to the first games of the
2017 March Madness tournament (i.e., the “play-in” games). This survey included (a)
reminders about the guidelines for study participation; (b) a brief tutorial on how to
provide subjective probability judgments (for a printout of this tutorial, see Appendix B);
and (c) a list of additional resources, including: links to information about the structure
and rules of the NCAA tournament, news outlets with the latest results and projections
for the tournament, and a printable version of the tournament bracket. After reading
through these materials, participants were asked to provide predictions about the four
“play-in” games of the NCAA tournament.
When making their predictions, participants were presented with basic
information about each of the two teams that would be playing (name, tournament
seeding, date of game, regular season conference, Division-I win/loss record, and
strength of schedule according to espn.com). With this information displayed,
participants were asked to provide a prediction about which of the two teams would win
and a numerical SPJ describing their confidence in the predicted outcome. For each
game, participants also provided (a) the minimum price at which they would sell a lottery
ticket that would pay $15 if their preferred team won (and $0 otherwise); and (b) their
choice between keeping the ticket or selling it at this price, with the understanding that
one of their choices (selected at random) would be paid out for real money.15 This same

15

Note: the present research will only examine participants’ binary predictions and SPJs. It does not
address the latter two types of responses.
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basic format was used for the remaining eight surveys. At the beginning of each survey,
participants were given the opportunity to refresh their memory about any (or all) of the
resources included in the “play-in game” survey. Then, participants were asked to make
predictions about upcoming games.
Because later-round matchups were determined in real time, each of the
remaining eight surveys was sent to participants with as much lead time as possible (i.e.,
as soon as the match-ups were determined) and asked for predictions about all
determined match-ups that had not yet been played. In the third overall survey (which
included predictions about the 32 first-round games), these predictions were followed by
a battery of cognitive tests similar to those used in the GJP (for additional details, see the
Detailed Procedure section of Analysis 2a.ii (GJP validity)). In all other cases, surveys
consisted entirely of participant predictions. Over the course of the study, participants
were asked to provide predictions for all 67 games in the 2017 March Madness
tournament. On average, participants provided 59 of these predictions (Mdn. = 67; SD =
16.4). Full printouts of each of the ten surveys can be found in Appendix B.

Source C: Philadelphia air temperature data.
Sample. Participants were recruited to participate in a third study through an
online panel curated by Jonathan Baron (the principal advisor on this thesis). To expedite
the data-gathering process, this study did not include an extended battery of cognitive
tests or demographic items and was designed to be completed in about 20 minutes.
Participants were alerted to the availability of the study through a private email list and
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were offered $4 for participation. In response to this email, 76 people completed the
study, of whom 73 provided usable data.16 Among the 76 participants who completed the
study (the SPJs from the three individuals who provided “unusable” data were still
included in the calculation of estimated optima; see below), the mean age was 49.0 (Mdn.
= 49.5; SD = 12.3) and 36% self-identified as male. For clarity, all references to these
data (i.e., figures, tables, and references to studies/analyses) will be accompanied by the
designation PHL.

Materials. After agreeing to participate in the study, participants were redirected
to an online survey consisting of three sections. In the first section, participants were
provided with a brief overview of the study and instructions on how to provide SPJs. On
the same page, participants were also asked to provide their sex, age, and email address.
In the second section of the study (beginning on the next page), participants were
presented with 40 sets of forecasting questions, each of which was displayed on a
separate page. At the top of each page, participants were provided with (a) a probe
temperature; (b) the month and year during which the probe temperature was recorded;
and (c) a statement indicating that the probe temperature was the 5th [warmest/coldest]
temperature on record for the stated month (in the stated year). Across pages, probe
temperatures varied according to a 2 × 2 factorial design that manipulated rank (5th

16

Participants were excluded from analysis if their SPJs yielded inestimable credibility functions on more
than 10 bootstrap trials (for more details, see the General Method section below). In the three cases that
were excluded, this occurred because the participants in question had zero variance in their responses.
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warmest vs. 5th coldest) and month (January vs. July), as recorded at the Philadelphia
International Airport during the 10-year span between 2008 to 2017.
For each probe temperature, participants were asked to provide three numerical
SPJs. The first asked participants to estimate the probability of observing a more extreme
temperature on the following day (i.e., cooler in January and warmer in July); the second
asked participants to estimate the probability of observing a temperature 5-degrees
warmer on the following day; and the third asked participants to estimate the probability
of observing a temperature 5-degrees cooler on the following day. For example, one set
of questions was:

The 5th lowest temperature in January 2008 was 35 degrees F.
What is the probability (in %) that the next day’s temperature was lower than 35?
What is the probability that the next day’s temperature was 40 or higher?
What is the probability that the next day’s temperature was 30 or lower?

Questions were presented in calendar order, with low probe temperatures
preceding high probe temperatures for each month. After providing estimates for each
probe temperature, participants completed the final section of the study, which consisted
of the eleven-item Actively Open-Minded Thinking scale used by Baron (in press) in his
research on actively open-minded thinking in American politics (this scale is based on
previous scales developed by: Baron, Scott, Fincer, & Metz, 2015; and Haran, Ritov, &
Mellers, 2013; see also: Baron, 2008).
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General procedure. As discussed above, Studies 2a-2c and 3a-3c all examined
the real-world performance of the linear credibility framework with parallel procedures.
In general, those procedures were as follows:

1. Select a calibration sample size (ncal); a minimum prediction sample size (npred);
and a number of bootstrap trials (nboot) that are appropriate to the data-set and
analysis at hand. For additional details on how this was done in Studies 2a-2c and
3a-3c, see the Detailed Procedure sections of Analyses 2a.i (GJP reliability), 2b.i
(MM reliability), and 2c.i (PHL reliability), respectively.

2. For a given data-set, extract a subset of observations that is consistent with the
parameters selected in step 1. In most cases, this will involve excluding
participants who did not provide a sufficient number of judgments to estimate
credibility and the effects of recalibration on the same trial.

3. Within the working data-set extracted in step 2, generate aggregate judgments for
each forecasting question by averaging SPJs across participants (within-question).
In cases where participants provided more than one SPJ for the same forecasting
question, first average these SPJs (within-participant) to arrive at participant-level
aggregates.

4. Use the following extremization function to estimate the optimal transformation
constant a, that minimizes the Brier scores of the aggregates calculated in step 3
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(this is done to optimally correct for judgmental regression. For a detailed
discussion of regression and its origins, see Baron et al., 2014).

( )=

(

)

,

(1)

Where p is one of the aggregate probability judgments calculated in step 3, and
( ) is an optimized aggregate.

5. Apply this optimal transformation to the aggregate probabilities calculated in step
3 to arrive at a set of optimized aggregates, or estimated optima.

6. Transform all SPJs extracted in step 2 and all estimated optima calculated in step
5 to log-odds using the standard logit link function.

After preparing the data, I then estimated credibility for each participant 100
times, selecting a new calibration sample, estimating a new credibility function, and
recalibrating judgments on each trial. Similar to Study 1, the purpose of these procedures
was to estimate two sets of outcome measures for each participant: (a) bootstrapped
credibility estimates (for use in Studies 2a-2c); and (b) bootstrapped summary-statistics
representing the typical effects of recalibration (for use in Studies 3a-3c).
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7. For participant i on trial n, select a calibration sample by randomly sampling ncal
observations from his or her pool of SPJs, where ncal is the calibration sample-size
selected in step 1.

8. Regress this calibration sample on the corresponding estimated optima calculated
in step 6 to arrive at a credibility function with estimated coefficients
corresponding to bias (

∗

) and expertise (
∗

corresponding to consistency (

( )=

∗

∗

+

∗

), and a standard error

):

∗

+ ,

ε ~ N(0,

∗

),

(2)

Where i is a participant; the asterisk symbol (*) indicates that an estimate
was derived from a participant’s calibration sample (here, a random subset
of his or her judgments rather than a stand-alone sample);

∗

is a vector

of log-odds transformed judgments corresponding to participant i’s beliefs
about the ncal events associated with her calibration sample; ( )
corresponds to the vector of log-odds transformed estimated optima
∗

calculated in step 6; and

,

∗

, and

∗

are the estimated parameters of

participant i’s credibility function, as defined above.

9. Record the values of

∗

,

∗

, and

∗

for the current trial, n.
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10. For each participant, recalibrate judgments in the prediction sample (i.e., all SPJs
that were not included in the calibration sample) according to the linear
relationship captured by the credibility function estimated in step 8 (i.e., “plug” a
participant’s prediction sample

∗

into Eq. 2 to estimate ( )).

11. After recalibration, examine (and record) the impact of step 10 by comparing the
accuracy of judgments before and after recalibration (for a specific list of outcome
measures, see the Detailed Procedure sections for the recalibration analyses
presented in Studies 3a-3c).

12. Conduct steps 7-11 a total of 100 times for each participant i, selecting a new,
random subset of her SPJs for use as a calibration sample on each trial.

13. Finally, average across the sampling distributions generated in steps 9 and 11 for
each participant to calculate (a) bootstrapped credibility estimates for each
participant (for use in Studies 2a-2c); and (b) bootstrapped summary-statistics
representing the typical effects of recalibration for each participant (for use in
Studies 3a-3c).

Procedural contrasts with Study 1. For each of the data-sets used in Studies 2a2c and 3a-3c, the performance of the linear credibility framework was examined using
the General Procedure, described above. As in Study 1, these analyses were intended to
shed light on the typical results of credibility estimation and credibility-based
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recalibration across forecasters. However, because these analyses involved empirical sets
of SPJs and latent probabilities (rather than simulated judgments and known “signal”
values), carrying them out required several modifications to Study 1’s procedure.
Because these modifications may not have been salient in the General Procedure, I
discuss them in more detail, below.

Optimizing aggregates by minimizing Brier scores. In each of the data-sets
described above, participants provided SPJs about actual, uncertain events in the world.
As such, it was difficult to identify “true” or “objective” probability values against which
to compare their judgments. In the absence of this information, it was no longer possible
to optimize crowd aggregates by minimizing the sum of squared deviations between
crowd aggregates and the corresponding “objective” values.17 To rectify this problem,
Studies 2a-2c and 3a-3c optimized crowd aggregates by finding the transformation
constant a that minimized empirical Brier scores (i.e., maximized empirical accuracy: see
step 4 of the General Procedure above; for a detailed discussion of the rationale behind
this modification, see: Baron et al., 2014) —a procedure that can be carried out in any
case where at least some outcomes are known.

17

Notably, detailed historical records allowed for the estimation of historical baserates concerning
Philadelphia air-temperatures. However, normative criteria of this sort are not widely available to realworld decision makers. In the interest of making a general case for the value and applicability of the linear
credibility framework, therefore, I do not consider the case where baserates are available for use as
estimated optima.
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Partitioning judgments into calibration samples and prediction samples.
Because participants in Studies 2a-2c and 3a-3c provided only a single set of judgments,
examining the effects of credibility-based recalibration required that I partition each
participant’s SPJs into a calibration sample and a prediction sample. By doing so, I was
able to estimate a participant’s credibility function on a small subset of his or her
judgments (the calibration sample) and examine the effects of recalibration on the
remaining, “out-of-sample” judgments (the prediction sample). Within each data-set, the
size of the calibration sample was held constant across participants and was determined
by a series of reliability experiments that I report in Chapter 2. In the results sections for
Study 2a-2c, these reliability analyses are designated by the Roman numeral “i” (i.e.,
Analyses 2a.i, 2b.i, and 2c.i), and are all accompanied by the parenthetical designation
“[data-set] reliability.”

Limiting analyses to forecasters with a sufficient number of judgments. For all
analyses associated with the GJP and Philadelphia air temperature study (i.e., Studies 2a,
2c, 3a, and 3c), forecasters were excluded from analysis if they did not provide a
sufficient number of judgments. In each of these cases, a “sufficient number” was defined
as the calibration sample size plus thirty (ncal + 30) to ensure that each forecaster’s
prediction sample would be sufficiently large to estimate the effects of recalibration (i.e.,
the minimum prediction sample size, or npred = 30). However, because forecasters were
limited to a maximum of 67 judgments in the March Madness data, this restriction was
not applied in Studies 2b and 3b, where calibration sample sizes were often > 37.
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Estimating a new credibility function for each bootstrap trial. To examine the
typical performance of the linear credibility framework, it is necessary to examine
credibility estimates and the effects of credibility-based recalibration across a large
number of trials. However, because each participant provided only a single set of
judgments, there is no way to run multiple trials with the same participant while holding
their calibration sample (and credibility function) constant — as was done in Study 1. To
solve this problem, Studies 2a-2c and 3a-3c used random sampling procedures to select a
small subset of each participant’s SPJs (the calibration sample) on each bootstrap trial.
Across trials, credibility functions were fit to only those SPJs in the calibration sample,
allowing for variance in the performance of the linear credibility framework from trial-totrial.

Examining additional standards of “improved” judgment. Finally, because it
was difficult to identify normative standards for judgmental “improvement” in Studies
3a-3c, tests of recalibration in these studies tracked a wider variety of outcome measures
than those examined in Study 1. As in Study 1, these measures fell into four (generic)
categories for each prediction sample: (a) the average proportion of judgments that
improved; (b) the mean pairwise difference in judgments; (c) the average effect-size
(Cohen’s d) associated with recalibration; and (d) the proportion of samples in which the
mean outcome measure improved.
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However, because “objective” probabilities were not available in Studies 3a-3c, it
was no longer possible to evaluate judgments in terms of the absolute difference between
judgments and the “truth” (i.e., absolute judgment error, or AJE). To account for this,
Studies 3a-3c measured outcomes in terms of (a) a variant of AJE that measures the
absolute difference between an SPJ and the corresponding estimated optimum (here, an
optimized crowd aggregate); and (b) a measure that I call absolute linear error (ALE),
which corresponds to the absolute difference between an SPJ and the event’s empirical
outcome. In Study 3c (PHL recalibration), the existence of detailed historical records
made it possible to estimate the baserates of various air temperatures in January and July
(for details, see the Detailed Procedure section of Study 3c). Thus, in Study 3c, I also
examined a variant of AJE that measures the absolute difference between SPJs and
estimated baserates.
Finally, in all three studies, I also examined the effects of credibility-based
recalibration on reliability — one component of Murphy’s (1973) three-component
decomposition of the Brier score (Brier, 1950). As a summary statistic, reliability is
defined as the weighted sum of squared-differences between an individual’s SPJs and
within-sample baserates (here, the relative frequencies of event occurrence when SPJs are
separated into 101 percentage-point “bins”). As such, reliability bears a close
mathematical relationship to the forecasting term calibration (for an overview, see:
Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1982) and can generally be understood as a measure
of agreement between SPJs and empirical baserates (though it is defined in such a way
that lower values indicate better agreement). While less interpretable than AJE and ALE,
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my main reason for examining reliability is that it can help provide insight into why
recalibration influences accuracy, rather than simply summarizing its effects.
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CHAPTER 2

LINEAR CREDIBILITY ESTIMATES ARE RELIABLE AND VALID
PREDICTORS OF FORECAST ACCURACY

Abstract:
At the conceptual level, measures of credibility are intended to provide information about
“skill” or “proficiency” in subjective probability judgment. However, it is an empirical
question whether these types of information can be extracted from empirical models of
credibility. To test whether they can, this chapter examines the extent to which “credible”
judgment is related to “good” judgment in three real-world contexts. Specifically, in
Studies 2a-2c, I examine (a) the conditions under which linear credibility estimates can
be reliably estimated; and (b) the convergent validity of linear credibility estimates with
other individual-level measures of performance in probabilistic prediction. The results of
these studies demonstrate that linear credibility estimates are often reliable and valid
predictors of forecast accuracy and generally occupy sensible positions within the larger
nomological network related to “good” judgment. Thus, I conclude that empirical
credibility estimates may often be indicative of “skill” or “proficiency” in subjective
probability judgment.

Introduction
In the introduction to this dissertation, I arrived at the notion of credibility by
working backwards from a conceptual definition of “objective” probability. Though
philosophically fraught, this definition helped to clarify the concept of “good” judgment
and allowed me to define “better” vs. “worse” judgment in terms of “agreement with the
truth.” With this definition in mind, I then argued that in any given decision environment,
there must always be a judgment that best describes the true state of nature, given the
information that is available at the time. In some cases, a decision maker may fail to
identify this “optimal” judgment because he or she does not have access to the full scope
of extant information. In others, this “optimal” judgment may stray from the “truth”
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because the full scope of extant information is biased or incomplete with respect to the
true state of nature. In all cases, however, the defining feature of this “optimal” judgment
is that it reflects the most epistemically defensible belief that one could hold, given the
information in the decision environment (i.e., it maximizes “agreement with the truth” to
the greatest extent that evidence and reason allow). In principle, therefore, this sort of
“optimal” judgment represents an appealing benchmark by which to evaluate the
“quality,” or relative validity, of subjective probability judgments (SPJs).
To formalize this approach to evaluation, I then defined credible judgment in
terms of the relationship between an individual’s SPJs and empirical approximations of
“optimal” judgments, which I call estimated optima. At the conceptual level, I did not
concern myself with a specific method for identifying estimated optima or modeling the
relationship between estimated optima and an individual’s SPJs. Instead, I simply defined
credibility as an abstract construct that describes the relationship between an individual’s
judgments and (estimates of) the “best” judgments that one could hold, given the
information that was available at the time. With this definition in mind, I then went on to
argue that decision makers might benefit from examining credibility in real-world
judgment. Specifically, if credibility can be modeled in an informative way, then access
to credibility information should help decision makers (a) evaluate an individual i's
relative “quality” as a source of probabilistic information; and (b) reverse-engineer what
an individual i “should have said” or “would be justified in believing,” given nothing
more than her SPJs.
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In practice, however, the costs associated with extracting this information play a
key role in determining whether decision makers will benefit from examining credibility.
If simple (and therefore, “cheap”) models of credibility can deliver the types of
information that the concept of credibility promises, then examining credibility may be
useful across a wide variety of domains. If instead, simple models of credibility fail to
deliver this information, then (a) the decision environment may not be amenable to
examining credibility (i.e., the credibility relationship may be prohibitively weak or
difficult to identify); or (b) the benefits of doing so may not outweigh the costs. From an
empirical perspective, therefore, the performance of simple models of credibility (e.g.,
the linear credibility framework) can serve as a useful litmus test for the value of
empirical models of credibility, more generally.
Following from this line of reasoning, Studies 2a-2c will test whether the linear
credibility framework appears to capture information about SPJ “quality.” To determine
whether they do, I will leverage the fact that credibility estimates can be interpreted as
measures of “skill” or “proficiency” in subjective probability judgment (see: the
introduction Chapter 1). If linear credibility estimates can be shown to be meaningfully
correlated with other measures of “skill” or “proficiency” in subjective probability
judgment (e.g., forecast accuracy), then it is reasonable to conclude that even simple
models of credibility can provide valid information about SPJ “quality.” Indeed, because
the linear credibility framework is one of the most rudimentary models that a decision
maker might apply, demonstrating that linear credibility estimates predict “good”
judgment (i.e., forecast accuracy) would suggest that (a) there is non-trivial amount of
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information to be gained by examining credibility; and (b) this information can be
extracted with simple statistical tools. Thus, if the linear credibility framework can be
shown to provide even a small degree of traction on the question of who tends to be a
“better” vs. “worse” judge of subjective probability, then credibility information may
represent a widely available (yet generally untapped) resource for evaluating beliefs.

Study 2a: Reliability and Validity of Credibility Estimates Derived from GJP Data
(GJP Reliability/Validity)

Throughout its four-year lifespan, the Good Judgment Project (GJP) produced a
remarkable set of results. Though too extensive to detail here (for summaries, see:
Mellers, Ungar, Baron, Ramos, Gürçay, Fincher, Scott, Moorse, Atanasov, Swift,
Murray, Stone, & Tetlock, 2014; Mellers, Stone, Atanasov, Rohrbaugh, Metz, Ungar,
Bishop, Horowitz, Merkle, & Tetlcok, 2015; and Mellers Stone, Murray, Minster,
Rohrbaugh, Bishop, Chen, Baker, Hou, Horowitz, Ungar, & Tetlock, 2015), three of
these results are particularly relevant to the study of credibility. First, researchers in the
GJP discovered that forecast accuracy can be improved by simple interventions such as
training participants in probabilistic reasoning or having participants work in teams
(Mellers et al., 2014). Second, exploratory analyses showed that the GJP’s most accurate
forecasters (i.e., the top 2% of participants, known as superforecasters) were not
dramatically different from other forecasters in terms of intelligence or education.
Instead, these individuals were distinguished by their tendency towards a flexible
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cognitive-style that emphasized (e.g.) the enjoyment of difficult problems and puzzles;
cognitive reflection; and actively open-minded thinking (Mellers et al., 2015b). Finally,
comparisons of superforecasters with other forecaster in the GJP indicated that the effects
of environmental enrichment (i.e., teaming, training, and superforecaster status) tended to
increase over time, rather than regressing toward the mean (Mellers et al., 2015b). Taken
together, these results led researchers in the GJP to conclude that forecast accuracy was
not the product of inborn talent or domain-specific expertise, but instead the result of a
cultivatable set of “skills” — many of which encouraged a flexible, elaborative, and
unbiased approach to reasoning (Mellers et al., 2015a; Mellers et al., 2015b; Mellers et
al., 2014).
Given these findings, data from the Good Judgment Project provide a rich
nomological backdrop against which to explore the relationships between linear
credibility estimates and other indicators of “good” judgment. Indeed, across four years
of tournaments, the GJP (a) provided participants with a large number of questions that
varied across a wide variety of geopolitical topics; (b) observed reliable and non-trivial
differences in forecast accuracy; and (c) were able to attribute these differences to a
succinct (and sensible) set of individual-difference variables. As a result, data from the
GJP provide a unique opportunity to compare the predictive validity of linear credibility
estimates to that of the most extensive profile of “skillful” or “proficient” forecasting yet
reported in the literature.
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Analysis 2a.i: Under what conditions are credibility estimates reliable? (GJP
reliability)
As discussed in the General Procedure, a prerequisite for credibility estimation
and credibility-based recalibration is the selection of three parameters: (a) a calibration
sample size, ncal; (b) a minimum prediction sample size, npred; and (c) the number of
bootstrap trials over which to examine outcomes, nboot.
To determine appropriate values for these parameters, it is important to consider
how each will influence the credibility estimation and/or credibility-based recalibration
procedures. In the case of prediction sample size (npred), selecting an appropriate value is
simple, as varying this parameter has only two consequences: (a) to change the number of
predictions available for out-of-sample recalibration; and (b) under some circumstances,
to change the overall number of forecasters included in the analysis (in step 2 of the
General Procedure, forecasters are excluded if they have not provided at least ncal + npred
SPJs). Because forecasters in the GJP typically provided a large number of forecasts
(Mean = 141.52; Mdn. = 119.5; SD = 62.01), their likelihood of exclusion on this basis
was low. Thus, the minimum prediction sample size for Study 2a was set at an a priori
value of 30 to ensure that each forecaster would have an adequate number of observations
for estimating the typical effects of recalibration.
In contrast to npred, selecting a calibration sample size (ncal) and a number of
bootstrap trials (nboot) is often less straightforward. From an empirical perspective, setting
either of these parameters too low could compromise the reliability and validity of the
resulting estimates, while setting them too high could result in wasted computational
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resources and prohibitively long run-times (especially for large data-sets, such as that
drawn from the GJP). To get the most out of the linear credibility framework, therefore, it
is important to select appropriate values for each of these parameters. However, because
the reliability and validity of linear credibility estimates depend on the degree of noise
and/or complexity in the informational environment, it is often difficult to identify an
appropriate set of values a priori. To address this issue, I began Study 2a with an analysis
of the parameter ranges under which it is possible to extract reliable credibility estimates
from GJP data.

Method.
Detailed Procedure. To identify an appropriate set of analytic parameters for
Study 2a, I conducted an experiment. Because there are several ways that reliability can
impact the performance of the linear credibility framework, this experiment was divided
into two arms, each of which addressed a different aspect of reliability.
In the first arm, I examined the reliability of non-bootstrapped credibility
estimates (i.e., non-aggregated estimates of bias, expertise, and consistency drawn from
individual bootstrap trials), varying by calibration sample size (ncal). The purpose of this
arm was to shed light on the variability of the recalibration transformation from trial-totrial, and to identify an ncal at which its effects would be relatively consistent. To gather
data for this portion of the experiment, I used the random sampling procedures described
in steps 7-9 of the General Procedure to record 30 estimates of bias, expertise, and
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consistency (i.e.,

∗

,

∗

, and

∗ 18

) for each forecaster at each level of ncal = {10, 20, …,

50}. For each combination of ncal × component of credibility = {bias, expertise,
consistency}, I then calculated the intraclass correlation (ICC) across these 30
observations.
In the second arm of the experiment, I examined the reliability of bootstrapped
credibility estimates while varying calibration sample size (ncal) and number of bootstrap
trials (nboot) according to a 5 × 12 factorial design. The purpose of this arm was to
identify a set of parameter values that would ensure bootstrapped credibility estimates
were well-suited to the analyses of validity that follow. To gather data for this portion of
the experiment, I followed the full set of steps outlined in the General Procedure. For
each combination of ncal = {10, 20, …, 50} × nboot = {10, 20, …, 100, 200, 250}, I
conducted three full iterations of the general credibility estimation procedure and
recorded bootstrapped credibility estimates ( ,

, and

) for each forecaster. After

completing these iterations, I then calculated the intraclass correlation across these three
observations (within each experimental cell).

Results. The results of Analysis 2a.i can be seen in Figures 6-9. In Figure 6, the
reliability of non-bootstrapped estimates of bias, expertise, and consistency are plotted in

18

An a priori sample size of 30 was selected for this experiment to ensure that the random sampling
procedures described in steps 7-9 of the General Procedure would produce representative samples of
credibility estimates across trials. To ensure that this sample size did not introduce undue bias, this analysis
was also conducted with sample sizes of 10 and 20, neither of which had a substantive impact on the
results.
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a single graph, with the y-axis representing reliability (i.e., intraclass correlation, or ICC);
the x-axis representing the calibration sample size; and separate curves representing
different components of credibility. In Figures 7-9, the reliabilities of bootstrapped
credibility estimates are plotted in separate graphs, with the y-axis of each graph
representing reliability (ICC); the x-axis of each graph representing the bootstrap sample
size; and separate curves representing different calibration sample sizes.

Figure 6
[GJP data]: Reliability of non-bootstrapped estimates of credibility, varying by
calibration sample size (ncal).

Figure 7
[GJP data]: Reliability of bootstrapped estimates of bias ( ), varying by number of
bootstrap trials (nboot) and calibration sample size (ncal).
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Figure 8
[GJP data]: Reliability of bootstrapped estimates of expertise ( ), varying by number of
bootstrap trials (nboot) and calibration sample size (ncal).

Figure 9
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[GJP data]: Reliability of bootstrapped estimates of consistency ( ), varying by number
of bootstrap trials (nboot) and calibration sample size (ncal).

Discussion. For the linear credibility framework to be useful, the estimates it
produces must provide insight into forecaster’s relative degree of “skill” or “proficiency”
in subjective probability judgment. To achieve this goal, credibility estimates must be
reliable enough to ensure that estimation errors are unlikely to be mistaken for genuine
between-subjects differences.
Practically speaking, however, it is difficult to know what constitutes a suitably
reliable estimate of credibility. In the absence of specific error tolerances, the only
reasonable criterion is that credibility estimates should be “reliable enough” to allow
forecasters to be correctly ordered according to their “skill” or “proficiency.” In statistical
terms, this means that the error variance in an individual’s credibility estimates should be
considerably smaller than the between-subjects variance in the same measure of
credibility. If this condition is met, then it is unlikely that the effects of measurement
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error will result in forecasters being sorted into the wrong order. To determine whether
credibility estimates from the GJP met this condition, Analysis 2a.i examined intraclass
correlation — a statistic that directly compares within-group variance to between-group
variance. In Analysis 2a.i, the “groups,” or classes being examined were the forecasterlevel credibility estimates (either bootstrapped or non-bootstrapped) produced by
different iterations of the same estimation procedure. If the estimation procedure was
reliable, then the within-class variance in credibility estimates (i.e., the “measurement
error” associated with the estimation procedure) will be small relative to the variance
between classes (i.e., the total variance, across forecasters), and the intraclass correlation
will be high.
If we take the conventional threshold for “excellent” intraclass correlation as our
benchmark (ICC ≥ 0.75; Ciccetti, 1994), then the results on Analysis 2a.i indicate that the
linear credibility framework is capable of producing reliable credibility estimates when
fit to data from the GJP. In the case of non-bootstrapped credibility estimates (Figure 6),
the reliability of all three components of credibility reached the threshold for “excellent”
at a calibration sample size of ncal = 40 and continued to climb thereafter. Thus, it is
likely that linear credibility estimates can be used to sort GJP forecasters into the correct
skill-order (and for the recalibration transformation to be relatively consistent from trialto-trial) with as few as 40 observations per forecaster.
In addition, the results of Analysis 2a.i also indicate that bootstrapping can be
used to dramatically improve the reliability of credibility estimates in the GJP. Indeed,
across all 180 observations (3 components of credibility × 5 levels of calibration sample
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size × 12 levels of bootstrap sample size), there were no cases in which the ICC of
bootstrapped credibility estimates fell below the conventional threshold for “excellent.”
Furthermore, an examination of all cases where ncal ≥ 40 demonstrates that the ICC of
bootstrapped credibility estimates never fell below 0.95 — a cut-off indicating that the
between-group variance (i.e., the total variance associated with individual differences in
credibility) was nineteen times larger than the within-group variance (i.e., the variance
attributable to “estimation error”). Thus, by applying a small amount of computational
power to the same sample size as before (40 observations per forecaster), it is
exceedingly likely that bootstrapped credibility estimates could be used to correctly rankorder forecasters in the GJP — a sign that bodes well for later examinations of validity.
With the above results in mind, I selected the following analytic parameters for
Study 2a: a calibration sample size of ncal = 50; a minimum prediction sample size of npred
= 30; and a bootstrap sample size of nboot = 100. In making these selections, calibration
sample size was set to ncal = 50 to maximize the likelihood of reliable estimates while still
maintaining a plausible real-world sample size. As discussed above, the minimum
prediction sample size was set at an a priori value of npred = 30 to ensure that forecasters
would have a sufficient number of SPJs to examine the effects of recalibration out-ofsample. And finally (despite being more computationally demanding than was strictly
necessary), the number of bootstrap trials was set to a value of nboot = 100 to ensure that
the effects of credibility-based recalibration could be observed across a sufficient number
of trials.
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Analysis 2a.ii: What are the predictors of credibility and what does credibility
predict? (GJP validity)
As discussed above, a key indicator of the linear credibility framework’s
performance is the extent to which credibility estimates demonstrate convergent validity
with other measures of “skill” or “proficiency” in subjective probability judgment. To
examine these relationships in GJP data, I conducted a series of exploratory analyses,
each of which was intended to shed light on the position of credibility within the larger
nomological network related to probabilistic prediction.

Method.
Detailed procedure. Using the analytic parameters selected in Analysis 2a.i (GJP
reliability) (i.e., ncal = 50; npred = 30; nboot =100), I conducted a single run of the General
Procedure to arrive at bootstrapped credibility estimates for each forecaster (i.e.,
and

,

,

). After excluding participants who provided too few forecasts (≤ 80), this analysis

was conducted on a working data-set of 337,919 forecasts provided by 754 forecasters
across all 380 questions. Within this sample, 57% of forecasters were trained in
probabilistic reasoning, 47% were assigned to work in collaborative teams, and 6% were
superforecasters (a designation given to the top 2% of forecasters from each tournament
year). The average age of forecasters in this sample was 40.2 (Mdn. = 36.0; SD = 13.6),
87% of forecasters were male, and 70% of forecasters had some level of advanced
degree.
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As in Study 1, I did not expect Analysis 2a.ii to produce veridical, face-valid
measures of bias, expertise, or consistency. Instead, I expected bootstrapped credibility
estimates in this analysis to predict a forecaster’s relative degree of “skill” or
“proficiency” in subjective probability judgment. To ensure that my exploratory analyses
matched the spirit of this prediction, I conducted Analysis 2a.ii with transformed
measures of bias and expertise, each of which corresponded to the absolute difference
between a forecaster’s bootstrapped average and the value that one would expect if an
individual’s credibility function were equal to identity (i.e., α = 0 and β = 1). To
distinguish these measures from their untransformed counterparts, I will indicate each
with the superscript “prime,” i.e.,

and

, where

= | | and

=

−1 ,

respectively.
To examine convergent validity in the GJP dataset, I then explored the covariation
of bootstrapped credibility estimates ( ,

, and

) with a subset of the most strongly

explanatory individual difference measures captured by the GJP. For the purposes of
Analysis 2a.ii, the main correlate of interest was a forecaster’s average Brier score,
which is widely used as a measure of forecast accuracy (where lower Brier scores
indicate more accurate predictions). In the interest of completeness, however, these
analyses also examined variables that fell into categories of: experimental condition (i.e.,
manipulations designed to “enrich” the forecasting environment such as teaming and
training); motivation and engagement; numerical fluency; cognitive ability; cognitive
style; and demographics.
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In detail (and in the tables below), these variables are as follows: Experimental
condition refers to a set of effects-coded indicators which describe (a) whether a
forecaster was working alone or in a collaborative team; (b) whether the forecaster had
received training in probabilistic reasoning; and (c) whether the individual had been
designated a superforecaster (all of whom were trained in probabilistic reasoning and
worked in collaborative teams). Number of questions addressed and average number of
updates per question serve as proxies for a forecaster’s motivation and engagement with
the GJP. Proportion of fine-grained forecasts refers to the proportion of a forecaster’s
SPJs which were not multiples of 0.05 or 0.10 (which I also consider a measure of
motivation and engagement). Threshold of estimative precision is a measure that
describes a forecaster’s ability to make fine-grained distinctions on the probability scale
(for additional details on the measure, see: Friedman, Baker, Mellers, Tetlock, &
Zeckhauser, 2018). Composite Berlin Numeracy is a forecaster’s average score on the
Berlin Numeracy Test (Cokely, Galesic, Schulz, Ghazal, & Garcia-Retamero, 2012)
measured over all four years of the GJP tournaments. Composite Raven’s is a forecaster’s
average score on the Raven’s progressive matrices test (Bors & Stokes, 1998), measured
during years 3 and 4. Composite CRT is a forecaster’s average score on the extended
Cognitive Reflection Task (Baron et al., 2015; see also: Frederick, 2005), measured in
years 3 and 4. Composite Need for Cognition is a forecaster’s average score on the Need
for Cognition questionnaire (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), measured in years 1, 2, and 4. One
question Fox-Hedgehog is a single-item scale measuring the extent to which a
forecaster’s approach to problem solving tends to rely on knowing “one big thing” rather
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than “many little things” (for additional details on this measure, see: Tetlock, 2005).
AOMT is a forecaster’s score on Baron’s 11-item Actively Open-Minded Thinking scale
(in press; see also: Baron, Scott, Fincer, & Metz, 2015; Haran, Ritov, & Mellers, 2013;
Baron, 2008). And Age, Male, and Education are standard descriptors of a forecaster’s
demographics (with education being split into effects-coded indicators).
In addition to simple correlations, I also conducted exploratory linear regressions
to examine the convergent validity of bootstrapped credibility estimates with individual
difference variables from the GJP. Specifically, I examined (a) which GJP measures
predicted the three components of credibility; and (b) whether bootstrapped credibility
estimates were meaningful predictors of forecast accuracy (as measured by average Brier
score). In all cases, continuous variables in these regressions were standardized and
categorical variables were effects-coded. Finally, because the GJP data-set presented a
non-trivial likelihood of redundancy, multi-collinearity, and/or suppression effects among
credibility estimates and GJP predictors, each of these regressions was conducted under
three approaches to variable selection.
In the first approach, which I call the kitchen sink approach, I included all
predictors that were neither the variable being predicted nor the other two components of
credibility (if a component of credibility were being predicted). In the reduced approach,
I included only those predictors that were statistically significant in the kitchen sink
model. And in the ridge-1SE approach, I used the R function cv.glmnet (from the
package glmnet: Friedman, Hastie, & Tibshirani, 2010) to conduct penalized ridge
regression and select the most parsimonious, statistically justified model from the
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available set of predictors (i.e., the model with the most regularized fit within one
standard error of the minimum penalized score, lambda). By comparing these models, I
was able to identify instances where credibility estimates were competing with other
predictors for overlapping segments of predictive variance, and to weakly examine which
had the stronger claim.

Results. The results of Analysis 2a.ii can be seen in the tables below. Similar to
Study 1, pairwise correlations between bootstrapped credibility estimates and GJP
individual difference measures can be seen in Table 7; exploratory regressions examining
the predictors of credibility can be seen in Tables 8-10; and an exploratory regression
examining the degree to which bootstrapped credibility estimates predict forecast
accuracy (average Brier scores) can be seen in Table 11.

Table 7
[GJP data]: Simple correlations between credibility estimates and individual difference
measures.
Credibility Estimate
Ind. Diff. Measure
(Bias)

(Expertise)

(Consist.)

Forecast accuracy
Average Brier score

0.74***

0.25***

0.76***

Experimental condition
Individual, w/training
Grouped, no training
Grouped, w/training

-0.10**
-0.28***
-0.33***

-0.05
-0.12**
-0.05

-0.12***
-0.30***
-0.35***
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-0.41***

-0.09*

-0.47***

Motivation and engagement
Number of questions addressed
Avg. num. updates per question
Prop. fine-grained forecasts

-0.15***
-0.16***
-0.04

-0.01
-0.01
-0.02

-0.20***
-0.21***
-0.13***

Numerical fluency
Threshold of estimative precision
Composite Berlin Numeracy

-0.40***
-0.30***

-0.13***
-0.05

-0.44***
-0.29***

Cognitive ability
Composite Raven’s
Composite CRT

-0.25***
-0.32***

-0.03
-0.05

-0.29***
-0.36***

Cognitive style
Composite Need for Cognition
One question Fox-Hedgehog
AOMT

-0.10**
-0.02
-0.16***

-0.05
-0.02
-0.04

-0.14***
-0.01
-0.15***

Superforecaster

Demographics
Age
-0.01
0.06
-0.02
Male
-0.10**
0.03
-0.09*
Education = bachelor’s degree
0.07
0.00
0.05
Education = master’s degree
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
Education = doctorate
-0.05
0.03
-0.06
Significance levels: * p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001
Note: missingness in individual difference data resolved through mean imputation. All
non-categorical measures standardized; all categorical variables effects-coded.

Table 8
[GJP data]: Predictors of bootstrapped alpha (i.e., bias;

).

Variable Selection Approach
Ind. Diff. Measure
(Intercept)

Kitchen-Sink
0.02 (0.08)

Reduced
-0.09 (0.03)***

Ridge-1SE
-0.06 (0.02)*
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Forecast accuracy
Average Brier score

0.61 (0.03)***

0.64 (0.03)***

Experimental condition
Individual, w/training
Grouped, no training
Grouped, w/training
Superforecaster

0.17 (0.05)***
0.00 (0.06)
-0.04 (0.05)
-0.40 (0.08)***

0.16 (0.05)***

-0.42 (0.07)***

-0.26 (0.04)***

Motivation and engagement
Number of questions addressed
Avg. num. updates per question
Prop. fine-grained forecasts

-0.05 (0.02)*
-0.06 (0.02)*
0.07 (0.02)**

-0.06 (0.02)**
-0.05 (0.02)*
0.07 (0.02)**

-0.06 (0.02)*
-0.06 (0.02)*
0.08 (0.02)***

Numerical fluency
Threshold of estimative precision
Composite Berlin Numeracy

-0.01 (0.03)
-0.06 (0.03)

Cognitive ability
Composite Raven’s

-0.08 (0.03)**

Composite CRT

-0.06 (0.03)*

-0.13 (0.02)***

-0.05 (0.03)

Cognitive style
Composite Need for Cognition
One question Fox-Hedgehog
AOMT

0.02 (0.02)
0.01 (0.02)
-0.06 (0.02)*

Demographics
Age
Male
Education = bachelor’s degree
Education = master’s degree
Education = doctorate

0.03 (0.02)
-0.08 (0.07)
0.04 (0.06)
-0.08 (0.05)
-0.05 (0.06)

Multiple R2
Adjusted R2
RMSE

0.628
0.618
0.61

0.64 (0.03)***

-0.09 (0.03)***
-0.05 (0.03)

-0.07 (0.02)**

-0.05 (0.02)*

0.616
0.612
0.619

0.617
0.613
0.618
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AIC
1437.52
1436.68
1436.72
BIC
1539.27
1482.93
1487.6
Significance levels: * p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001
Note: missingness in individual difference data resolved through mean imputation. All
non-categorical measures standardized; all categorical variables effects-coded.

Table 9
[GJP data]: Predictors of bootstrapped beta (i.e., expertise;

).

Variable Selection Approach
Ind. Diff. Measure

Kitchen-Sink

Reduced

(Intercept)

-0.13 (0.13)

-0.01 (0.04)

Forecast accuracy
Average Brier score

0.27 (0.05)***

0.23 (0.04)***

Experimental condition
Individual, w/training
Grouped, no training
Grouped, w/training
Superforecaster

-0.07 (0.07)
-0.21 (0.09)*
0.12 (0.07)
0.14 (0.13)

Motivation and engagement
Number of questions addressed
Avg. num. updates per question
Prop. fine-grained forecasts

0.00 (0.04)
0.01 (0.04)
0.02 (0.04)

Numerical fluency
Threshold of estimative precision
Composite Berlin Numeracy

-0.03 (0.04)
-0.01 (0.04)

Cognitive ability
Composite Raven’s
Composite CRT

0.01 (0.04)
0.04 (0.05)

Cognitive style
Composite Need for Cognition

-0.03 (0.04)

Ridge-1SE
0.00 (0.04)

-0.09 (0.06)
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One question Fox-Hedgehog
AOMT

-0.02 (0.04)
-0.01 (0.04)

Demographics
Age
Male
Education = bachelor’s degree
Education = master’s degree
Education = doctorate

0.06 (0.04)
0.12 (0.11)
0.01 (0.09)
0.02 (0.08)
0.06 (0.09)

Multiple R2
Adjusted R2
RMSE

0.082
0.057
0.957

0.065
0.062
0.967

0
0
0.999

AIC
2118.04
2096.41
2142.76
BIC
2219.79
2114.91
2152.01
Significance levels: * p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001
Note: missingness in individual difference data resolved through mean imputation. All
non-categorical measures standardized; all categorical variables effects-coded.

Table 10
[GJP data]: Predictors of bootstrapped sigma (i.e., consistency;

).

Variable Selection Approach
Ind. Diff. Measure

Kitchen-Sink

Reduced

Ridge-1SE

(Intercept)

-0.03 (0.07)

-0.12 (0.02)***

-0.12 (0.02)***

Forecast accuracy
Average Brier score

0.58 (0.03)***

0.59 (0.02)***

0.59 (0.02)***

Experimental condition
Individual, w/training
Grouped, no training
Grouped, w/training
Superforecaster

0.20 (0.04)***
0.01 (0.05)
0.00 (0.04)
-0.59 (0.08)***

0.20 (0.04)***

0.20 (0.04)***

-0.58 (0.06)***

-0.58 (0.06)***

Motivation and engagement
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Number of questions addressed
Avg. num. updates per question
Prop. fine-grained forecasts

-0.08 (0.02)***
-0.11 (0.02)***
-0.01 (0.02)

Numerical fluency
Threshold of estimative precision
Composite Berlin Numeracy

-0.01 (0.02)
-0.01 (0.03)

Cognitive ability
Composite Raven’s
Composite CRT

-0.11 (0.02)***
-0.10 (0.03)***

Cognitive style
Composite Need for Cognition
One question Fox-Hedgehog
AOMT

-0.02 (0.02)
0.03 (0.02)
-0.03 (0.02)

Demographics
Age
Male
Education = bachelor’s degree
Education = master’s degree
Education = doctorate

0.01 (0.02)
-0.07 (0.07)
0.01 (0.05)
-0.05 (0.05)
-0.05 (0.05)

-0.08 (0.02)***
-0.11 (0.02)***

-0.08 (0.02)***
-0.11 (0.02)***

-0.01 (0.02)

-0.12 (0.02)***
-0.11 (0.02)***

-0.12 (0.02)***
-0.11 (0.02)***

Multiple R2
0.695
0.691
0.691
Adjusted R2
0.686
0.688
0.687
RMSE
0.552
0.556
0.556
AIC
1288.6
1272.37
1274.22
BIC
1390.36
1314
1320.47
Significance levels: * p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001
Note: missingness in individual difference data resolved through mean imputation. All
non-categorical measures standardized; all categorical variables effects-coded.

Table 11
[GJP data]: Predictors of average Brier score (i.e., forecast accuracy).
Variable Selection Approach
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Ind. Diff. Measure

Kitchen-Sink

Reduced

Ridge-1SE

-0.01 (0.07)

0.05 (0.02)*

0.00 (0.02)

0.34 (0.04)***
0.16 (0.02)***
0.43 (0.04)***

0.34 (0.04)***
0.16 (0.02)***
0.43 (0.04)***

0.34 (0.04)***
0.16 (0.02)***
0.38 (0.04)***

0.03 (0.04)
0.00 (0.05)
-0.19 (0.04)***

-0.18 (0.04)***

-0.10 (0.03)***

0.21 (0.08)**

0.24 (0.06)***

Motivation and engagement
Number of questions addressed
Avg. num. updates per question
Prop. fine-grained forecasts

0.07 (0.02)**
0.05 (0.02)*
-0.08 (0.02)***

0.07 (0.02)**
0.05 (0.02)*
-0.08 (0.02)***

Numerical fluency
Threshold of estimative precision
Composite Berlin Numeracy

-0.17 (0.02)***
-0.02 (0.03)

-0.17 (0.02)***

Cognitive ability
Composite Raven’s
Composite CRT

0.07 (0.02)**
0.00 (0.03)

0.07 (0.02)**

Cognitive style
Composite Need for Cognition
One question Fox-Hedgehog
AOMT

0.00 (0.02)
0.01 (0.02)
0.00 (0.02)

(Intercept)
Credibility
Estimated bias ( )
Estimated expertise ( )
Estimated consistency ( )
Experimental condition
Individual, w/training
Grouped, no training
Grouped, w/training
Superforecaster

-0.14 (0.02)***

Demographics
Age
Male
Education = bachelor’s degree
Education = master’s degree

-0.02 (0.02)
0.04 (0.07)
0.02 (0.05)
0.02 (0.05)
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Education = doctorate

0.04 (0.05)

Multiple R2
0.698
0.697
0.672
2
Adjusted R
0.689
0.693
0.67
RMSE
0.549
0.55
0.572
AIC
1282.97
1262.03
1312.64
BIC
1393.98
1317.54
1345.02
Significance levels: * p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001
Note: missingness in individual difference data resolved through mean imputation. All
non-categorical measures standardized; all categorical variables effects-coded.

Discussion. Broadly speaking, the results of Analysis 2a.ii demonstrate that the
linear credibility framework is capable of identifying valid and informative indicators of
“skill” or “proficiency” in subjective probability judgment. Though far from perfect
(indeed, several aspects of these results bear close examination), the general implication
of these findings is that simple models of credibility can provide decision makers with a
great deal of information about (a) who is likely to be a “better” vs. “worse” judge of
uncertain events; and (b) why these differences are likely to exist — at least when fit to a
sufficiently rich data-set, such as that provided by the GJP.
Beginning with simple, pairwise correlations, the validity of bootstrapped
credibility estimates can be seen in (a) the strong positive relationship between forecast
accuracy (average Brier score) and estimated bias ( ); (b) the strong positive
relationship between forecast accuracy and estimated consistency ( ); and (c) the smallto-moderate positive relationship between accuracy and estimated expertise ( ). In and
of themselves, these relationships indicate that credible forecasters are also likely to be
accurate forecasters, lending support to the notion that credibility estimates are
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meaningfully related to errors and biases in judgment. Practically speaking, however, the
insight provided by bootstrapped credibility estimates is not limited to their value as
predictors of forecast accuracy. Indeed, in examining the wider set of correlational
relationships in Table 7, it is apparent that all three measures occupy sensible and
interpretable places within the larger nomological network related to “skill” or
“proficiency” in subjective probability judgment.
In the cases of both bias and consistency, for example, credibility estimates
demonstrate consistent, convergent relationships with nearly all measures that the GJP
has identified as important to successful forecasting (i.e., nearly all non-demographic
items in Table 7), and little to no covariation with incidental variables such age, sex, and
education.19 Though the same cannot be said for estimates of expertise, the relationships
in Table 7 nevertheless provide some indication that better (lower) expertise scores are
systematically related to environmental enrichment (teaming) and cognitive engagement
(threshold of estimative precision). Though far from ideal for a variable that is meant to
capture “good” judgment, post-hoc analyses indicate that the variance of nonstandardized expertise scores was small in the GJP sample, suggesting a relatively
homogenous population (

= 0.06, whereas

( ) = 0.37 and

( ) = 0.15).

19
Out of context, one might predict that successful forecasting strongly covaries with education. In
practice, however, this is unlikely to be true for two reasons. First, while it is reasonable to expect that both
forecasting accuracy and educational attainment are driven by something like general intelligence, the
differential impact of this intelligence-like variable is likely to be relatively small among a population that
excludes participants who have not yet attained a bachelor’s degree. Second, because GJP questions were
limited to the geopolitical domain, it is unlikely that any domain-general variable such as education or
intelligence would be sufficient to drive Brier scores. Instead, as was reported by the GJP, successful
forecasting was predicted by an interactive constellation of factors such as fluid intelligence, intrinsic
motivation, domain knowledge, and cognitive style (Mellers et al., 2015b).
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Thus, is impressive that the linear credibility framework was able to identify covariates of
expertise at all.
As can be seen in Tables 8-10, the results of exploratory regressions concerning
the predictors of credibility tell a similar story. In Table 8, for example, bootstrapped
estimates of bias ( ) are (a) strongly related to both forecast accuracy and
superforecaster status; and (b) are consistently predicted by prominent GJP measures
such as Raven’s progressive matrices (Bors & Stokes, 1998), actively open-minded
thinking (Baron, in press; Baron et al., 2015; Haran et al., 2013; Baron, 2008), and
various measures of motivation and engagement (e.g., number of questions addressed,
average number of updates per question). In Table 10, the results are much the same for
estimates of consistency ( ), with some additional evidence to suggest that training may
play a role in improving the consistency of individuals working alone. Finally, in Table 9,
the results of the reduced model indicate that estimates of expertise ( ) are meaningfully
related to forecast accuracy, even if the Ridge-1SE model rejected this predictor as
statistically tenuous.20 Taken together, these analyses demonstrate that bootstrapped
estimates of bias, expertise, and consistency all exhibit convergent validity with other
indicators of “skill” or “proficiency” in GJP data, and — with the single exception of a

20

Based on a qualitative examination of the data, this is likely because bootstrapped estimates of expertise
( ) in the GJP data-set are noticeably homogenous. When regressed on a (relatively) more heterogeneous
criterion, the resulting regression line is likely to provide a poor fit to the data, as the limited range of the
predictor values will constrain their ability to explain differences among individuals. Under such
conditions, it is conceivable that an intercept-only model would provide a more regularized fit to the
criterion than a model that includes expertise, as appears to have been the case in Table 9.
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small positive relationship between bias and proportion of fine-grained forecasts — did
not display any unexpected, inexplicable, or incorrectly-signed relationships.
Perhaps most notably, however, the results of Analysis 2a.ii demonstrate that
bootstrapped estimates of credibility were strongly predictive of forecast accuracy
(average Brier scores). Indeed, as can be seen in Table 11, the results of the simultaneous
“contest” between GJP measures and linear credibility estimates suggests that the most
parsimonious model of forecast accuracy (i.e., the Ridge-1SE model) was one that
included all three measures of credibility and little else. Indeed, while this model
included two predictors that provide a nod to the importance of enriched environments
(experimental condition = grouped, w/training) and a general facility with numerical
probabilities (threshold of estimative precision), a comparison of the ridge-1SE model
with the reduced and kitchen-sink models suggests that bootstrapped estimates of
credibility are in direct competition for nearly all of the explanatory variance provided by
GJP variables. Though far from a conclusive test, this result is consistent with a highly
attractive narrative. Specifically, the close overlap in the variance explained by these two
sets of predictors suggests that the reason enriched forecasting environments, numerical
fluency, cognitive ability, cognitive style, and motivation are all related to predictive
accuracy is the same reason that credibility is related to predictive accuracy — namely,
that all are related to less severe errors and biases in judgment. Though a direct test of
this hypothesis was impossible with the existing data, I explore this possibility further,
below.
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Analysis 2a.iii: How effective are credibility estimates at predicting forecast
accuracy? (GJP enrichment vs. credibility)
In Analysis 2a.ii (GJP validity), exploratory linear regressions indicated that much
of the variance in forecast accuracy (i.e., average Brier scores) that can be explained by
“environmental enrichment” in the GJP (i.e., by experimental condition) can also be
explained by bootstrapped estimates of credibility. Though far from conclusive, these
results are consistent with the idea that the “skills” imparted by teaming, training, and
superforecaster status may have increased accuracy in the GJP because they reduced the
likelihood of errors and biases in judgment (i.e., increased credibility). Practically
speaking, however, the results of Analysis 2a.ii do not provide any insight into the
relative explanatory power (and/or redundancy) of these two sets of variables — only that
“environmental enrichment” variables and linear credibility estimates are competing for
the same portion of explanatory variance. Thus, in Analysis 2a.iii, I conducted a series of
predictive contests between these two sets of variables to (a) compare the incremental
validity of each set of predictors in models of forecast accuracy; and (b) determine
whether one set of variables is redundant with (or subsumed by) the other.

Method.
Detailed procedure. To compare the predictive validity of bootstrapped
credibility estimates with the GJP’s “environmental enrichment” variables (i.e., teaming,
training, and superforecaster status), I constructed four linear regression models, each of
which used forecast accuracy (i.e., average Brier scores) as its criterion. In the baseline
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model, I included all predictors that were not drawn from the two categories of interest.
In the environmental only model, I added the four effects-coded predictors for
“environmental enrichment” (i.e., experimental condition) to the baseline model.21 In the
credibility only model, I added the three bootstrapped credibility estimates to the
baseline. And in the full model, I included all available predictors to establish a highwater mark for the GJP data’s overall predictive validity. To compare the incremental
value of the GJP’s environmental enrichment variables with that of bootstrapped
credibility estimates, I then conducted a series of likelihood-ratio tests in which I (a)
contrasted the two intermediary models (environmental only and credibility only) with
the baseline model; and (b) contrasted the full model with the two intermediaries. In
cases where models weren’t nested (e.g., environmental only vs. credibility only), I made
qualitative comparisons by examining each model’s multiple R2 and Bayesian
information criterion, or BIC.

Results. The four models used in Analysis 2a.iii can be seen in Table 12.
Likelihood-ratio tests comparing nested models within this set indicate each of the
following:

21

When constructing the environmental only model and the credibility only model, I “added” predictors to
the baseline model in the sense that I added the focal set of predictors to the pool of variables being
included in the model. In all cases, all predictors for each model were estimated simultaneously.
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(a) The inclusion of environmental enrichment variables improved the fit of the
environmental only model over the baseline model by a significantly greater
degree than would be expected by chance, F(735, 739) = 29.92, p < 0.001.

(b) The inclusion of bootstrapped credibility estimates improved the fit of the
credibility only model over the baseline model by a significantly greater degree
than would be expected by chance, F(736, 739) = 306.21, p < 0.001.

(c) The inclusion of environmental enrichment variables improved the fit of the full
model over the credibility only model by a significantly greater degree than would
be expected by chance, F(732, 736) = 6.22, p < 0.001.

(d) The inclusion of bootstrapped credibility estimates improved the fit of the full
model over the environmental only model by a significantly greater degree than
would be expected by chance, F(732, 735)= 243.75, p < 0.001.

This pattern of results is corroborated by an examination of multiple R2 and BIC.
In the case of both intermediary models (i.e., the environmental only model and the
credibility only model), the addition of the focal predictors provided a sizeable
improvement over the baseline, and the addition of the complementary predictors (to
arrive at the full model) offered a noticeable improvement over each of the
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intermediaries. Qualitatively speaking, however, the impact of adding bootstrapped
credibility estimates to the environmental only model was considerably larger than that of
adding the predictors in the reverse order.

Table 12
[GJP data]: A comparison of credibility measures vs. environmental enrichment
variables as predictors of average Brier score (i.e., forecast accuracy).
Model
Ind. Diff. Measure
(Intercept)

Baseline
-0.01 (0.11)

Envir. Only
-0.08 (0.1)

Credibility
Est. bias ( )
Est. expert. ( )
Est. consist. ( )
Exp. condition
(Envir. enrich.)
Indiv., w/train.
Group, no train.
Group, w/train.
Superforecaster
Motiv. & Engage.
Num. questions
Avg. n. updates
Prop. fine-grain

Cred. Only

Full

-0.06 (0.07)

-0.01 (0.07)

0.36 (0.04)***
0.16 (0.02)***
0.42 (0.04)***

0.34 (0.04)***
0.16 (0.02)***
0.43 (0.04)***

0.33 (0.06)***
-0.05 (0.07)
-0.36 (0.06)***
-0.32 (0.11)**

0.03 (0.04)
0.00 (0.05)
-0.19 (0.04)***
0.21 (0.08)**

0.07 (0.03)*
-0.06 (0.03)
-0.13 (0.03)***

0.03 (0.03)
-0.03 (0.03)
-0.12 (0.03)***

0.08 (0.02)***
0.05 (0.02)*
-0.08 (0.02)***

0.07 (0.02)**
0.05 (0.02)*
-0.08 (0.02)***

Num. fluency
Thresh. precision -0.45 (0.03)***
Comp. Numer.
-0.11 (0.04)**

-0.36 (0.03)***
-0.09 (0.04)*

-0.16 (0.02)***
-0.02 (0.03)

-0.17 (0.02)***
-0.02 (0.03)

Cognitive ability
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Comp. Raven’s
Comp. CRT

-0.02 (0.04)
-0.10 (0.04)*

-0.01 (0.03)
-0.11 (0.04)**

0.08 (0.02)**
0.01 (0.03)

0.07 (0.02)**
0.00 (0.03)

Cognitive style
Comp. NF Cog.
Fox-Hedgehog
AOMT

0.00 (0.03)
0.03 (0.03)
-0.07 (0.03)*

-0.01 (0.03)
0.04 (0.03)
-0.07 (0.03)*

0.00 (0.02)
0.01 (0.02)
0.01 (0.02)

0.00 (0.02)
0.01 (0.02)
0.00 (0.02)

Demographics
Age
Male
Ed. = bachelor’s
Ed. = master’s
Ed. = doctorate

-0.03 (0.03)
-0.02 (0.1)
0.14 (0.08)
-0.02 (0.07)
0.02 (0.08)

0.01 (0.03)
0.01 (0.09)
0.08 (0.07)
-0.04 (0.07)
0.01 (0.07)

-0.02 (0.02)
0.04 (0.07)
0.02 (0.05)
0.02 (0.05)
0.02 (0.05)

-0.02 (0.02)
0.04 (0.07)
0.02 (0.05)
0.02 (0.05)
0.04 (0.05)

Multiple R2
0.298
0.397
0.688
0.698
2
Adjusted R
0.284
0.381
0.68
0.689
RMSE
0.837
0.776
0.558
0.549
AIC
1905.61
1799.73
1300.22
1282.97
BIC
1984.24
1896.87
1392.73
1393.98
Significance levels: * p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001
Note: missingness in individual difference data resolved through mean imputation. All
non-categorical measures standardized; all categorical variables effects-coded.

Discussion. The results of Analysis 2a.iii indicate that (a) the GJP’s
environmental enrichment variables; and (b) bootstrapped credibility estimates both
demonstrate a high degree of predictive validity with respect to average Brier scores (i.e.,
forecast accuracy) in the GJP. In both cases, the inclusion of these variables significantly
increased the fit of linear regression models designed to predict forecasting accuracy —
both (a) with respect to a baseline model that included all non-focal predictors; and (b)
with respect to each other. Taken together, these findings suggest that both environmental
enrichment variables and bootstrapped credibility estimates are useful predictors of
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forecasting accuracy in the GJP, and that neither set of variables was redundant with (or
subsumed) by the other.
Critically, however, the results of the likelihood-ratio tests reported in Table 12
indicate that the incremental validity of environmental enrichment variables was
considerably smaller than that of bootstrapped credibility estimates when added to the
complementary intermediary model. From a qualitative perspective, this result suggests
that most (but not all) of the explanatory power provided by environmental enrichment
variables can also be provided by bootstrapped credibility estimates. This inference is
also supported by disparate changes in multiple R2 and BIC when moving from each of
the intermediary models to the full model. When bootstrapped credibility estimates were
added to the environmental only model, the multiple R2 of the full model increased by
0.30 and its BIC decreased by 502.89 — the latter of which is more than 50-times larger
than the conventional threshold for a “very large” improvement (Raftery, 1995). In
contrast, when environmental enrichment variables were added to the credibility only
model, the multiple R2 of the full model only increased by 0.01 and its BIC increased
(i.e., got worse) by 1.25 to account for the model’s reduced degree of parsimony. Thus,
while likelihood-ratio tests indicate that environmental enrichment variables can account
for unique variance in forecast accuracy in GJP data, a closer examination suggests that
the practical value of this effect is small.

General Discussion
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Despite the simplicity of the linear credibility framework, the results of Study 2a
demonstrate that linear regression can provide reliable and valid estimates of credibility
when fit to empirical data. Indeed, despite its statistical simplicity, the linear credibility
framework provided informative estimates of “skill” or “proficiency” in subjective
probability judgment at nearly every juncture of Study 2a. In Analysis 2a.i (GJP
reliability), repeated trials of the credibility estimation procedure demonstrated that it is
possible to derive reliable credibility estimates (both bootstrapped and non-bootstrapped)
using a calibration sample-size of 50 judgments and as few as 10 bootstrap trials — both
of which are small enough to have made the linear credibility framework a viable tool for
researchers in the GJP. In Analysis 2a.ii (GJP validity), exploratory regressions
demonstrated that bootstrapped credibility estimates (a) can be used to predict forecasting
accuracy; (b) covary with a wide variety of measures related to “skill” or “proficiency” in
the GJP; and (c) generally account for a large proportion of explanatory variance in
models of forecast accuracy. Finally, in Analysis 2a.iii (GJP enrichment vs. credibility),
likelihood-ratio tests demonstrated that bootstrapped credibility estimates are more
strongly predictive of forecasting accuracy than the GJP’s environmental enrichment
variables — very nearly to the point of making them redundant. Thus, it is evident from
the results of Study 2a that linear credibility estimates can provide a great deal of insight
into who is likely to be a “better” vs. “worse” forecaster in the GJP.
Critically, however, there was one area of Study 2a where the linear credibility
framework did not perform as expected. In Analysis 2a.ii (GJP validity), exploratory
linear regressions did not reveal a strong network of convergent validity between
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individual difference measures and bootstrapped estimates of expertise ( ). Fortunately,
a qualitative examination of the data suggests that convergent validity may have failed to
manifest in this case because GJP forecasters were relatively homogenous in terms of
expertise (see also: Footnote 20). Despite the ease with which this anomaly can be
explained, however, its presence raises an important question. To what extent are the
results of Study 2a a function of the GJP’s uncharacteristically rich data-set?
Furthermore, given that one of the main selling-points of the GJP is that its forecasters
were exceedingly accurate, how likely are the results of Study 2a to generalize to less
extraordinary (and perhaps less-well studied) populations? To address these questions,
Study 2b examined the applicability of the linear credibility framework to a more
ordinary sample of forecasters.

Study 2b: Reliability and Validity of Credibility Estimates Derived from March
Madness Data (MM Reliability/Validity)
In Study 2a (GJP reliability/validity), I demonstrated that the linear credibility
framework can provide reliable and valid predictors of “skill” or “proficiency” in
subjective probability judgment under ideal conditions. To be useful to decision makers,
however — and, indeed, to represent a meaningful contribution to decision science — the
linear credibility framework must be informative across a variety of domains. In practice,
therefore, the results of Study 2a represent a rather weak (and perhaps nonrepresentative) test of the linear credibility framework as a tool for identifying “better”
vs. “worse” judges of subjective probability.
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To remedy this problem, Study 2b examined the reliability and validity of
credibility estimates derived from the 2017 NCAA Division-I Men’s Basketball
Championship, or what is commonly known as the 2017 “March Madness” tournament.
Unlike forecasts in the GJP, predictions in Study 2b were provided by novice forecasters
who (a) had only minimal (and/or preexisting) training in subjective probability judgment
(for the full text of the instructions provided to participants, see: Appendix B); and (b) did
not have the benefit of working in collaborative teams. In addition, forecasters in Study
2b had less than a month to learn from their mistakes in vivo and were privy to only the
most basic feedback about the quality of their predictions (i.e., which team won in a oneoff event). Finally, and perhaps most critically, forecasters in Study 2b were constrained
to a maximum of 67 judgments, thereby limiting the power of any credibility assessment
to a rather stringent, real-world scope.
Based on these differences, the purpose of Study 2b was to provide a more
representative test of the linear credibility framework. Strictly speaking, however, Study
2b also contained several features that were out of the ordinary. First, Study 2b used a
sample that was even more “convenient” than the typical, behavioral sciences baseline
(i.e., affluent, Western college students). Specifically, by targeting recruitment efforts at
student organizations such as sports teams and fraternities, it is likely that participants in
Study 2b were individuals who were particularly interested in the March Madness
tournament. On the one hand, this self-selection bias might increase the validity of Study
2b’s results because the participants who completed the study were (a) especially likely
to be engaged with the task; and (b) the same set of individuals who might use credibility
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information to improve their March Madness predictions in future. On the other hand, the
intrinsic motivation of participants in Study 2b might also have reduced its validity, in
that preexisting loyalties to teams, conferences, and/or geographic regions might have led
to biased reasoning about outcomes (thereby undermining the validity of crowdsourced
beliefs).
Perhaps more importantly, however, Study 2b may have been unrepresentative in
that it asked participants to provide SPJs about extremely uncertain events. Indeed,
according to the forecasting blog FiveThirtyEight, a historical analysis of the 11.6 million
tournament brackets registered on espn.com in 2015 reveals that only 273 individuals
maintained a perfect prediction record beyond the tournament’s first day (Paine & Boice,
2017, March 14). Practically speaking, therefore, it is evident that outcomes in the March
Madness tournament are extremely difficult to predict. Even when pooling information
across individuals, therefore, it is likely that the predictive “signal” associated with
estimated optima in Study 2b was relatively weak. Thus, while Study 2b is more
representative than the Good Judgment Project in its scope and design, it may also be
unrepresentative as a test of the linear credibility framework in that it sets an exceedingly
high bar.

Analysis 2b.i: Under what conditions are credibility estimates reliable? (MM
reliability)
To apply the linear credibility framework to March Madness data, I once again
had to select three analytic parameters: a calibration sample size (ncal), a minimum
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prediction sample size (npred), and a number of bootstrap trials (nboot). Because forecasters
were limited to a maximum of 67 predictions in the March Madness tournament, the
minimum prediction sample size (npred) for Study 2b was set to an a priori value of 1 to
maximize statistical power. To select appropriate values for the other two parameters, I
once again conducted an experiment. Similar to Analysis 2a.i (GJP reliability), the
purpose of this experiment was to examine the empirical parameter ranges under which
reliable credibility estimates could be extracted from the March Madness data.

Method.
Detailed Procedure. To identify an appropriate set of analytic parameters for
Study 2b, Analysis 2b.i employed the same two-armed design as Analysis 2a.i (GJP
reliability). In the first arm, I examined the sensitivity of non-bootstrapped credibility
estimates to five levels of calibration sample size, ncal = {10, 20, …, 50}, with reliability
in each cell estimated across 30 bootstrap trials. In the second arm, I examined the
sensitivity of bootstrapped credibility estimates to changes in calibration sample size and
number of bootstrap trials according to a 5 × 12 design: ncal = {10, 20, …, 50} × nboot =
{10, 20, …, 100, 200, 250}, with reliability in each cell estimated across three runs of the
General Procedure. Similar to Analysis 2a.i (GJP reliability), the purpose of the first arm
of this experiment was to identify the minimum calibration sample size at which the
effects of recalibration were likely to be consistent, and the purpose of the second arm
was to ensure that bootstrapped credibility estimates would be appropriate for later
analyses of validity.
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Results. The results on Analysis 2b.i can be seen in Figures 10-13, below. In
Figure 10, the reliability of non-bootstrapped estimates of credibility are once again
graphed in a single plot, where the y-axis represents reliability (i.e., intraclass correlation,
or ICC); the x-axis represents calibration sample size (ncal); and separate curves represent
different components of credibility. In Figures 11-13, the reliability of bootstrapped
estimates of bias, expertise, and consistency are graphed in separate plots. In each of
these plots, the y-axis represents reliability (ICC); the x-axis represents the number of
bootstrap trials (nboot); and separate curves represent different calibration sample sizes
(ncal).

Figure 10
[MM data]: Reliability of non-bootstrapped estimates of credibility, varying by
calibration sample size (ncal).
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Figure 11
[MM data]: Reliability of bootstrapped estimates of bias ( ), varying by number of
bootstrap trials (nboot) and calibration sample size (ncal).

Figure 12
[MM data]: Reliability of bootstrapped estimates of expertise ( ), varying by number of
bootstrap trials (nboot) and calibration sample size (ncal).

Figure 13
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[MM data]: Reliability of bootstrapped estimates of consistency ( ), varying by number
of bootstrap trials (nboot) and calibration sample size (ncal).

Discussion. Despite the high bar set by the March Madness study, the results of
Analysis 2b.i indicate that the linear credibility framework was able to extract reliable
credibility estimates from the available data. Indeed, the results of the first arm of
Analysis 2b.i suggest that non-bootstrapped estimates of expertise and consistency
exceeded the conventional threshold for “excellent” reliability (ICC ≥ 0.75; Ciccetti,
1994) at a smaller calibration sample-size than in the GJP (ncal = 20 vs. 50). Though the
same cannot be said for non-bootstrapped estimates of bias, even these reached a
conventionally “good” level of reliability (0.60 ≤ ICC ≤ 0.74; Ciccetti, 1994), suggesting
that errors and biases were no less prevalent in the March Madness data than elsewhere
— even if crowd aggregates were generally less accurate.
In addition, Analysis 2b.i demonstrated that highly reliable credibility estimates
could be extracted from the March Madness data by employing a nominal degree of
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bootstrapping. Indeed, in all observed cases (Figures 12 and 13), intraclass correlations
never fell below a value of 0.93 — a level that is very high for empirical data. As with
non-bootstrapped estimates, bootstrapped estimates of bias (Figure 11) were considerably
less reliable than the other two components of credibility. Even here, however, nearly all
observations fell above the 0.75 threshold for “excellent” intraclass correlation, and in
cases where they didn’t, calibration sample size was never more than ncal = 20.
Based on these findings, the analytic parameters selected for Study 2b were: a
calibration sample size of ncal = 50, to maximize the likelihood of consistent recalibration
while still leaving a non-trivial number of predictions out-of-sample; a minimum
prediction sample-size of npred = 1 to maximize statistical power; and — in the absence of
strong concerns about the reliability of bootstrapped credibility estimates — nboot = 100
bootstrap trials to ensure a sufficient number of trials over which to examine the effects
of recalibration.

Analysis 2b.ii: What are the predictors of credibility and what does credibility
predict? (MM validity)
In Analysis 2a.ii (GJP validity), exploratory linear regressions revealed a rich
network of convergent validity between bootstrapped credibility estimates and predictors
of accuracy in the GJP. Though far from providing a face-valid readout of each
forecaster’s bias, expertise, and consistency, these results suggest that linear credibility
estimates can help decision makers learn a great deal about the “quality” of an
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individual’s SPJs — especially if their goal is to predict forecast accuracy (i.e., average
Brier scores).
Practically speaking, however, convergent validity with individual difference
measures in the GJP represents a low bar for the linear credibility framework. Prior to the
current research, Mellers et al. (2015a; 2015b; 2014) had already demonstrated that GJP
forecasters (a) could produce remarkably accurate predictions about the outcomes of
geopolitical events; (b) varied widely in their forecast accuracy; (c) generally tended to
have greater accuracy when trained in probabilistic reasoning and/or working in groups;
and (d) tended to become more accurate over time. Based on these results, Mellers et al.
concluded that geopolitical forecasting is a domain where “skill” or “proficiency” can be
actively cultivated, and that doing so can have a direct impact on forecast accuracy. Thus,
Mellers et al. had already provided a strong basis for assuming the forecasters in the GJP
varied in terms of credibility, and that these differences were at least partially responsible
for differences in Brier scores. In Analysis 2a.ii (GJP validity), therefore, the only open
question was whether linear credibility estimates could capture these differences.
In the March Madness data, by contrast, the conceptual coupling between
accurate forecasting and credible forecasting was considerably weaker. Strictly speaking,
the assumptions of the linear credibility framework were still the same: if there is
predictive signal in the March Madness data and if one can use Baron et al.’s (2014)
method to amplify it and if the resulting estimated optima tend to be more accurate than
the beliefs held by most individuals and if an individual’s SPJs tend to depart from
estimated optima in systematic ways and if those departures can be meaningfully
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captured by linear regression, then the linear credibility framework should yield estimates
that are strongly predictive of forecast accuracy. However, because the March Madness
data were more likely to violate these assumptions than forecasts from the GJP (e.g.,
participants likely had less domain knowledge; March Madness predictions likely yielded
weaker predictive signal; team loyalties likely made some participants’ judgement
strategies less reliable), it was an empirical question whether the rich predictive validities
observed in Analysis 2a.ii (GJP validity) would replicate.
To determine if they do, Analysis 2b.ii examined the validity of bootstrapped
credibility estimates derived from the 2017 March Madness data. In an ideal scenario, the
results of this analysis would reveal a rich network of convergent validity between
credible forecasting and “good” forecasting, as defined by forecast accuracy (i.e., average
Brier scores). Even if they don’t, however, the observation of any non-trivial predictive
validity in Analysis 2b.ii would suggest that decision makers might still benefit from
examining credibility. Regardless of whether linear regression is a “good” model of
credibility, that is, the existence of predictive validity in Analysis 2b.ii would suggest that
it is not a bankrupt one. Thus, as long as bootstrapped credibility estimates are not
orthogonal to forecast accuracy, the March Madness data must contain some degree of
information about the “quality” or relative validity of an individual’s judgments. If this
turns out to be true, then even weak results in Analysis 2b.ii would suggest that decision
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makers might benefit from examining credibility, as there are very few costs associated
with probing this information and nothing to gain by leaving it on the table.22

Method.
Detailed Procedure. Using the analytic parameters selected in Analysis 2b.i (MM
reliability) (i.e., ncal = 50; npred = 1; nboot =100), I used the General Procedure to arrive at
bootstrapped credibility estimates for each forecaster in the March Madness study (i.e.,
,

, and

). After excluding participants who provided too few forecasts (< 51), this

data-set included a working sample of 118 participants. Among these participants, the
mean age was 24.4 (Mdn. = 23.0; SD = 5.7), and 43% of participants self-identified as
having completed “some undergraduate” education (0% reported no college education;
23% reported an associate’s or bachelor’s degree; 15% reported “some postbaccalaureate” education; and 20% reported an advanced degree). In addition, 48% of
participants self-identified as female (50% male; 1% other/neither) and 50% selfidentified as “white or Caucasian” (19% black or African American; 13% East Asian; 8%
Hispanic or Latinx; 4% South Asian; 5% Other; 1% Middle Eastern; 0% Native
American; 0% Pacific Islander; 0% Other Indigenous People).

22

In practice, of course, the low-cost of credibility information does not mean that there is no risk in using
it. As such, any decision maker interested in using credibility information to recalibrate SPJs (and by
extension, influence decisions) should carefully consider the reliability and validity of credibility estimates
before putting them into action. Fortunately, the research presented in this dissertation provides a
preliminary set of analytic tools for doing just that.
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After estimating credibility, I transformed estimates of bias and expertise to
absolute differences from the normative values implied by identity (i.e., I calculated
and

by taking the absolute difference of the untransformed values from 0 and 1,

respectively). Then, using parallel procedures to those used in Analysis 2a.ii (GJP
validity) (i.e., all continuous variables standardized; all categorical variables effectscoded), I calculated pairwise correlations and conducted exploratory linear regressions to
examine the relationships among bootstrapped credibility estimates ( ,

, and

) and

the individual difference measures captured in the March Madness study.
In the interest of replicating Analysis 2a.ii (GJP validity) as closely as possible,
the March Madness study administered a similar set of individual difference measures as
those captured by the GJP. Once again, the principal variable of interest was an
individual’s forecast accuracy (average Brier score), but exploratory analyses were
conducted across a broad range of variables. Specifically, in the tables below, Berlin
Numeracy reflects the number of questions a participant answered correctly on the Berlin
Numeracy Test (Cokely et al., 2012). CRT reflects a forecaster’s score on the extended
Cognitive Reflection Task (Baron et al., 2015; see also: Frederick, 2005). Need for
Cognition reflects a participant’s score on the Need for Cognition questionnaire
(Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). One question Fox-Hedgehog reflects a participant’s response
to a single-item scale measuring the extent to which an individual’s approach to problem
solving tends to rely on knowing “one big thing” rather than “many little things” (for
additional details on this measure, see: Tetlock, 2005). And AOMT reflects a participant’s
score on Baron’s 11-item Actively Open-Minded Thinking scale (in press).
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In addition to these measures, the March Madness study also included measures
of Working memory, which reflects the number of items a participant correctly recalled
after memorizing six verbal cues under high cognitive load (here, timed arithmetic
problems; for an overview of working memory, see Baddeley & Hitch, 1974); and a set
of self-report domain knowledge questions that asked participants to rate their agreement
with statements claiming “extensive expertise” in the areas of “college basketball,”
“basketball, in general,” “probabilistic prediction,” and “another type of prediction or
prediction, in general” (7-point Likert, anchored at “strongly disagree” and “strongly
agree”). As in the GJP, participants also provided demographic information about their
age, race, gender, and level of education, though the March Madness study offered a
wider range of response options in each of the latter three categories.
Because this set of variables once again presented a non-trivial likelihood of
redundancy, multi-collinearity, and/or suppression effects, exploratory regressions in
Analysis 2b.ii were conducted under three approaches to variable selection: the kitchen
sink approach, the reduced approach, and the ridge-1SE approach (for additional details,
see the Detailed Procedure section of Analysis 2a.ii (GJP validity)). By comparing these
three approaches, I was once again able to observe instances where variables were
competing for overlapping segments of explanatory variance.

Results. The results on Analysis 2b.ii can be seen in Tables 13-17, below. Simple
correlations between bootstrapped credibility estimates ( ,

, and

) and individual

difference measures can be seen in Table 13; exploratory regression analyses examining
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the predictors of credibility can be seen Tables 14-16; and an exploratory regression
analysis concerning the predictors of forecast accuracy (i.e., average Brier scores) can be
seen in Table 17.

Table 13
[MM data]: Simple correlations between credibility estimates and individual difference
measures.
Credibility Estimate
Ind. Diff. Measure
(Bias)

(Expertise)

(Consist.)

0.13

0.27**

0.76***

-0.17

-0.13

-0.53***

-0.15
0.07

-0.03
-0.09

-0.29**
-0.30***

Cognitive style
Need for Cognition
One question Fox-Hedgehog
AOMT

-0.14
-0.11
-0.20*

-0.10
0.01
-0.08

-0.17
0.00
-0.26**

Domain knowledge (self-report)
College basketball
Basketball (general)
Probabilistic prediction

-0.06
-0.02
-0.07

-0.03
-0.10
-0.12

-0.30***
-0.28**
-0.24*

-0.01

-0.13

-0.15

0.11
-0.01

0.00
-0.13

0.08
-0.35***

Forecast accuracy
Average Brier score
Numerical fluency
Berlin Numeracy score
Cognitive ability
CRT
Working memory

Prediction (general)
Demographics
Age
Gender = male
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Gender = female
0.01
0.13
0.35***
Race = black/African American
0.10
-0.04
0.28**
Race = East Asian
0.01
0.01
-0.08
Race = Hispanic/Latinx
0.17
-0.01
0.09
Race = Middle Eastern
0.01
0.02
0.03
Race = South Asian
0.02
-0.02
0.06
Race = white/Caucasian
-0.05
-0.02
-0.28**
Education = some undergrad.
0.08
-0.15
0.01
Education = bachelor’s degree
-0.09
0.12
-0.07
Education = master’s degree
0.05
0.02
0.06
Education = doctorate
0.04
0.05
-0.07
Significance levels: * p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001
Note: missingness in individual difference data resolved through mean imputation. All
non-categorical measures standardized; all categorical variables effects-coded.
Table 14
[MM data]: Predictors of bootstrapped alpha (i.e., bias;

).

Variable Selection Approach
Ind. Diff. Measure

Kitchen-Sink

(Intercept)

-0.04 (0.51)

Forecast accuracy
Average Brier score

0.12 (0.12)

Numerical fluency
Berlin Numeracy

-0.16 (0.15)

Cognitive ability
CRT
Working memory

0.07 (0.15)
0.24 (0.11)*

Cognitive style
Need for Cognition
One question Fox-Hedgehog
AOMT

-0.11 (0.14)
-0.05 (0.11)
-0.11 (0.16)

Reduced
0.00 (0.09)

Ridge-1SE
0.00 (0.09)

0.07 (0.09)
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Domain knowledge (self-report)
College basketball
Basketball (general)
Probabilistic prediction
Prediction (general)

-0.06 (0.17)
0.04 (0.18)
-0.10 (0.22)
0.11 (0.21)

Demographics
Age
Gender = male
Gender = female
Race = Black/African American
Race = East Asian
Race = Hispanic/Latinx
Race = Middle Eastern
Race = South Asian
Race = White/Caucasian
Education = some undergrad.
Education = bachelor’s degree
Education = some post-bac.
Education = master’s degree
Education = doctorate

0.24 (0.15)
-0.13 (0.48)
-0.35 (0.46)
0.15 (0.32)
0.14 (0.32)
0.63 (0.37)
-1.07 (0.94)
0.11 (0.47)
0.14 (0.24)
0.34 (0.28)
-0.01 (0.28)
0.02 (0.34)
-0.04 (0.33)
-0.36 (0.46)

Multiple R2
0.18
0.005
0
2
Adjusted R
-0.043
-0.004
0
RMSE
0.902
0.993
0.996
AIC
364.44
339.33
337.87
BIC
439.25
347.64
343.41
Significance levels: * p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001
Note: missingness in individual difference data resolved through mean imputation. All
non-categorical measures standardized; all categorical variables effects-coded.
Table 15
[MM data]: Predictors of bootstrapped beta (i.e., expertise;

).

Variable Selection Approach
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Ind. Diff. Measure

Kitchen-Sink

Reduced

(Intercept)

0.34 (0.51)

0.00 (0.09)

Forecast accuracy
Average Brier score

0.3 (0.12)*

0.26 (0.09)**

Numerical fluency
Berlin Numeracy

-0.05 (0.15)

Cognitive ability
CRT
Working memory

0.16 (0.15)
-0.05 (0.11)

Cognitive style
Need for Cognition
One question Fox-Hedgehog
AOMT

-0.08 (0.14)
-0.03 (0.11)
-0.02 (0.16)

Domain knowledge (self-report)
College basketball
Basketball (general)
Probabilistic prediction
Prediction (general)

0.19 (0.17)
-0.05 (0.18)
-0.02 (0.22)
-0.08 (0.21)

Demographics
Age
Gender = male
Gender = female
Race = Black/African American
Race = East Asian
Race = Hispanic/Latinx
Race = Middle Eastern
Race = South Asian
Race = White/Caucasian
Education = some undergrad.
Education = bachelor’s degree
Education = some post-bac.

-0.10 (0.15)
-0.32 (0.49)
-0.14 (0.47)
-0.13 (0.32)
0.07 (0.32)
-0.09 (0.38)
0.3 (0.95)
0.11 (0.48)
0.02 (0.24)
-0.34 (0.29)
0.19 (0.28)
0.02 (0.35)

Ridge-1SE
0.00 (0.09)
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Education = master’s degree
Education = doctorate

0.08 (0.34)
-0.13 (0.46)

Multiple R2
0.166
0.07
0
Adjusted R2
-0.061
0.062
0
RMSE
0.91
0.96
0.996
AIC
366.5
331.27
337.87
BIC
441.31
339.59
343.41
Significance levels: * p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001
Note: missingness in individual difference data resolved through mean imputation. All
non-categorical measures standardized; all categorical variables effects-coded.
Table 16
[MM data]: Predictors of bootstrapped sigma (i.e., consistency;

).

Variable Selection Approach
Ind. Diff. Measure

Kitchen-Sink

Reduced

Ridge-1SE

(Intercept)

0.26 (0.28)

0.04 (0.06)

0.00 (0.06)

Forecast accuracy
Average Brier score

0.65 (0.07)***

0.69 (0.06)***

0.65 (0.06)***

Numerical fluency
Berlin Numeracy

-0.30 (0.08)***

-0.32 (0.07)***

-0.29 (0.06)***

Cognitive ability
CRT
Working memory

0.23 (0.08)**
-0.12 (0.06)*

0.12 (0.07)
-0.13 (0.06)*

Cognitive style
Need for Cognition
One question Fox-Hedgehog
AOMT

-0.10 (0.08)
0.03 (0.06)
0.01 (0.09)

Domain knowledge (self-report)
College basketball
Basketball (general)
Probabilistic prediction

0.08 (0.1)
-0.08 (0.1)
-0.17 (0.12)
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Prediction (general)
Demographics
Age
Gender = male
Gender = female
Race = Black/African American
Race = East Asian
Race = Hispanic/Latinx
Race = Middle Eastern
Race = South Asian
Race = White/Caucasian
Education = some undergrad.
Education = bachelor’s degree
Education = some post-bac.
Education = master’s degree
Education = doctorate

0.24 (0.11)*

0.11 (0.06)

0.16 (0.08)*
-0.17 (0.27)
-0.01 (0.26)
0.11 (0.18)
-0.13 (0.18)
-0.01 (0.21)
0.06 (0.52)
0.30 (0.26)
-0.15 (0.13)
0.01 (0.16)
-0.20 (0.16)
0.03 (0.19)
-0.42 (0.18)*
-0.38 (0.25)

0.04 (0.06)

-0.30 (0.16)

Multiple R2
0.749
0.693
0.648
Adjusted R2
0.681
0.673
0.642
RMSE
0.499
0.552
0.59
AIC
224.8
212.56
218.51
BIC
299.61
237.49
229.59
Significance levels: * p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001
Note: missingness in individual difference data resolved through mean imputation. All
non-categorical measures standardized; all categorical variables effects-coded.
Table 17
[MM data]: Predictors of average Brier score (i.e., forecast accuracy).
Variable Selection Approach
Ind. Diff. Measure

Kitchen-Sink

(Intercept)

-0.37 (0.3)

Credibility
Estimated bias ( )

-0.03 (0.06)

Reduced
-0.04 (0.06)

Ridge-1SE
0.00 (0.06)
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Estimated expertise ( )
Estimated consistency ( )

0.17 (0.06)**
0.78 (0.08)***

Numerical fluency
Berlin Numeracy

0.14 (0.09)

Cognitive ability
CRT
Working memory

-0.25 (0.09)**
0.08 (0.07)

Cognitive style
Need for Cognition
One question Fox-Hedgehog
AOMT

0.11 (0.08)
-0.02 (0.06)
-0.05 (0.09)

Domain knowledge (self-report)
College basketball
Basketball (general)
Probabilistic prediction
Prediction (general)

-0.18 (0.1)
0.02 (0.1)
0.22 (0.13)
-0.25 (0.12)*

Demographics
Age
Gender = male
Gender = female
Race = Black/African American
Race = East Asian
Race = Hispanic/Latinx
Race = Middle Eastern
Race = South Asian
Race = White/Caucasian
Education = some undergrad.
Education = bachelor’s degree
Education = some post-bac.
Education = master’s degree
Education = doctorate

-0.10 (0.09)
0.31 (0.28)
0.27 (0.27)
-0.03 (0.19)
0.04 (0.19)
-0.05 (0.22)
-0.19 (0.56)
-0.24 (0.28)
-0.03 (0.14)
-0.01 (0.17)
0.09 (0.17)
-0.04 (0.2)
0.49 (0.2)*
0.46 (0.27)

0.15 (0.06)*
0.72 (0.06)***

0.76 (0.06)***

-0.04 (0.06)

-0.13 (0.06)*

0.32 (0.16)*
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Multiple R2
0.721
0.636
0.577
Adjusted R2
0.637
0.62
0.573
RMSE
0.526
0.6
0.648
AIC
241.2
228.45
238.4
BIC
321.55
247.85
246.71
Significance levels: * p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001
Note: missingness in individual difference data resolved through mean imputation. All
non-categorical measures standardized; all categorical variables effects-coded.

Discussion. From a purely descriptive perspective, the results of Analysis 2b.ii
tell a mixed story about the validity of bootstrapped credibility estimates derived from the
March Madness data. As can be seen in Table 13, simple correlations reveal (a) a strong
positive relationship between bootstrapped estimates of consistency ( ) and forecast
accuracy (average Brier score); and (b) a rich network of convergent validity with other
relevant variables (the only effects with unexpected signs and/or magnitudes are: gender;
and race = white/Caucasian). In this same table, however, bootstrapped estimates of
expertise ( ) only demonstrate a small-to-moderate relationship with forecast accuracy
and bootstrapped estimates of bias ( ) don’t show any significant relationship with Brier
score, whatsoever. Somewhat surprisingly, bootstrapped estimates of bias and expertise
also don’t seem to share any meaningful relationships with the other variables measured
in the March Madness Study, beyond generally tending to have the expected signs.
As shown in Tables 14-16, exploratory linear regressions tell a similar story. In
Table 16, bootstrapped estimates of consistency demonstrate a strong, predictive
relationship with forecast accuracy and show a small (yet promising) degree of
convergent validity with numeracy and working memory (the former of which can be
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seen in the reduced model but does not make the cut for the statistically stringent ridge1SE model). By contrast, bootstrapped estimates of expertise demonstrate only a
moderate degree of convergent validity with forecast accuracy (Table 15), and
bootstrapped estimates of bias are predicted by nothing except working memory (Table
14). Notably, however, this singular effect is (a) fairly weak; (b) only observed in the
atheoretical kitchen sink model; and (c) not in the expected direction. Thus, the results of
Analysis 2b.ii indicate that consistency and expertise are the only components of
credibility that could have provided any insight into “skill” or “proficiency” in the March
Madness study, and that the latter’s contribution was quite small — a conclusion that is
corroborated by Table 17.
Based on these results, it is tempting to conclude that the linear credibility
framework was not well suited to capturing an individual’s “true” degree of credibility in
Study 2b. When considered in the context of the March Madness data, however, there are
at least two reasons why this conclusion may be overstated. First, bootstrapped estimates
of consistency ( ) were able to explain a large proportion of the variance in forecast
accuracy. Indeed, even though bootstrapped measures of bias ( ) and expertise ( )
didn’t add much to the story, the results presented in Table 17 indicate that consistency
alone was able to account for 57% of the observed variance in average Brier scores. In
practice, therefore, this result suggests that the construct-validity of bias, expertise, and
consistency may be rather weak (i.e., the linear credibility framework’s three-component
model of credibility may not have been empirically justified). From the perspective of the
“big picture,” however, the overall quality of the information provided by the linear
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credibility framework was strong. Thus, it an overstatement to conclude that the linear
credibility framework “was not informative” in Study 2b.
Perhaps more importantly, however, the second reason to be circumspect about
the results of Analysis 2b.ii it is that there are two plausible explanations for bias and
expertise’s weak predictive validity. The first is that the linear credibility framework did
not provide an accurate model of the latent construct of credibility, suggesting that the
model, the construct, or both were poorly specified. The second is that the March
Madness data did not contain much information about “skillful” forecasting to begin
with, suggesting that there was little signal for the linear credibility framework to
amplify. Because Analysis 2b.ii cannot disambiguate between these two explanations, it
is premature to conclude that the linear credibility framework was “ill suited” to its task
in Study 2b.
In the interest of disentangling these two explanations, however, I conducted
several post-hoc analyses. In general, these analyses revealed a relatively weak degree of
predictive signal in the March Madness data — suggesting, perhaps, that the weak results
of Analysis 2b.ii can be attributed to the data, rather than the linear credibility
framework. Consider, for example, the estimated optima used in Study 2b (MM
reliability/validity). Even though these aggregates were used as a stand-in for “optimal”
judgments, average Brier scores indicate that they were less accurate than 16% of
individual forecasters. In addition, these so-called “optima” were only slightly better than
the average forecaster at predicting win/loss outcomes. If all probability estimates in the
March Madness study were collapsed to binary (i.e., yes/no) predictions, that is, then the
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predictions implied by estimated optima would have been correct 75% of the time,
whereas the average forecaster was correct 66% of the time (Mdn. = 66%; SD = 6%).
Though a Wilcoxon signed-rank test indicates that this difference is significant (V = 68, p
< 0.001), the practical value of this improvement is debatable, given that 6% (7/118) of
Study 2b’s untrained, amateur forecasters provided more accurate predictions.
Though far from conclusive, these post-hoc analyses suggest that the linear
credibility framework may have struggled to identify predictive signal in the March
Madness data because that signal was weak to begin with. Critically, however, the results
of Analysis 2b.ii indicate that — with the predictive signal that was available —
bootstrapped estimates of consistency were able to account for 57% of the observed
variance in forecast accuracy. Thus, even if the linear credibility framework was a poor
statistical model in Study 2b, it was still an informative one, and could still be used to
identify important predictors of who was likely to be a “better” vs. “worse” judge of
subjective probability.

General Discussion
From a statistical perspective, the results of Study 2b suggest that the linear
credibility framework is an imperfect tool for examining “skill” or “proficiency” in
subjective probability judgment. In Analysis 2b.i (MM reliability), both bootstrapped and
non-bootstrapped credibility estimates demonstrated acceptable degrees of reliability, but
in Analysis 2b.ii (MM validity), bootstrapped estimates failed to demonstrate consistent
validity as predictors of forecast accuracy. Upon examining these result more closely, it
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is worth noting that bootstrapped estimates of expertise ( ) and consistency ( ) showed
non-trivial degrees of predictive validity, and were together able to explain somewhere
between 57% and 62% of the observed variance in Brier scores (see also: Table 17; the
discussion section of Analysis 2b.ii (MM validity)). Nevertheless, the overall implication
of Study 2b was that the linear credibility framework was not a well-specified model of
“skill” or “proficiency” in March Madness predictions.
Practically speaking, however, there is reason to believe that Study 2b may not
have been a fair test of the linear credibility framework. Specifically, outcomes in the
March Madness tournament were so uncertain that forecasters in Study 2b may not have
differed meaningfully in terms of their “true,” or latent credibility. To put this in
perspective, consider the odds of constructing a “perfect bracket” in the March Madness
tournament (i.e., correctly predicting the outcomes of all 67 games, ex ante). From a
combinatorial perspective, the probability of constructing a perfect bracket by chance is
less than 1 in 9.2 quintillion, and the forecasting blog FiveThirtyEight suggests that even
sophisticated methods of forecast aggregation can only shorten these odds to about 1 in
one-or-two-billion (Paine & Boice, 2017, March 14). In Study 2b, participants had better
odds than these, as the study’s design asked them to make predictions about only those
games that were played (rather than attempting to divine the entire path of the
tournament, ex ante). However, a simple extrapolation from the March Madness data
suggests that the chances of predicting all 67 games correctly were still about 1 in 138
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million — an outcome that would have required a forecaster’s yes/no predictions to be
5.67 standard deviations above the mean.23
Based on these calculations, it is unlikely that participants’ performance in Study
2b represented a (globally) wide range of “skill” or “proficiency” in subjective
probability judgment. As a result, small differences in credibility may not have been
useful for distinguishing “better” vs. “worse” forecasters in this data-set. Thus, the mixed
results observed in Study 2b (and Analysis 2b.ii (MM validity), in particular) may be
partially attributable to the inherent uncertainty of March Madness outcomes, rather than
any failing of the linear credibility framework. With this possibility in mind, the results of
Study 2b provide room for optimism. Despite the fact that (a) outcomes in the March
Madness tournament were exceedingly difficult to predict; and (b) the linear credibility
framework was only able to provide rudimentary information about “true” or latent
credibility in these data, examining credibility still provided statistical traction on the
question of who is likely to be a “better” vs. “worse” judge of subjective probability.
Thus, even at the boundaries of the linear credibility framework’s validity, the results of
Study 2b suggest that the predictive utility of credibility information was surprisingly
robust — a promising result for decision makers.

23
This extrapolation was conducted by modeling forecasters’ rates of correct binary prediction as a Normal
distribution with a mean of 0.66 and a standard deviation of 0.06-- the empirical mean and standard
deviation observed in the March Madness data. Strictly speaking, of course, this is an inappropriate
statistical model, as plausible values for correct prediction rates are bounded at 0 and 1. As a first order
approximation, however, this model represents only a small abuse of statistical realism, as all implausible
values are at least 5.67 standard deviations from the empirical mean. Thus, the inappropriately-long tails of
the Normal distribution used in this analysis represent a negligible departure from a more appropriately
specified probability density function.
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Study 2c: Reliability and Validity of Credibility Estimates Derived from
Philadelphia Air Temperature Data (PHL Reliability/Validity)
Up to this point, I have examined two applications of the linear credibility
framework to empirical data. In the first application (Study 2a; GJP reliability/validity),
data from the Good Judgment Project (GJP) revealed strong evidence for the reliability
and validity of linear credibility estimates. However, because GJP forecasters were
exceptional in a variety of ways, a broader consideration of these findings suggests that
the general performance of the linear credibility framework may often be somewhat
weaker. In the second application (Study 2b; MM reliability/validity), predictions from
the March Madness study revealed weak (or, at least inconsistent) evidence for the
reliability and validity of linear credibility estimates. However, because outcomes in the
March Madness tournament were exceedingly uncertain (and thus, differences in “true”
credibility may have been small), a broader consideration of these findings suggests that
the general performance of the linear credibility framework may often be somewhat
stronger.
For reasons that should be apparent to the reader, neither of these studies is
entirely satisfactory. In Study 2a, the richness of the GJP data-set provides a plausible
explanation for the richness of the predictive information uncovered by the linear
credibility framework. And in Study 2b, a lack of heterogeneity in “true” credibility
provides a plausible explanation for why linear credibility estimates were inconsistent
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predictors of forecast accuracy. In general, therefore, the results of both studies present a
non-trivial chance that the observed relationships between linear credibility estimates and
forecast accuracy were not mediated by the underlying construct of credibility (i.e., a
forecaster’s relative tendencies towards error and bias in judgment). Thus, in both Study
2a (GJP reliability/validity) and Study 2b (MM reliability/validity), it is conceivable that
the strength of the relationship between “good” judgment and credible judgment is not
diagnostic of the latent covariation between linear credibility estimates and an
individual’s tendencies towards error and bias in judgment. Or, in simpler terms, neither
Study 2a nor Study 2b provides an ironclad test of whether linear credibility estimates
were valid indicators of “true” credibility.
To address this issue, Study 2c examined the performance of the linear credibility
framework when fit to predictions about Philadelphia air temperature — a domain where
between-subjects differences in accuracy and estimated credibility were unlikely to be
driven by anything other than an individual’s tendencies towards error and bias in
judgment (i.e., an individual’s “true” degree of credibility). As described in the General
Method section, Study 2c was designed to be administered to a large number of
participants in a short period of time. As such, Study 2c was less comprehensive than
Studies 2a and 2b in that it only examined the convergent validity of linear credibility
estimates with a handful of measures related to “good” judgment. However, Study 2c
represented an improvement over Studies 2a and 2b in several ways:
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(1) The “true” credibility of participants in Study 2c was likely to vary due to
differences in (e.g.) domain knowledge; proficiency in probabilistic reasoning;
and differential susceptibility to errors and biases in judgment (e.g.,
representativeness; anchoring and adjustment; baserate neglect; for an
overview, see: Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982).

(2) Air temperatures are familiar enough that ordinary people can make
reasonable predictions, but outcomes were neither so certain nor so uncertain
that individuals did not vary in terms of accuracy.

(3) And finally, participants in Study 2c were not expected to be extraordinary in
any way. Thus, if the linear credibility framework can provide meaningful
insight into “skill” or “proficiency” in subjective probability judgment in this
study, then there is little reason to suspect that these results won’t generalize.

Analysis 2c.i: Under what conditions are credibility estimates reliable? (PHL
reliability)
As with previous applications of the linear credibility framework, Study 2c
required that I select three analytic parameters: a calibration sample size (ncal), a
minimum prediction sample size (npred), and a number of bootstrap trials (nboot). Because
most participants in Study 2c provided a total of 120 SPJs, there was little concern that
participants would be excluded for providing too-few judgments. Thus, the minimum
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prediction sample size for Study 2c was set at an a priori value of npred = 30 to ensure that
each participant would have a sufficient number of predictions held out-of-sample. To
select appropriate values for the other two parameters, I conducted a parallel experiment
to those conducted in Analysis 2a.i (GJP reliability) and 2b.i (MM reliability). Thus, in
Analysis 2c.i, I manipulated calibration sample size (ncal) and number of bootstrap trials
(nboot) to determine the empirical parameter ranges under which reliable credibility
estimates could be extracted from the Philadelphia air temperature data.

Method.
Detailed Procedure. As with previous reliability experiments, Analysis 2c.i,
employed a two-armed experimental design. In the first arm, I examined the sensitivity of
non-bootstrapped credibility estimates to five levels of calibration sample size, ncal = {10,
20, …, 50}, with reliability in each cell estimated across 30 bootstrap trials. In the second
arm, I examined the sensitivity of bootstrapped credibility estimates to changes in
calibration sample size and number of bootstrap trials according to a 5 × 12 design: ncal =
{10, 20, …, 50} × nboot = {10, 20, …, 100, 200, 250}, with reliability in each cell
estimated across three runs of the General Procedure. Similar to Analyses 2a.i (GJP
reliability) and 2b.i (MM reliability), the purpose of the first arm was to identify the
minimum calibration sample size at which the effects of recalibration were likely to be
consistent across trials, and the purpose of the second arm was to ensure that
bootstrapped credibility estimates would be appropriate for later examinations of validity.
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Results. The results of Analysis 2c.i can be seen in Figures 14-17. In Figure 14,
the reliability of non-bootstrapped estimates of credibility are graphed in a single plot,
where the y-axis represents reliability (i.e., intraclass correlation, or ICC); the x-axis
represents calibration sample size (ncal); and separate curves represent different
components of credibility. In Figures 15-17, the reliability of bootstrapped estimates of
bias, expertise, and consistency are graphed in separate plots. In each of these plots, the
y-axis represents reliability (ICC); the x-axis represents the number of bootstrap trials
(nboot); and separate curves represent different calibration sample sizes (ncal).

Figure 14
[PHL data]: Reliability of non-bootstrapped estimates of credibility, varying by
calibration sample size (ncal).

Figure 15
[PHL data]: Reliability of bootstrapped estimates of bias ( ), varying by number of
bootstrap trials (nboot) and calibration sample size (ncal).
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Figure 16
[PHL data]: Reliability of bootstrapped estimates of expertise ( ), varying by number of
bootstrap trials (nboot) and calibration sample size (ncal).

Figure 17
[PHL data]: Reliability of bootstrapped estimates of consistency ( ), varying by number
of bootstrap trials (nboot) and calibration sample size (ncal).
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Discussion. In contrast with previous reliability experiments, the results of
Analysis 2c.i indicate that the reliabilities of non-bootstrapped estimates of credibility
were somewhat inconsistent when fit to the Philadelphia air temperature data. As can be
seen in Figure 14, non-bootstrapped estimates of consistency (

∗

) surpassed the

conventional threshold for “excellent” intraclass correlation (ICC ≥ 0.75; Ciccetti, 1994)
at a calibration sample size of ncal = 20 and remained high throughout the experiment.
However, non-bootstrapped estimates of bias (

∗

) and expertise (

∗

) started extremely

low in Analysis 2c.i, and never surpassed the thresholds for “poor” (ICC < 0.40) and
“fair” (0.40 ≤ ICC ≤ 0.59), respectively (Ciccetti, 1994). Fortunately for Study 2c, these
results did not compromise the remaining analyses in the Philadelphia air temperature
study, as the reliability of bootstrapped estimates for all three components of credibility
stabilized at above-excellent levels for experimental cells with nboot ≥ 100 bootstrap trials
(Figures 15-17).
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Despite these somewhat puzzling results, Analysis 2c.i led me to two decisions.
The first was to forge-ahead with my planned analyses of the Philadelphia air
temperature data, even though the low reliabilities of non-bootstrapped estimates of bias
and expertise would set an upper-bound on the validity of these estimates and create a
high bar for credibility-based recalibration. For the purposes of Studies 2c (PHL
reliability/validity) and 3c (PHL recalibration), therefore, I selected the following set of
analytic parameters: a calibration sample size of ncal = 50 to maximize the consistency of
the recalibration transformation from trial-to-trial (while still remaining realistic for realworld data-sets); a minimum prediction sample size of npred = 30 to ensure that each
forecaster would have an adequate number of judgments with which to examine the
effects of recalibration out-of-sample; and nboot = 100 bootstrap trials to ensure that the
validities of bootstrapped credibility estimates would not be unduly constrained by being
unreliable.
Perhaps more importantly, however, the results of Analysis 2c.i led me to a
second decision. Because Study 2c (PHL reliability/validity) was designed to examine the
linear credibility framework under representative (and fairly favorable) conditions, I was
surprised to see the reliabilities of non-bootstrapped estimates of bias and expertise
depart so dramatically from those reported in Analyses 2a.i (GJP reliability) and 2b.i
(MM reliability) — to say nothing of their contrast with non-bootstrapped estimates of
consistency in the same study. Based on these results, I decided to conduct a variety of
follow-up analyses in which I examined linear credibility estimates derived from subsets
of the Philadelphia air temperature data (e.g., January predictions only vs. July
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predictions only). As I report in Chapter 4, the results of these analyses revealed an
important limitation of the linear credibility framework: namely, that “errors” and
“biases” can only be detected if they are (reasonably) stable across judgments. If they are
not — as was the case in the Philadelphia air temperature data, then the reliability and
validity of the linear credibility estimates will be limited (for additional details about
these analyses, see: Study 4).

Analysis 2c.ii: What are the predictors of credibility and what does credibility
predict? (PHL validity)
Despite the limitations of the Philadelphia air temperature data (suboptimal
reliability; inconsistent errors and biases across question-types), the primary goal of
Study 2c was to determine whether linear credibility estimates could be used to
distinguish between “better” vs. “worse” judges of subjective probability. Consequently,
in Analysis 2c.ii, I once-again examined the validity of linear credibility estimates as
predictors of forecast accuracy (i.e., average Brier scores). As with other examinations of
validity, the prevailing assumption of this analysis was not that linear credibility
estimates would represent face-valid measures of a participant’s errors and biases, but
rather that forecast accuracy and linear credibility estimates would both covary with the
(latent) soundness of a participant’s judgments. Thus, even in the noisy world of
judgment under uncertainty, I expected accurate judgment and “credible” judgment to
move together.
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Method.
Detailed Procedure. Using the analytic parameters selected in Analysis 2c.i (PHL
reliability) (i.e., ncal = 50; npred = 30; nboot =100), I applied the General Procedure to arrive
at bootstrapped credibility estimates for each forecaster in the Philadelphia air
temperature study (i.e.,

,

, and

). After excluding participants who provided too few

forecasts (< 80), this data-set included forecasts from 73 participants. Within this sample,
the mean age was 48.8 (Mdn. = 49.0; SD = 12.5) and 36% self-identified as male.
After estimating credibility, I then transformed estimates of bias and expertise to
measures of absolute difference from identity (i.e., I calculated

and

by taking the

absolute differences of the untransformed values from 0 and 1, respectively). Then, using
similar procedures to Analysis 2a.ii (GJP validity) (i.e., all continuous variables
standardized; sex dummy-coded), I used pairwise correlations and exploratory linear
regressions to probe the relationships among bootstrapped credibility estimates ( ,
and

,

) and the handful of individual difference measures captured in the Philadelphia air

temperature study.
In the interest of simplicity, Study 2c (PHL reliability/validity) focused on the
relationships between linear credibility estimates and forecast accuracy (i.e., average
Brier score). However, because this study was conducted in collaboration with Jonathan
Baron (the principal advisor on this thesis), participants also completed Baron’s 11-item
Actively Open-Minded Thinking scale (in press) (AOMT Score in Tables 18-22, below)
in addition to providing basic information about their age and sex. Similar to previous
studies, exploratory regressions were conducted under three approaches to variable
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selection: the kitchen sink approach, the reduced approach, and the ridge-1SE approach
(for additional details, see the Detailed Procedure section of Analysis 2a.ii (GJP validity))
— a methodology that allowed me to look for instances where variables were competing
for overlapping segments of explanatory variance.

Results. The results on Analysis 2c.ii can be seen in Tables 18-22, below. Simple
correlations between bootstrapped credibility estimates ( ,

, and

) and individual

difference measures can be seen in Table 18; exploratory regression analyses examining
the predictors of credibility can be seen Tables 19-21; and an exploratory regression
analysis concerning the predictors of forecast accuracy (average Brier score) can be seen
in Table 22.

Table 18
[PHL data]: Simple correlations between credibility estimates and individual difference
measures.
Credibility Estimate
Ind. Diff. Measure
(Bias)
(Expertise)
***
0.75
0.41***
Average Brier score
0.27*
-0.11
AOMT Score
-0.32**
0.04
Age
0.08
-0.19
Male
Significance levels: * p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001
Note: All non-categorical measures standardized; gender dummy-coded.

(Consist.)
0.19
-0.20
0.09
-0.22

Table 19
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[PHL data]: Predictors of bootstrapped alpha (i.e., bias;

).

Variable Selection Approach
Ind. Diff. Measure
(Intercept)
Average Brier score
AOMT Score
Age
Male

Kitchen-Sink

Reduced

Ridge-1SE

0.03 (0.09)
0.72 (0.08)***
0.05 (0.08)
-0.24 (0.08)**
-0.1 (0.17)

0.00 (0.07)
0.72 (0.07)***

0.00 (0.08)
0.75 (0.08)***

-0.25 (0.07)**

Multiple R2
0.623
0.62
2
Adjusted R
0.601
0.609
RMSE
0.61
0.612
AIC
146.91
143.51
BIC
160.66
152.67
Significance levels: * p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001
Note: All non-categorical measures standardized; gender dummy-coded.

0.558
0.552
0.66
152.58
159.45

Table 20
[PHL data]: Predictors of bootstrapped beta (i.e., expertise;

).

Variable Selection Approach
Ind. Diff. Measure
(Intercept)
Average Brier score
AOMT Score
Age
Male

Kitchen-Sink

Reduced

Ridge-1SE

0.16 (0.13)
0.49 (0.11)***
-0.15 (0.12)
0.06 (0.11)
-0.44 (0.23)

0.00 (0.11)
0.41 (0.11)***

0.00 (0.11)
0.41 (0.11)***

Multiple R2
0.259
0.168
Adjusted R2
0.215
0.156
RMSE
0.855
0.906
AIC
196.28
198.74
BIC
210.02
205.61
Significance levels: * p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001
Note: All non-categorical measures standardized; gender dummy-coded.

0.168
0.156
0.906
198.74
205.61

160

Table 21
[PHL data]: Predictors of bootstrapped sigma (i.e., consistency;

).

Variable Selection Approach
Ind. Diff. Measure
(Intercept)
Average Brier score
AOMT Score
Age
Male

Kitchen-Sink
0.15 (0.14)
0.28 (0.12)*
-0.18 (0.13)
0.09 (0.12)
-0.43 (0.25)

Reduced
0.00 (0.12)
0.19 (0.12)

Multiple R2
0.144
0.036
2
Adjusted R
0.094
0.022
RMSE
0.919
0.975
AIC
206.81
209.48
BIC
220.55
216.35
Significance levels: * p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001
Note: All non-categorical measures standardized; gender dummy-coded.

Ridge-1SE
0.00 (0.12)

0
0
0.993
210.16
214.74

Table 22
[PHL data]: Predictors of average Brier score (i.e., forecast accuracy).
Variable Selection Approach
Ind. Diff. Measure
(Intercept)
Estimated bias ( )

Kitchen-Sink

Estimated consistency ( )

-0.06 (0.1)
0.74 (0.1)***
0.10 (0.11)
-0.07 (0.1)

AOMT Score
Age

0.06 (0.09)
0.15 (0.09)

Estimated expertise ( )

Reduced

Ridge-1SE

0.00 (0.08)
0.75 (0.08)***

0.00 (0.08)
0.75 (0.08)***
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Male

0.17 (0.18)

Multiple R2
0.598
0.558
2
Adjusted R
0.561
0.552
RMSE
0.63
0.66
AIC
155.7
152.58
BIC
174.03
159.45
Significance levels: * p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001
Note: All non-categorical measures standardized; gender dummy-coded.

0.558
0.552
0.66
152.58
159.45

Discussion. The results of Analysis 2c.ii demonstrate that bootstrapped estimates
of bias ( ) and expertise ( ) demonstrated strong convergent validity with forecast
accuracy (average Brier scores) in the Philadelphia air temperature study. As can be seen
in Table 18, simple correlations suggest that estimated bias and expertise were both
strongly related to better (lower) Brier scores, and that estimated bias was moderately
related to participants’ tendency towards actively open-minded thing (AOMT). The
convergent relationships between bias, expertise, and forecast accuracy are also evident
in Tables 19 and 20 (bias and accuracy in Table 19; and expertise and accuracy in Table
20), and the convergent relationship between bias and forecast accuracy in Table 22.
Unfortunately, throughout these exploratory analyses, bootstrapped estimates of
consistency ( ) were not strongly related to forecast accuracy (Table 21). However, the
post-hoc reliability analyses conducted in Analysis 2c.i suggest that this may have been
because participants’ tendencies towards error and bias varied across question types.
Thus, I return to this issue when I re-examine subsets of the Philadelphia air temperature
data in Study 4.
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General Discussion
Despite Study 2c’s intentions, the Philadelphia air temperature data were not as
unimpeachable as originally intended. However, the results of Study 2c suggest that it is
generally reasonable to construe linear credibility estimates as individual-difference-type
measures of “skill” or “proficiency” in subjective probability judgment. In Analysis 2c.i
(PHL reliability), results demonstrated that bias, expertise, and consistency can be
reliably estimated with moderate calibration sample-sizes and/or a large number of
bootstrap trials, and in Analysis 2c.ii (PHL validity), results demonstrated that estimates
of bias and expertise can be used to predict forecast accuracy (average Brier scores). In
practice, of course, the results of Study 2c also demonstrate that the reliability and
validity of credibility estimates (and especially those that are derived from simple models
such as the linear credibility framework) are constrained by the stability and
generalizability of an individual’s tendencies towards errors and biases in judgment.
Despite an experimental design that limited stability and generalizability, however, linear
credibility estimates in Study 2c were still able to explain somewhere between 56% and
60% of the observed variance in forecast accuracy. Given that these estimates were
derived from truly amateur forecasters with only lay knowledge of Philadelphia air
temperatures — to say nothing of an oversimplified model of credibility — these results
suggest that examining credibility is likely to provide decision makers with insight into
“skill” or “proficiency” in subjective probability judgment across a wide variety of
decision environments.
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Conclusions
Taken together, the results of Studies 2a-2c suggest that the linear credibility
framework is an informative (albeit imperfect) tool for examining “skill” or “proficiency”
in subjective probability judgment. In general, therefore, it is likely that decision makers
will gain valuable insight by examining credibility, though they would be wise to treat
such insight with a degree of skepticism. Given the inconsistent performance of linear
credibility estimates across studies, the results of Study 2a-2c suggest that (linear)
estimates of bias, expertise, and consistency may not be orthogonal components of
credibility. Indeed, the rigidity and simplicity of the linear credibility framework make it
an unlikely candidate for modeling credibility in a descriptively accurate way.
Nevertheless, Studies 2a-2c provided strong evidence to suggest that linear credibility
estimates (in one combination or another) are often powerfully explanatory with respect
to judgmental accuracy. As such, these studies provide a strong empirical basis for
concluding that credibility can be probed with simple statistical tools and that doing so is
often informative for decision makers. Furthermore, because it is reasonable to assume
that the results of Studies 2a-2c represent an empirical lower-bound for the performance
of empirical models of credibility, these results suggest that examinations of credibility
may be informative, in general. Thus, when considered in a broader context, it is evident
that credibility is a useful theoretical construct and that additional studies of credibility
are warranted.
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CHAPTER 3

THE LINEAR CREDIBILITY FRAMEWORK IS OFTEN USEFUL AND
CREDIBILITY (IN GENERAL) IS WORTH EXAMINING

Abstract:
Errors in judgment can lead to errors in decision making. Thus, decision makers have an
incentive to ensure that their subjective probability judgments (SPJs) are as wellcalibrated as possible. However, decision makers do not always have the necessary
information to assess calibration. To address this issue, models of credibility are intended
to provide a substitute for calibration information. To determine whether empirical
credibility models can deliver on this promise, this chapter examines whether the linear
credibility framework can be used to reduce individuals’ tendencies toward error and bias
in judgment. Specifically, in Studies 3a-3c, I examine the effects of credibility-based
recalibration on absolute judgment error (AJE), absolute linear error (ALE), and
reliability (Murphy, 1973) to determine whether the linear credibility framework can
improve accuracy. Across three data-sets, the results of these studies generally suggest
that it can. Thus, I argue that even simple models of credibility can often be useful.

Introduction
When facing an uncertain yet consequential choice, a decision maker’s principal
concern is that errors in judgment will lead to errors in decision making. Though it is
possible for such errors to exist without changing a decision maker’s behavior (indeed, in
some cases it is quite common; for an elaboration of this point, see: Arkes, Gigerenzer, &
Hertwig, 2016), the presence of poorly-calibrated beliefs necessarily opens the door to
edge-cases where the balance of (subjective) expected utility shifts. Thus, in any case
where errors in belief are persistent or consequential, decision makers have a rational
(i.e., utilitarian) incentive to ensure that their subjective probability judgments (SPJs) are
as well-calibrated as possible (for an overview of probabilistic calibration, see:
Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1982).
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In practice, however, examining calibration is not always feasible. Because
empirical baserates (and other approximations of “objective” probabilities) are often
inestimable or unknown, decision makers generally do not have access to the necessary
information to determine if and how their beliefs may err. In principle, empirical models
of credibility are useful because they can provide decision makers with a proxy or
substitute for this information. Though necessarily less informative than a direct,
quantitative measure of an SPJ’s agreement with the “truth,” measures of credibility do
this by estimating systematic differences between an individual’s judgments and an
idealized set of estimated optima. If a credibility model can succeed in this task — and if
the focal set of estimated optima is worth emulating — then some or all of the differences
captured by this model should reflect systematic tendencies towards error and bias in
judgment. Consequently, while empirical models of credibility are unlikely to be a
panacea, they should allow decision makers to move judgments closer to the truth by
identifying and ameliorating suboptimal judgment strategies that have historically
prevented an individual’s SPJs from being as accurate and/or as well-calibrated as
possible.
Following from this line of reasoning, one way to test the usefulness of an
empirical model of credibility is to determine whether it can help a decision maker
“undo” errors and biases in judgment (i.e., increase accuracy and/or calibration) by
correcting for an individual’s personalized pattern of errors. In practice, of course,
credibility estimates derived from simple models such as the linear credibility framework
may not reflect the full scope of errors and biases in an individual’s judgments, and the
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scope it does reflect may not be captured perfectly. Thus, the “correction” procedures
encapsulated in an individual’s credibility function may not allow for perfect
recalibration or even improve judgments all the time. However, if an empirical credibility
model is to be useful in general — and certainly if a decision maker is to put stock in its
estimates — then the typical effects of credibility-based recalibration must be positive
and its effect-size practically significant.
To achieve this standard, a credibility model must meet three empirical criteria:

Criterion 1. The estimated relationship between an individual’s SPJs and a focal set
of estimated optima must be stable and generalizable within a given
decision environment.

Criterion 2. Reversing an individual’s estimated errors and biases in a given decision
environment (i.e., employing credibility-based recalibration) must
generally improve the accuracy and/or calibration of her SPJs.

Criterion 3. The typical effect-size associated with credibility-based recalibration
must be both statistically and practically significant.

In Studies 3a-3c, I will examine whether the linear credibility framework meets
these criteria when applied to empirical judgments. If it does (despite being a deliberately
simple model), then decision makers may benefit from examining credibility more
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generally, especially to the extent that their credibility models are fit with descriptively
accurate curves rather than a single, atheoretical line.

Study 3a: Typical Effects of Recalibration with GJP Data (GJP Recalibration)
In Study 2a (GJP reliability/validity), exploratory regression analyses revealed a
strong degree of predictive validity between linear credibility estimates and forecast
accuracy in the Good Judgment Project (GJP). From an empirical perspective, these
relationships suggest that the linear credibility framework is sensitive to systematic trends
in an individual’s judgment strategy that bear on overall accuracy. As a practical matter,
however, it is unclear whether these trends represent stable, generalizable tendencies
toward error and bias in judgment, or whether they were an empirical catchall for
circumstantial variations in forecast accuracy (e.g., differences in domain knowledge;
random and/or uncharacteristic variations in accuracy; etc.). To address this issue, Study
3a will examine the degree to which the linear credibility framework meets the three
criteria for a useful credibility model (see above) when applied to forecasts from the GJP.
As in Study 1, I will probe these criteria by examining the effects of credibilitybased recalibration on out-of-sample SPJs. If correcting for the ostensible “errors” and
“biases” in a forecaster’s calibration sample systematically improves the accuracy and/or
calibration of judgments in her prediction sample, then these estimates must reflect stable
and generalizable relationships with estimated optima (criterion 1). When accuracy is
measured in terms of absolute judgment error (i.e., AJE; the absolute difference between
an SPJ and the corresponding estimated optimum), the existence of these relationships
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would suggest that an individual’s judgments are predictably different from estimated
optima, though they cannot speak to the origin of these differences.24 However, when
accuracy is measured in terms of absolute linear error (i.e., ALE; the absolute difference
between an SPJ and the corresponding empirical outcome), a systematic improvement
due to recalibration would suggest that an individual’s judgments are predictably less
accurate than estimated optima — an outcome that solidifies their interpretation as errors
and biases in judgment (criterion 2). Finally, if the typical effects of recalibration are
substantial and systematic — either because they reduce departures from estimated
optima (AJE) or empirical outcomes (ALE) — then it is likely that forecasters would
have seen practical benefits from examining (and accounting for) their historical degree
of credibility over the course of the GJP (criterion 3).

Method
Detailed procedure. As described in the General Method section, Study 3a was
conducted at the same time as Study 2a (GJP reliability/validity). Consequently, the
dependent variables I examined in Study 3a were observed during the same run of the
General Procedure that was used to calculate bootstrapped credibility estimates in
Analysis 2a.ii (GJP validity). In this analysis, credibility functions were fit to a

24

Consider, for example, a case where some individuals have “inside information” that is not available to
other members of the crowd. In this case, a positive effect of recalibration on AJE would indicate a
systematic relationship between an individual’s judgments and estimated optima, but this “improvement” in
AJE might correspond to a decrease in predictive accuracy if (crowdsourced) estimated optima are
systematically less accurate than SPJs derived from inside information.
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calibration sample size of ncal = 50; forecasters were only included if they provided
enough SPJs to accommodate a minimum prediction sample size of npred = 30; and the
effects of recalibration were observed over nboot = 100 bootstrap trials.
As a brief reminder, data for Study 3a were generated by recalibrating each
participant’s SPJs across a large number of bootstrap trials. For a given participant on a
given trial, this was accomplished by (a) using a random sampling procedure to partition
participant i’s SPJs into a calibration sample (ncal = 50) and a prediction sample (all
remaining SPJs); (b) estimating a credibility function by regressing participant i’s
calibration sample on the corresponding estimated optima; (c) using the resulting
credibility function to recalibrate SPJs in participant i’s prediction sample; and (d)
recording the effects of recalibration for the given trial (for a list of specific outcome
measures, see below). For the purposes of Study 3a, this process was conducted a total of
100 times per forecaster (i.e., over 100 bootstrap trials), with a new calibration sample
and a new credibility function being selected each time.
To examine the effects of credibility-based recalibration, Study 3a recorded ten
outcome measures for each forecaster on each bootstrap trial. Eight of these outcome
measures were variants of judgmental accuracy and can be divided into two general
categories: (a) absolute judgment error (AJE), which measures to the absolute difference
between an SPJ and the corresponding estimated optimum; and (b) absolute linear error
(ALE), which measures the absolute difference between an SPJ and the corresponding
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empirical outcome.25 For each type of accuracy, I recorded four summary statistics per
trial, yielding eight of the ten total outcome measures:


The proportion of individual judgments for which recalibration improved
(reduced) AJE / ALE;



The mean pairwise difference in AJE / ALE due to recalibration;26



The effect-size (Cohen’s d) associated with pairwise changes in AJE /
ALE due to recalibration;



And a binary indicator of whether recalibration improved (reduced) the
sample’s mean AJE / ALE.27

In addition to judgmental accuracy, I also recorded two outcome measures related
to changes in reliability on each trial. As discussed in the General Methods section,
reliability is one of the three components of Murphy’s (1973) three-component
decomposition of the Brier score (Brier, 1950) and is defined as the weighted sum of
squared-differences between an individual’s SPJs and observed baserates (here, the
relative frequencies of event occurrence for SPJs separated into 101 percentage-point

25

In all three studies (3a-3c), I also examined the empirical effects of recalibration on Brier scores.
However, because the Brier score is a variant of the quadratic scoring rule, changes in Brier scores often
produce highly skewed distributions. As such, it is not always informative to examine the “typical” effects
of recalibration in terms of mean or median changes in Brier scores. Despite this limitation, however, the
typical effects of credibility-based recalibration on Brier scores were not substantively different than those
reported below.
26
Note that these measures (i.e., the mean differences in AJE / ALE) are mathematically equivalent to the
difference in mean AJE / ALE, due to recalibration. Thus, I will only discuss the former and not the latter
when presenting results.
27
In all cases, binary indicators were coded as “1” if the stated event occurred, and “0” if it did not.
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“bins”). From a mathematical perspective, reliability is closely related to the forecasting
measure calibration (see: Lichtenstein et al., 1982) and can be conceptualized as a
measure of agreement between subjective probability judgments and empirical baserates
(though it is defined in such a way that larger values indicate worse agreement). Though
conceptually similar to consistency (i.e., both measures describe the extent to which SPJs
depart from a set of benchmark judgments), the value of examining reliability in this
context is that reliability is independent of subjective beliefs. By contrast, consistency
describes the extent to which an individual’s SPJs tend to agree with estimated optima —
a standard which here depends on intersubjective agreement. In principle, therefore,
reliability provides a more “objective” measure of SPJ validity, though the strength of
this claim is limited by the extent to which within-sample baserates are representative of
“objective” probabilities. Thus, in each trial of Study 3a (GJP recalibration), I recorded
two outcome measures related to reliability:


A binary indicator of whether recalibration improved (reduced) reliability;



And the pairwise change in sample reliability associated with
recalibration.

By averaging outcome measures (within-measure) across each participant’s 100
bootstrap trials, Study 3a (GJP recalibration) produced 10 summary-statistics per
participant:
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The typical28 proportion of participant i's judgments for which
recalibration improved (reduced) AJE / ALE.



The typical pairwise change in participant i's AJE / ALE due to
recalibration;



The typical effect-size (Cohen’s d) of recalibration on participant i's AJE /
ALE;



The proportion of prediction samples in which recalibration improved
(reduced) participant i's mean AJE / ALE.



The proportion of prediction samples in which recalibration improved
(reduced) reliability;



And typical pairwise change in sample reliability due to recalibration.

As in Study 1, each of these summary-statistics represented a different aspect of
the typical or expected effect of recalibration for a given participant. Thus, these
measures were used as the primary dependent variables (DVs) in the tests that follow.

Results
Analysis 3a.i: typical effects of recalibration on AJE (GJP recal., AJE). In
Analysis 3a.i, I examined the typical effects of recalibration on absolute judgment error

28

As in Chapter 1, I will use the word “typical” in this chapter to indicate bootstrapped averages, calculated
over each participant’s 100 recalibration trials. This is done to prevent confusion in instances where
“typical” values are bootstrapped averages of sample-level means.
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(AJE). As discussed above, the effects of recalibration on AJE can be used to draw
inferences about the stability and generalizability of the observed relationship between an
individual’s judgments and estimated optima. If credibility-based recalibration can be
used to improve (reduce) AJE in out-of-sample judgments, then this would suggest that
the ostensible “errors” and “biases” observed in an individual’s calibration sample were
similar to those that remained unobserved in her prediction sample. Though a reliable
improvement in AJE is not sufficient to conclude that the differences between an
individual’s judgments and estimated optima were detrimental (see: Footnote 24), it is
enough to conclude that some portion of this relationship was stable and generalizable.
Thus, the observation of a reliable, positive effect of recalibration on AJE would suggest
that the linear credibility framework meets the first criterion of a useful model of
credibility.
To determine whether this was the case, Analysis 3a.i examined the typical effects
of recalibration on AJE, across forecasters. The results of this analysis can be seen in the
figures and tables below. Figures 18-21 show the empirical distributions of the four AJErelated DVs across forecasters, and Figure 22 shows a visual comparison of mean AJEs
before and after recalibration. Table 23 provides descriptive statistics for each of the
distributions represented in Figures 18-21, and Table 24 shows the results of Wilcoxon
signed-rank tests examining the null hypothesis that the median of each distribution does
not differ from chance (represented by red dotted lines in Figures 18-21).

Figure 18
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[GJP data]: Typical proportion of judgments for which recalibration improved (reduced)
AJE.

Figure 19
[GJP data]: Typical pairwise change in AJE (pre – post), due to recalibration.

Note: positive values indicate an improvement (reduction) in AJE.

Figure 20
[GJP data]: Typical effect-size (Cohen’s d) of recalibration on AJE.

178

Note: positive values indicate an improvement (reduction) in AJE.

Figure 21
[GJP data]: Proportion of samples in which recalibration improved (reduced) mean
AJE.

Figure 22
[GJP data]: Mean AJE, before and after recalibration.
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Note: smaller values indicate more accurate judgements (smaller errors), on average.

Table 23
[GJP data]: Typical effects of credibility-based recalibration on AJE, summarized across
forecasters.
Between-Subjects Summary Statistics
Outcome Measure
Typical proportion of judgments for
which recalibration improved AJE

Mean

Mdn.

SD

Min.

Max.

69%

69%

5%

47%

82%

6.84
× 10-2

5.84
× 10-2

5.00
× 10-2

-1.32
× 10-2

28.98
× 10-2

Typical effect (Cohen's d) of
recalibration on AJE

0.41

0.41

0.17

-0.11

1.05

Proportion of samples in which
recalibration improved mean AJE

98%

100%

7%

35%

100%

Typical pairwise change in AJE
(pre - post), due to recalibration

Table 24
[GJP data]: Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, assessing whether credibility-based
recalibration typically improved judgments (i.e., reduced AJE) beyond chance.
180

Outcome Measure
Typical proportion of judgments for
which recalibration improved AJE

Prop. Mass
> H0
Mdn. = 0.5
100%
H0

Stat. (V)

p-value

2.85 ×
105

<.001***

Typical pairwise change in AJE
(pre - post), due to recalibration

Mdn. = 0

98%

2.84 ×
105

<.001***

Typical effect (Cohen's d) of
recalibration on AJE

Mdn. = 0

99%

2.85 ×
105

<.001***

Mdn. = 0.5

99%

2.83 ×
105

<.001***

Proportion of samples in which
recalibration improved mean AJE

Significance levels: * p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001

Discussion. The results of Analysis 3a.i overwhelmingly suggest that credibilitybased recalibration typically led to improvements in AJE. Depending on how AJE was
summarized, the study-wide expected effects of recalibration (i.e., the typical effects of
recalibration for the average GJP forecaster) were to reduce AJE in 69% of individual
judgments, each by an average of 6.84 points on the probability scale. Overall, this
corresponded to an average, pairwise Cohen’s d of 0.41, and a smaller mean AJE in 98%
of bootstrap samples, on average. For all four AJE-based outcome measures, this
corresponded to a distribution of typical effect sizes that was significantly greater than
chance, suggesting that credibility-based recalibration would have been expected to
improve AJE in the Good Judgment Project, in general. Indeed, even when examined in
terms of the worst-performing measure (typical pairwise change in AJE), fewer than
2.5% of forecasters could have expected a negative effect of recalibration. Consequently,
the results of Analysis 3a.i strongly suggest that the linear credibility framework fulfilled
181

the first criterion of a useful credibility model (stable, generalizable relationships) when
fit to forecasts from the GJP.

Analysis 3a.ii: typical effects of recalibration on ALE (GJP recal., ALE). In
Analysis 3a.ii, I examined the typical effects of recalibration on absolute linear error
(ALE). Much like AJE, ALE can be used to draw inferences about the stability and
generalizability of the observed relationship between individual judgments and estimated
optima. However, because recalibration will only improve (reduce) ALE if estimated
optima are more accurate than individual judgments, observing a reliable, positive effect
of recalibration would suggest that the linear credibility framework is capturing genuine
errors and biases in judgment. Practically speaking, therefore, if the results of Analysis
3a.ii reveal a reliable improvement (reduction) in ALE, then this would suggest that the
linear credibility framework meets the first two criteria of a useful model of credibility
(stable/generalizable relationships; capable of improving judgments). Furthermore, if the
practical effect-size of this improvement is large, a case can be made that the same result
also fulfills criterion 3 (practical value).
To test these possibilities, Analysis 3a.ii examined the typical effects of
credibility-based recalibration on ALE, across forecasters. The results of this analysis can
be seen in the figures and tables below. Figures 23-26 show the empirical distributions of
the four ALE-related DVs across forecasters, and Figure 27 shows a visual comparison of
mean ALEs before and after recalibration. Table 25 provides descriptive statistics for
each of the distributions represented in Figures 23-26, and Table 26 shows the results of
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Wilcoxon signed-rank tests examining the null hypothesis that the median of each
distribution does not differ from chance (represented by red dotted lines in Figures 2326).

Figure 23
[GJP data]: Typical proportion of judgments for which recalibration improved (reduced)
ALE.

Figure 24
[GJP data]: Typical pairwise change in ALE (pre – post), due to recalibration.

Note: positive values indicate an improvement (reduction) in ALE.
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Figure 25
[GJP data]: Typical effect-size (Cohen’s d) of recalibration on ALE.

Note: positive values indicate an improvement (reduction) in ALE.

Figure 26
[GJP data]: Proportion of samples in which recalibration improved (reduced) mean
ALE.

Figure 27
[GJP data]: Mean ALE, before and after recalibration.
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Note: smaller values indicate more accurate judgements (smaller errors), on average.

Table 25
[GJP data]: Typical effects of credibility-based recalibration on ALE, summarized
across forecasters.
Between-Subjects Summary Statistics
Outcome Measure
Typical proportion of judgments for
which recalibration improved ALE

Mean

Mdn.

SD

Min.

Max.

76%

78%

10%

21%

93%

7.07
× 10-2

6.23
× 10-2

4.87
× 10-2

-2.84
× 10-2

26.36
× 10-2

Typical effect (Cohen's d) of
recalibration on ALE

0.43

0.42

0.21

-0.30

1.51

Proportion of samples in which
recalibration improved mean ALE

95%

100%

14%

0%

100%

Typical pairwise change in ALE
(pre - post), due to recalibration

Table 26
[GJP data]: Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, assessing whether credibility-based
recalibration typically improved judgments (i.e., reduced ALE) beyond chance.
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Outcome Measure
Typical proportion of judgments for
which recalibration improved ALE

Prop. Mass
> H0
Mdn. = 0.5
97%
H0

Stat. (V)

p-value

2.82 ×
105

<.001***

Typical pairwise change in ALE
(pre - post), due to recalibration

Mdn. = 0

97%

2.84 ×
105

<.001***

Typical effect (Cohen's d) of
recalibration on ALE

Mdn. = 0

98%

2.84 ×
105

<.001***

Mdn. = 0.5

98%

2.82 ×
105

<.001***

Proportion of samples in which
recalibration improved mean ALE

Significance levels: * p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001

Discussion. The results of Analysis 3a.ii demonstrate that credibility-based
recalibration typically led to large improvements in ALE. As with AJE, this conclusion
was supported by all four ALE-based outcome measures, with the average GJP forecaster
being able to expect 76% of her individual judgments to improve, each by an average of
7.07 points on the probability scale. Overall, this corresponded to an average, pairwise
Cohen’s d of 0.43, and a better (smaller) mean ALE in 95% of a forecaster’s samples, on
average. Once again, these averages corresponded to distributions of typical effect sizes
that were significantly better than chance, suggesting that credibility-based recalibration
would likely have improved ALE in the Good Judgment Project, in general. Critically, all
four distributions of DVs suggested that the expected effects of recalibration were very
rarely negative (< 3.5% of forecasters), and that the practical effects of recalibration were
substantial. Thus, the results of Analysis 3a.ii suggest that the linear credibility
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framework fulfilled all three criteria for a useful credibility model when applied to
judgments from the GJP.

Analysis 3a.iii: typical effects of recalibration on reliability (GJP recal.,
reliability). In Analysis 3a.iii, I examined the typical effects of recalibration on the
reliability of GJP forecasts. As discussed above, reliability is closely related to the
forecasting term calibration (see: Lichtenstein et al., 1982), though defined in such a way
that better reliability is indicated by smaller numbers (Murphy, 1973). As with ALE, a
reliable improvement (decrease) in reliability due to recalibration would suggest that the
linear credibility framework had captured genuine errors and biases in judgment.
Critically, however, improvements in ALE might result in better scores simply because
judgments became more extreme (and thus were closer to empirical outcomes of 0 or 1).
Examining reliability avoids this problem by comparing SPJs to within-sample baserates
that need not be extreme. Consequently, if credibility-based recalibration reliably
improves reliability, it is because the calibration of forecasts has genuinely improved,
relative to empirical baserates.
To determine whether the linear credibility framework could systematically
improve forecast calibration, Analysis 3a.iii examined the typical effects of credibilitybased recalibration on reliability, across forecasters. The results of this analysis can be
seen in the figures and tables below. Figures 28 and 29 show the empirical distributions
of the two reliability-based DVs across forecasters. Table 27 provides descriptive
statistics for each of the distributions represented in Figures 28 and 29, and Table 28
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shows the results of Wilcoxon signed-rank tests examining the null hypothesis that the
median of each distribution does not differ from chance (represented by red dotted lines
in Figures 28 and 29).

Figure 28
[GJP data]: Proportion of samples in which recalibration improved (reduced) reliability.

Figure 29
[GJP data]: Typical pairwise change in reliability (pre – post), due to recalibration.

Note: positive values indicate an improvement (reduction) in reliability.
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Table 27
[GJP data]: Typical effects of credibility-based recalibration on reliability, summarized
across forecasters.
Between-Subjects Summary Statistics
Outcome Measure

Mean

Mdn.

SD

Min.

Max.

Proportion of samples in which
recalibration improved reliability

77%

84%

23%

1%

100%

Typical pairwise change in reliability
(pre - post), due to recalibration

0.02

0.01

0.04

-0.02

0.27

Table 28
[GJP data]: Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, assessing whether credibility-based
recalibration typically improved judgments (i.e., reduced reliability) beyond chance.
Prop. Mass
Outcome Measure
H0
Stat. (V) p-value
> H0
Proportion of samples in which
Mdn. = 0.5
84%
2.60 × <.001***
recalibration improved reliability
105
Typical pairwise change in reliability
(pre - post), due to recalibration

Mdn. = 0

82%

2.61 ×
105

<.001***

Significance levels: * p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001

Discussion. Much like the other findings in Study 3a (GJP recalibration), the
results of Analysis 3a.iii demonstrate that credibility-based recalibration typically had a
beneficial effect on judgments in the GJP. Indeed, recalibration could be expected to
improve (reduce) reliability in 77% of samples for the average GJP forecaster and in 84%
of samples for the median GJP forecaster. Though less interpretable than measures of
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absolute error, this was accompanied by an average pairwise improvement (reduction) of
0.02 in reliability across samples. In the case of both reliability-based outcome measures,
the typical effects of recalibration were better than chance for more than 80% of
forecasters, both of which corresponded to statistically significant effects. In general,
therefore, the results of Analysis 3a.iii provide evidence to suggest that credibility-based
recalibration did not improve judgmental accuracy simply because it made SPJs more
extreme, but instead because it genuinely improved forecast calibration.

General Discussion
In nearly all cases, the results of Study 3a demonstrate that credibility-based
recalibration can identify and ameliorate errors and biases in GJP data. As such, these
results provide a clear example of a domain in which empirical models of credibility can
be useful. As in Study 2a (GJP reliability/validity), it is conceivable that these results can
be attributed to the unusual skill of GJP forecasters or the remarkable richness of the GJP
data-set. However, a qualitative assessment suggests that this is not the case. Consider,
for example, the sheer breadth of forecasters included in this sample. While it is true that
some GJP forecasters demonstrated exceptional skill; provided a large number of
forecasts; and were uncommonly motivated (etc.), this was certainly not true of all GJP
forecasters. Despite this, the results of Study 3a demonstrate that the linear credibility
framework was able to produce reliable improvements in AJE and ALE for nearly every
forecaster (≥ 97%, in all cases). Though the results were not quite as strong for measures
of reliability (84% and 82% of forecasters saw positive typical effect-sizes, respectively),
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these results nevertheless indicate that the usefulness of the linear credibility framework
was not limited to the most exceptional participants in the GJP. Thus, the results of Study
3a provide a strong preliminary basis for arguing that the linear credibility framework —
and perhaps other models of credibility — may be useful to decision makers, in general.

Study 3b: Empirical Effects of Recalibration with March Madness Data (MM
recalibration)
In Study 2b (MM reliability/validity), the linear credibility framework uncovered
surprisingly reliable trends in participants’ judgments, but exploratory analyses indicated
these relationships were not consistently related to forecast accuracy. These findings
present two possible explanations. The first is that bootstrapped estimates of bias ( ) and
expertise ( ) — i.e., the two measures that were not strongly related to forecast accuracy
— reflected systematic departures from estimated optima but had little bearing on the
participant’s overall performance. However, for this explanation to be true, one would
need to posit a rather contrived scenario in which the costs and benefits to recalibration
were symmetric, such as a case in which estimated optima hovered around 0.50 and the
outcome of each game was a toss-up. From an empirical perspective, the results of the
March Madness study demonstrate that this was not true. While it is true that empirical
outcomes were split 49:51 over the course of the tournament (i.e., 49% of outcomes
resolved to 0 and 51% resolved to 1), this near-symmetric split in outcomes could only
have created symmetric costs and benefits to recalibration if estimated optima were
systematically less extreme (i.e., closer to 0.50) than most participants’ SPJs. As reported
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in Study 2b (MM reliability/validity), estimated optima in the March Madness
tournament were more accurate (i.e., had a smaller average Brier score) than
approximately 84% of participants. Thus, it is highly unlikely that bootstrapped estimates
of bias ( ) and expertise ( ) were unrelated to forecast accuracy in this study for purely
artifactual reasons.
In Study 2b (MM reliability/validity), therefore, the most likely explanation for
the inconsistent validity of bootstrapped credibility estimates is that estimated optima in
the March Madness study were not particularly accurate. Thus, the degree to which an
individual’s SPJs resembled estimated optima in Study 2b was predictive of accuracy
only to the extent that their judgment strategy was relatively stable — an aspect of “skill”
or “proficiency” that is captured by consistency ( ). In Study 3b, this would suggest that
credibility-based recalibration may succeed in shrinking an individual’s SPJs towards
estimated optima, but that it is unlikely to improve their accuracy. Or, in operational
terms, a lack of predictive signal among estimated optima would suggest that
recalibration is likely to produce a reliable improvement in AJE, but perhaps not an
improvement in ALE.
If this turns out to be the case, then the linear credibility framework will fail to
meet the criteria for a useful credibility model in this Study 3b. However, this will not be
because linear regression is a poor descriptive model (a possibility that would be
indicated by little improvement in both AJE and ALE). Instead, an empirical split
between ALE and AJE in Study 3b would suggest that the use of linear regression is
sound (at least to a degree), but that my faith in the focal set of estimated optima was not
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— largely because prediction in this study was such a difficult task. To distinguish
between these possibilities, Study 3b will examine the fit of the linear credibility
framework to data from the March Madness study by examining its performance against
the three criteria of a useful model. If the linear credibility framework does not fulfil any
of the three criteria in Study 3b, then linear regression may not be a useful tool for
examining credibility in this domain (and thus, may not be useful, in general); if it fulfills
only the first criterion (stable/generalizable relationship with estimated optima), then
linear regression may be a generally useful tool, but one that can backfire when fit to a
poor set of estimated optima; and finally, if it fulfils two or more criteria, then it may be a
more useful tool than the results of Study 2b (MM reliability/validity) suggest.

Method
Detailed procedure. Study 3b followed the same procedure as Study 3a (GJP
recalibration) — excepting, of course, that it focused on March Madness data rather than
forecasts from the GJP. As described in the Detailed Procedure section of Study 2b (MM
reliability/validity), credibility functions in this analysis were fit to a calibration sample
size of ncal = 50; the minimum prediction sample size was set to npred = 1 to maximize
statistical power; and the effects of recalibration were observed over nboot = 100 bootstrap
trials.

Results
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Analysis 3b.i: typical effects of recalibration on AJE (MM recal., AJE). In
Analysis 3b.i, I examined the typical effects of recalibration on absolute judgment error
(AJE). As before, the effects of recalibration on AJE were used to draw inferences about
the stability and generalizability of the observed relationship between an individual’s
judgments and estimated optima (i.e., the first criterion of a useful credibility model). If
credibility-based recalibration can reliably improve AJE in out-of-sample judgments,
then this would suggest that the errors and biases observed in the calibration sample were
similar to those that remained unobserved in the prediction sample — i.e., that these
relationships were stable and generalizable. To determine whether this was true in the
March Madness data, Analysis 3b.i examined the typical effects of recalibration on AJE,
across forecasters.
The results of Analysis 3b.i can be seen in the figures and tables below. Figures
30-33 show the empirical distributions of the four AJE-related DVs across forecasters,
and Figure 34 shows a visual comparison of mean AJEs before and after recalibration.
Table 29 provides descriptive statistics for each of the distributions represented in Figures
30-33, and Table 30 shows the results of Wilcoxon signed-rank tests examining the null
hypothesis that the median of each distribution does not differ from chance (represented
by red dotted lines in Figures 30-33).

Figure 30
[MM data]: Typical proportion of judgments for which recalibration improved (reduced)
AJE.
194

Figure 31
[MM data]: Typical pairwise change in AJE (pre – post), due to recalibration.

Note: positive values indicate an improvement (reduction) in AJE.

Figure 32
[MM data]: Typical effect-size (Cohen’s d) of recalibration on AJE.
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Note: positive values indicate an improvement (reduction) in AJE.

Figure 33
[MM data]: Proportion of samples in which recalibration improved (reduced) mean AJE.

Figure 34
[MM data]: Mean AJE, before and after recalibration.

196

Note: smaller values indicate more accurate judgements (smaller errors), on average.

Table 29
[MM data]: Typical effects of credibility-based recalibration on AJE, summarized across
forecasters.
Between-Subjects Summary Statistics
Outcome Measure
Typical proportion of judgments for
which recalibration improved AJE

Mean

Mdn.

SD

Min.

Max.

56%

53%

10%

38%

86%

0.79
× 10-2

0.05
× 10-2

1.79
× 10-2

-1.00
× 10-2

10.18
× 10-2

Typical effect (Cohen's d) of
recalibration on AJE

0.10

0.05

0.25

-0.42

0.80

Proportion of samples in which
recalibration improved mean AJE

73%

77%

23%

18%

100%

Typical pairwise change in AJE
(pre - post), due to recalibration

Table 30
[MM data]: Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, assessing whether credibility-based
recalibration typically improved judgments (i.e., reduced AJE) beyond chance.
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Outcome Measure
Typical proportion of judgments for
which recalibration improved AJE

Prop. Mass
> H0
Mdn. = 0.5
65%
H0

Stat. (V)

p-value

5391

<.001***

Typical pairwise change in AJE
(pre - post), due to recalibration

Mdn. = 0

53%

4732

0.01**

Typical effect (Cohen's d) of
recalibration on AJE

Mdn. = 0

63%

4652

<.001***

Mdn. = 0.5

81%

6236.50

<.001***

Proportion of samples in which
recalibration improved mean AJE

Significance levels: * p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001

Discussion. The results of Analysis 3b.i suggest that credibility-based
recalibration typically led to small, but consistent improvements in AJE. Depending on
how AJE was summarized, the study-wide expected effects of recalibration (i.e., the
typical effects of recalibration for the average March Madness forecaster) were to reduce
AJE in 56% of individual judgments, each by an average of 0.79 points on the probability
scale. Overall, this corresponded to an average, pairwise Cohen’s d of 0.10, and a smaller
mean AJE in 73% of bootstrap samples, on average. Though considerably less impressive
than the effects observed in the Good Judgment Project, the medians of the distributions
for all four outcome measures were significantly greater than chance, suggesting that
credibility-based recalibration would have generally improved AJE in the March
Madness study. Thus, while the results of Analysis 3b.i are small, they nevertheless
indicate that the linear credibility framework was able to identify stable, generalizable
relationships in the March Madness data — a rather impressive feat, in and of itself.
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Analysis 3b.ii: typical effects of recalibration on ALE (MM recal., ALE). In
Analysis 3b.ii, I examined the typical effects of recalibration on absolute linear error
(ALE) in the March Madness data. As with the previous study, a reliable improvement in
ALE due to recalibration would suggest that the trends observed in Analysis 3b.i (MM
recal., AJE) represent genuine errors and biases in judgment and that correcting them
would systematically lead to increased accuracy. As discussed at the outset of Study 3b
(MM recalibration), however, there is reason to suspect that estimated optima in the
March Madness study were not particularly accurate as “model” judgments. As such,
shrinking an individual’s SPJs towards estimated optima in Analysis 3b.ii may not result
in a reliable increase in ALE. If this turns out to be the case, then the linear credibility
framework would not meet the criteria for a useful model of credibility when applied to
the March Madness data. Because Analysis 3b.i (MM recal., AJE) revealed a consistent
effect of recalibration on AJE, however, this would suggest that the principal reason the
linear credibility framework was not useful was because estimated optima were a poor
stand-in for “objective” judgments in the March Madness study, not because linear
regression was too simple of a model to capture credibility.
To better tease-apart these possibilities, Analysis 3b.ii examined the typical
effects of credibility-based recalibration on ALE, across forecasters. The results of this
analysis can be seen in the figures and tables below. Figures 35-38 show the empirical
distributions of the four ALE-related DVs across forecasters, and Figure 39 shows a
visual comparison of mean ALEs before and after recalibration. Table 31 provides
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descriptive statistics for each of the distributions represented in Figures 35-38, and Table
32 shows the results of Wilcoxon signed-rank tests examining the null hypothesis that the
median of each distribution does not differ from chance (represented by red dotted lines
in Figures 35-38).

Figure 35
[MM data]: Typical proportion of judgments for which recalibration improved (reduced)
ALE.

Figure 36
[MM data]: Typical pairwise change in ALE (pre – post), due to recalibration.
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Note: positive values indicate an improvement (reduction) in ALE.

Figure 37
[MM data]: Typical effect-size (Cohen’s d) of recalibration on ALE.

Note: positive values indicate an improvement (reduction) in ALE.

Figure 38
[MM data]: Proportion of samples in which recalibration improved (reduced) mean
ALE.
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Figure 39
[MM data]: Mean ALE, before and after recalibration.

Note: smaller values indicate more accurate judgements (smaller errors), on average.

Table 31
[MM data]: Typical effects of credibility-based recalibration on ALE, summarized across
forecasters.
Between-Subjects Summary Statistics
Outcome Measure

Mean

Mdn.

SD

Min.

Max.
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Typical proportion of judgments for
which recalibration improved ALE

38%

35%

11%

19%

71%

Typical pairwise change in ALE
(pre - post), due to recalibration

-1.48
× 10-2

-1.46
× 10-2

1.93
× 10-2

-6.66
× 10-2

7.51
× 10-2

Typical effect (Cohen's d) of
recalibration on ALE

-0.32

-0.39

0.28

-0.73

0.56

Proportion of samples in which
recalibration improved mean ALE

18%

6%

27%

0%

100%

Table 32
[MM data]: Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, assessing whether credibility-based
recalibration typically improved judgments (i.e., reduced ALE) beyond chance.
Prop. Mass
Outcome Measure
H0
Stat. (V) p-value
> H0
Typical proportion of judgments for
Mdn. = 0.5
11%
726.5
<.001***
which recalibration improved ALE
Typical pairwise change in ALE
(pre - post), due to recalibration

Mdn. = 0

11%

829

<.001***

Typical effect (Cohen's d) of
recalibration on ALE

Mdn. = 0

10%

704

<.001***

Mdn. = 0.5

11%

737.5

<.001***

Proportion of samples in which
recalibration improved mean ALE

Significance levels: * p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001
Note: p-values in red indicate that effects were not in the expected direction

Discussion. Somewhat unexpectedly — though generally in-line with the
concerns outlined at the beginning of this study — the results of Analysis 3b.ii indicate
that credibility-based recalibration typically had a negative effect on (i.e., increased)
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ALE. This conclusion was supported by all four ALE-based outcome measures, with the
average GJP forecaster being able to expect only 38% of her individual judgments to
improve in terms of ALE, and the average size of her errors to increase by 1.48 points on
the probability scale. Overall, this corresponded to an average, pairwise Cohen’s d of 0.32, and a worse (larger) mean ALE in 82% of a forecaster’s samples, on average.
Across the board, distributions of typical effect sizes were significantly worse than
chance, suggesting that credibility-based recalibration would have decreased accuracy in
the March Madness study, in general. As such, the results of Analysis 3b.ii suggest that
the linear credibility framework would not have been a useful model for improving
March Madness predictions, primarily because estimated optima were not particularly
accurate (relative to individuals).
Despite this disappointing performance, however, the results of Analysis 3b.ii
suggest that the linear credibility framework was statistically powerful enough to pick-up
on small trends in individual judgments. Consequently, it is still conceivable that the
linear credibility framework might be of some use, if a better standard of judgment can be
identified. Thus, in Chapter 4, I will return to the March Madness data to determine
whether it is possible to salvage the benefits of credibility-based recalibration by using a
more accurate set of estimated optima.

Analysis 3b.iii: typical effects of recalibration on reliability (MM recal.,
reliability). In Analysis 3b.iii, I examined the typical effects of recalibration on
reliability, a measure that is closely related to calibration in the forecasting literature
204

(see: Lichtenstein et al., 1982). As with ALE, a systematic improvement in reliability due
to recalibration would suggest that shrinking SPJs towards estimated optima reduced
errors and biases in judgment. Critically, while the results of Analysis 3b.ii (MM recal.,
ALE) have already shown that credibility-based recalibration was generally detrimental
to forecast accuracy in the March Madness data, these results cannot speak to whether
that accuracy was lost because judgments were made “truly” worse, or simply less
extreme. Examining reliability can help disambiguate this effect because it measures the
(dis)agreement between SPJs and within-sample baserates, rather than observed
outcomes. As such, a consistent improvement in reliability paired with a consistent
worsening of ALE would suggest that part of the reason estimated optima were less
accurate than 16% of individual forecasters in the March Madness study was that those
forecasters benefitted from short-term overconfidence. As such, observing the predictions
of the same forecasters over a larger number of events might have seen the top
performers regress to the mean, causing estimated optima to become (relatively) more
useful.
To determine whether this was the case, Analysis 3a.iii examined the typical
effects of credibility-based recalibration on reliability, across forecasters. The results of
this analysis can be seen in the figures and tables below. Figures 40 and 41 show the
empirical distributions of the two reliability-related DVs across forecasters. Table 33
provides descriptive statistics for each of the distributions represented in Figures 40 and
41, and Table 34 shows the results of Wilcoxon signed-rank tests examining the null
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hypothesis that the median of each distribution does not differ from chance (represented
by red dotted lines in Figures 40 and 41).

Figure 40
[MM data]: Proportion of samples in which recalibration improved (reduced) reliability.

Figure 41
[MM data]: Typical pairwise change in reliability (pre – post), due to recalibration.

Note: positive values indicate an improvement (reduction) in reliability.

Table 33
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[MM data]: Typical effects of credibility-based recalibration on reliability, summarized
across forecasters.
Between-Subjects Summary Statistics
Outcome Measure
Proportion of samples in which
recalibration improved reliability
Typical pairwise change in reliability
(pre - post), due to recalibration

Mean

Mdn.

SD

Min.

Max.

56%

56%

17%

20%

95%

0.49
× 10-2

0.19
× 10-2

1.08
× 10-2

-0.73
× 10-2

8.25
× 10-2

Table 34
[MM data]: Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, assessing whether credibility-based
recalibration typically improved judgments (i.e., reduced reliability) beyond chance.
Prop. Mass
Outcome Measure
H0
Stat. (V) p-value
> H0
Proportion of samples in which
Mdn. = 0.5
64%
4754
<.001***
recalibration improved reliability
Typical pairwise change in reliability
(pre - post), due to recalibration

Mdn. = 0

67%

5396

<.001***

Significance levels: * p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001

Discussion. Though the effects are quite small, the results of Analysis 3b.iii
indicate that credibility-based recalibration had a systematically beneficial effect on
reliability in the March Madness data. For the average participant, recalibration was
expected to improve (reduce) reliability in 56% of samples, and the average pairwise
change in reliability was positive. In both cases, the typical effects of recalibration were
positive for about 65% of forecasters, corresponding to statistically significant effects. In
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general, therefore, the results of Analysis 3a.iii indicate that credibility-based
recalibration genuinely improved calibration (albeit to a small degree). When considered
in conjunction with the results of Analysis 3b.ii (MM recal., ALE), this suggests that
some participants in the March Madness study may have outperformed estimated optima
due to short-term overconfidence — an effect that helps to explain why estimated optima
did not appear to be optimal in the March Madness study, as measured by forecast
accuracy.

General Discussion
As in Study 2b (MM reliability/validity), a provisional glance at the results of
Study 3b suggests that the linear credibility framework may not have been worth
examining in the March Madness study. Indeed, as defined by my own criteria for a
useful model of credibility, the results of Study 3b indicate that the linear credibility
framework was not useful for improving March Madness SPJs. In practice, however, this
does not mean that the results of Study 3b are not informative. Instead, when considered
in a broader context, the pattern of findings uncovered in Study 3b suggests that the linear
credibility framework was not useful for a very predictable reason — namely that I failed
to identify a strong set of estimated optima. Unsurprisingly, therefore, building a model
of credibility around a weak set of “model” judgments did not reveal much about “good”
forecasting in the March Madness study and served as a poor basis for improving SPJs.
Despite this shortcoming, however, it is worth noting that the linear credibility
framework still performed admirably in Study 3b. Indeed, even when applied to a
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situation that systematically undermined its chances for success, Analysis 3b.i (MM
recal., AJE) demonstrates that the linear credibility framework was able to identify stable,
generalizable trends in participants’ judgments. In addition, Analysis 3b.iii (MM recal.,
reliability) indicates that — above and beyond the fact that March Madness games are
notoriously hard to predict — one of the reasons that estimated optima were so poor in
this study (or, rather seemed so poor) is that some forecasters benefited from short-term
overconfidence. As such, the results of Study 3b suggest that there is still hope for the
linear credibility framework, despite its limitations and real-world boundary conditions.
To explore these boundary conditions further, I will return to the March Madness data in
Chapter 4 to see if the usefulness of the linear credibility framework can be improved by
fitting it to a more accurate set of estimated optima.

Study 3c: Empirical Effects of Recalibration with Philadelphia Air Temperature
Data (PHL recalibration)
Much as in Chapter 2, the first two studies presented in Chapter 3 occupy
opposite ends of the “usefulness” spectrum. In Study 3a (GJP recalibration), I tested the
usefulness of the linear credibility framework when fit to the remarkably rich data-set
provided by the Good Judgment Project; in Study 3b (MM recalibration), I examined the
surprisingly spartan data gathered during the 2017 March Madness tournament. Though
both studies provide a great deal of information about the capabilities of the linear
credibility framework, neither can be called representative, per se. Thus, in Study 3c, I
examined the usefulness of the linear credibility framework when applied to a thoroughly
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ordinary data-set: judgments from the Philadelphia air temperature study. As discussed in
Study 2c (PHL reliability/validity), exploratory regression analyses revealed a promising
but somewhat haphazard degree of predictive validity between linear credibility estimates
and forecast accuracy in these data — as one might expect from SPJs provided by truly
amateur judges.
As in previous studies, I tested these data against the three criteria of a useful
credibility model by examining the effects of credibility-based recalibration on out-ofsample judgments. If “undoing” the trends in judgment observed in a participant’s
calibration sample systematically improves judgments in her prediction sample, then
these trends must reflect a set of stable and generalizable relationships with estimated
optima (criterion 1). Furthermore, by manipulating how “improvements” are defined, the
effects of credibility-based recalibration can provide insight into the type of relationship
that existed between an individual’s judgments and estimated optima in the first place. In
Study 3c, this flexible testing structure was important because it allowed me to examine a
set of outcome measures that were not available in previous studies. Specifically, because
detailed historical records of Philadelphia air temperatures are widely available, building
a statistical model that predicts one day’s air temperature from the previous day’s
temperature is a relatively simple matter. Consequently, in Study 3c, I was able to test the
effects of recalibration on three types of judgmental accuracy: AJE vs. crowd aggregates
(previously just AJE; criterion 1: stable/generalizable trends); AJE vs. baserates (criteria
1 & 2: stable, generalizable, and detrimental trends); and the existing standard of ALE
(criteria 1 & 2: stable, generalizable, and detrimental trends).
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Method
Detailed procedure. To examine the usefulness of the linear credibility
framework when applied to the Philadelphia air temperature data, Study 3c followed a
procedure that was largely parallel to Studies 3a (GJP recalibration) and 3b (MM
recalibration). As mentioned above, however, the one major difference was that the
existence of detailed historical records made it possible to estimate baserates for various
temperatures observed in Philadelphia during January and July. Thus, in Study 3c, I
examined four additional outcome measures for each participant, corresponding to “AJE
vs. baserates” variants of the four AJE-based outcome measures that were used in
previous studies (here, referred to as “AJE vs. crowd aggregates”).
To estimate baserates in Study 3c, I constructed two linear regression models: one
for January and one for July. Using daily air temperature data recorded at the
Philadelphia International Airport from 2008-2017, these models were constructed by
regressing the high temperature from each day t on the high temperature from each day t
+ 1 in January and July (excluding t = 31 for both months, where the temperature on day t
+ 1 would fall in the next month). After estimating these models, it was possible to
estimate the probability of observing a temperature q the day after observing a
temperature p by evaluating the likelihood of drawing a temperature at least as large (or
at least as small) as q from a Normal distribution with a mean equal to the model’s fitted
value for q(p) and a standard deviation equal to the model’s standard error of the
estimate.
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Beyond examining AJE vs. baserates, Study 3c was conducted in a manner
similar to previous studies in Chapter 3. Thus, the dependent variables in Study 3c were
observed during the same run of the general procedure that was used to calculate
bootstrapped credibility estimates in Analysis 2c.ii (PHL validity). As described in Study
2c (PHL reliability/validity), credibility functions in this analysis were fit to a calibration
sample size of ncal = 50; participants were only included if they had provided enough
SPJs to accommodate a minimum prediction sample size of npred = 30; and the effects of
recalibration were observed over nboot = 100 bootstrap trials.

Results
Analysis 3c.i: typical effects of recalibration on AJE vs. crowd aggregates
(PHL recal., AJE vs. crowd). In Analysis 3c.i, I examined the typical effects of
recalibration on absolute judgment error relative to estimated optima (i.e., AJE vs. crowd
aggregates, or what was previously referred to as AJE). As before, the effects of
recalibration on AJE vs. crowd aggregates were used to draw inferences about the
stability and generalizability of trends captured by linear credibility estimates (i.e., the
first criterion of a useful credibility model).
The results of this analysis can be seen in the figures and tables below. Figures
42-45 show the empirical distributions of the four AJE-vs.-crowd-aggregates-related DVs
across forecasters, and Figure 46 shows a visual comparison of mean AJEs vs. crowd
aggregates before and after recalibration. Table 35 provides descriptive statistics for each
of the distributions represented in Figures 42-45, and Table 36 shows the results of
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Wilcoxon signed-rank tests examining the null hypothesis that the median of each
distribution does not differ from chance (represented by red dotted lines in Figures 4245).

Figure 42
[PHL data]: Typical proportion of judgments for which recalibration improved (reduced)
AJE vs. crowd aggregates.

Figure 43
[PHL data]: Typical pairwise change in AJE vs. crowd aggregates (pre – post), due to
recalibration.

Note: positive values indicate an improvement (reduction) in AJE.
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Figure 44
[PHL data]: Typical effect-size (Cohen’s d) of recalibration on AJE vs. crowd
aggregates.

Note: positive values indicate an improvement (reduction) in AJE.

Figure 45
[PHL data]: Proportion of samples in which recalibration improved (reduced) mean AJE
vs. crowd aggregates.

Figure 46
[PHL data]: Mean AJE vs. crowd aggregates, before and after recalibration.
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Note: smaller values indicate more accurate judgements (smaller errors), on average.

Table 35
[PHL data]: Typical effects of credibility-based recalibration on AJE vs. crowd
aggregates, summarized across forecasters.
Between-Subjects Summary Statistics
Mean

Mdn.

Typical proportion of judgments for which
recalibration improved AJE vs. crowd agg.

64%

62%

11%

43%

90%

Typical pairwise change in AJE vs. crowd
agg. (pre - post), due to recalibration

5.99
× 10-2

3.40
× 10-2

6.16
× 10-2

-0.27
× 10-2

27.06
× 10-2

Typical effect (Cohen's d) of recalibration
on AJE vs. crowd agg.

0.37

0.31

0.28

-0.02

1.13

Prop. of samples in which recalibration
improved mean AJE vs. crowd agg.

95%

100%

13%

41%

100%

Outcome Measure

SD

Min.

Max.

Table 36
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[PHL data]: Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, assessing whether credibility-based
recalibration typically improved judgments (i.e., reduced AJE vs. crowd aggregates)
beyond chance.
Prop.
Outcome Measure
H0
Stat. (V) p-value
Mass > H0
Typical proportion of judgments for which Mdn.
97%
2670
<.001***
recalibration improved AJE vs. crowd agg. = 0.5
Typical pairwise change in AJE vs. crowd
agg. (pre - post), due to recalibration

Mdn.
=0

95%

2682

<.001***

Typical effect (Cohen's d) of recalibration
on AJE vs. crowd agg.

Mdn.
=0

96%

2692

<.001***

Prop. of samples in which recalibration
improved mean AJE vs. crowd agg.

Mdn.
= 0.5

96%

2694

<.001***

Significance levels: * p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001

Discussion. Though less impressive than the results of Analysis 3a.i (GJP recal.,
AJE), the results of Analysis 3c.i demonstrate that credibility-based recalibration once
again led to a universal improvement in AJE vs. crowd aggregates (which, for the
remainder of this analysis, I will simply refer to as AJE). Depending on how AJE was
summarized, the expected effect of recalibration for the average study participant was to
reduce AJE in 64% of individual judgments, each by an average of 5.99 points on the
probability scale. Overall, this corresponded to an average, pairwise Cohen’s d of 0.37,
and a better (smaller) mean AJE in 95% of bootstrap samples, on average. For all four
AJE-based outcomes, this corresponded to distributions of typical effect sizes that were
significantly greater than chance, suggesting that credibility-based recalibration could
have been expected to improve AJE in the Philadelphia air temperature study, in general.
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Consequently, the results of Analysis 3a.i suggest that the linear credibility framework
fulfilled the first criterion of a useful credibility model (stable, generalizable
relationships) when fit to predictions from the Philadelphia air temperature study.

Analysis 3c.ii: typical effects of recalibration on AJE vs. baserates (PHL
recal., AJE vs. baserates). In Analysis 3c.ii, I examined the typical effects of
recalibration on absolute judgment error with respect to historical baserates (AJE vs.
baserates). As discussed above, this category of outcome measure was unique to Study
3c, in that the Philadelphia air temperature data were the only ones that allowed for the
estimation of empirical baserates. Though still just another set of estimated optima, these
baserates represent a high-water mark the usefulness of the linear credibility framework,
as they are the only criteria in Chapter 3 that can be unambiguously defended as a
normative standard of “good” judgment. Thus, if credibility-based recalibration can be
shown to systematically improve (reduce) AJE vs. baserates, then Analysis 3c.ii will
definitively show that even simple models of credibility can be used to identify and
ameliorate errors and biases in judgment (criteria 1 & 2: identify stable, generalizable,
and detrimental trends in judgment).
To determine whether the Philadelphia air temperature could support this
conclusion, Analysis 3c.ii examined the effects of credibility-based recalibration (with
credibility functions fit to crowd aggregates as estimated optima) on AJE vs. baserates.
The results of this analysis can be seen in the figures and tables below. Figures 47-50
show the empirical distributions of the four AJE vs. baserates DVs across forecasters, and
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Figure 51 shows a visual comparison of mean AJEs vs. baserates before and after
recalibration. Table 37 provides descriptive statistics for each of the distributions
represented in Figures 47-50, and Table 38 shows the results of Wilcoxon signed-rank
tests examining the null hypothesis that the median of each distribution does not differ
from chance (represented by red dotted lines in 47-50).

Figure 47
[PHL data]: Typical proportion of judgments for which recalibration improved (reduced)
AJE vs. baserates.

Figure 48
[PHL data]: Typical pairwise change in AJE vs. baserates (pre – post), due to
recalibration.
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Note: positive values indicate an improvement (reduction) in AJE.

Figure 49
[PHL data]: Typical effect-size (Cohen’s d) of recalibration on AJE vs. baserates.

Note: positive values indicate an improvement (reduction) in AJE.

Figure 50
[PHL data]: Proportion of samples in which recalibration improved (reduced) mean AJE
vs. baserates.
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Figure 51
[PHL data]: Mean AJE vs. baserates, before and after recalibration.

Note: smaller values indicate more accurate judgements (smaller errors), on average.

Table 37
[PHL data]: Typical effects of credibility-based recalibration on AJE vs. baserates,
summarized across forecasters.
Between-Subjects Summary Statistics
Outcome Measure

Mean

Mdn.

SD

Min.

Max.
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Typical proportion of judgments for which
recalibration improved AJE vs. baserates

60%

56%

11%

42%

88%

Typical pairwise change in AJE vs.
baserates (pre - post), due to recalibration

5.13
× 10-2

3.25
× 10-2

6.47
× 10-2

-1.16
× 10-2

31.88
× 10-2

Typical effect (Cohen's d) of recalibration
on AJE vs. baserates

0.30

0.21

0.30

-0.14

1.05

Prop. of samples in which recalibration
improved mean AJE vs. baserates

84%

100%

28%

1%

100%

Table 38
[PHL data]: Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, assessing whether credibility-based
recalibration typically improved judgments (i.e., reduced AJE vs. baserates) beyond
chance.
Prop.
Outcome Measure
H0
Stat. (V) p-value
Mass > H0
Typical proportion of judgments for which Mdn.
74%
2346
<.001***
recalibration improved AJE vs. baserates
= 0.5
Typical pairwise change in AJE vs.
baserates (pre - post), due to recalibration

Mdn.
=0

84%

2553

<.001***

Typical effect (Cohen's d) of recalibration
on AJE vs. baserates

Mdn.
=0

84%

2560

<.001***

Prop. of samples in which recalibration
improved mean AJE vs. baserates

Mdn.
= 0.5

84%

2490

<.001***

Significance levels: * p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001

Discussion. Despite the fact that participants in Study 3c had only lay knowledge
of air temperatures in Philadelphia, the results of Analysis 3c.ii demonstrate that a basic
willingness to attend to one’s errors (and a small sample of historical outcomes) is all a
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decision maker needs to systematically improve SPJs. Perhaps even more remarkably,
Analysis 3c.ii demonstrates that this “true” improvement in judgmental accuracy (i.e., a
systematic decrease in the differences between SPJs and historical baserates) can be
achieved with (a) a realistic amount of data; (b) only modest knowledge of empirical
outcomes; and (c) no knowledge of “objective” probabilities, whatsoever. Thus, as
anticipated, Analysis 3c.ii provides a definitive example of a case where a simple
credibility model (here, the linear credibility framework) can be used to improve realworld judgments.
Specifically, the results of Analysis 3c.ii demonstrate that shrinking SPJs towards
crowdsourced estimated optima was able to systematically improve the accuracy of SPJs,
relative to historical baserates. Depending on how AJE vs. baserates was measured, the
study-wide expected effects of recalibration were to reduce AJE in 60% of individual
judgments, each by an average of 5.13 points on the probability scale. This corresponded
to an average, pairwise Cohen’s d of 0.30, and an improvement in mean AJE in 84% of
bootstrap samples, on average. Though these effects were predictably smaller than the
corresponding reduction in AJE vs. crowd aggregates, all four effects on AJE vs.
baserates were significantly greater than chance, suggesting that credibility-based
recalibration could have been expected to improve AJE vs. baserates in Study 3c, in
general. Consequently, the results of Analysis 3c.ii provide clear evidence that the linear
credibility framework was able to meet the first two criteria of a useful credibility model
(identifying stable, generalizable, and detrimental relationships) when fit to the
Philadelphia air temperature data.
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Analysis 3c.iii: typical effects of recalibration on ALE (PHL recal., ALE). In
Analysis 3c.iii, I examined the typical effects of recalibration on absolute linear error
(ALE). As with other recalibration studies, a reliable, positive effect of recalibration on
ALE would indicate that the linear credibility framework can be useful for identifying
(and correcting) genuine errors and biases in judgment. In addition, if the effects of
recalibration on ALE are suitably large, then the argument can be made that the linear
credibility framework met all three criteria of a useful credibility model — suggesting,
perhaps, that “usefulness” is a common feature of empirical models of credibility.
To examine this possibility, Analysis 3c.iii examined the typical effects of
credibility-based recalibration on ALE, across forecasters. The results of this analysis can
be seen in the figures and tables below. Figures 52-55 show the empirical distributions of
the four ALE-based DVs across forecasters, and Figure 56 shows a visual comparison of
mean ALEs before and after recalibration. Table 39 provides descriptive statistics for
each of the distributions represented in Figures 52-55, and Table 40 shows the results of
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests examining the null hypothesis that the median of each
distribution does not differ from chance (represented by red dotted lines in Figures 5255).

Figure 52
[PHL data]: Typical proportion of judgments for which recalibration improved (reduced)
ALE.
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Figure 53
[PHL data]: Typical pairwise change in ALE (pre – post), due to recalibration.

Note: positive values indicate an improvement (reduction) in ALE.

Figure 54
[PHL data]: Typical effect-size (Cohen’s d) of recalibration on ALE.

224

Note: positive values indicate an improvement (reduction) in ALE.

Figure 55
[PHL data]: Proportion of samples in which recalibration improved (reduced) mean
ALE.

Figure 56
[PHL data]: Mean ALE, before and after recalibration.
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Note: smaller values indicate more accurate judgements (smaller errors), on average.

Table 39
[PHL data]: Typical effects of credibility-based recalibration on ALE, summarized
across forecasters.
Between-Subjects Summary Statistics
Mean

Mdn.

59%

64%

15%

27%

75%

4.37
× 10-2

3.55
× 10-2

4.88
× 10-2

-5.42
× 10-2

21.68
× 10-2

Typical effect (Cohen's d) of recalibration
on ALE

0.21

0.27

0.22

-0.51

0.68

Proportion of samples in which
recalibration improved mean ALE

87%

100%

29%

0%

100%

Outcome Measure
Typical proportion of judgments for which
recalibration improved ALE
Typical pairwise change in ALE
(pre - post), due to recalibration

SD

Min.

Max.

Table 40
[PHL data]: Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, assessing whether credibility-based
recalibration typically improved judgments (i.e., reduced ALE) beyond chance.
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Outcome Measure

H0

Typical proportion of judgments for which
recalibration improved ALE

Mdn.
= 0.5

Typical pairwise change in ALE
(pre - post), due to recalibration

Mdn.
=0

Typical effect (Cohen's d) of recalibration
on ALE
Proportion of samples in which
recalibration improved mean ALE

Prop.
Mass > H0
71%

Stat. (V)

p-value

2198

<.001***

86%

2508

<.001***

Mdn.
=0

86%

2437

<.001***

Mdn.
= 0.5

86%

2468.5

<.001***

Significance levels: * p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001

Discussion. Similar to previous findings in Study 3c (PHL recalibration), the
results of Analysis 3c.iii demonstrate that credibility-based recalibration typically led to
non-trivial improvements in ALE. As with both variants of AJE, this conclusion was
supported by all four ALE-based outcome measures, with the average participant in the
Philadelphia air temperature study being able to expect 59% of their individual judgments
to improve, each by an average of 4.37 points on the probability scale. Overall, this
corresponded to an average, pairwise Cohen’s d of 0.21, and a better (smaller) mean ALE
in 87% of a forecaster’s prediction samples, on average. Once again, this corresponded to
distributions of typical effect sizes that were significantly greater than chance, suggesting
that credibility-based recalibration would likely have improved ALE in Study 3c, in
general. Critically, all four distributions of DVs suggested that (a) the effects of
recalibration were more frequently positive than they were negative (the odds of a
positive effect were roughly 7:3 for the lowest performing DV, and greater than 17:3 for
227

the other three); and (b) that the practical effects of recalibration were not insubstantial
(the study-wide average improvement in ALE was 4 points on the probability scale).
Thus, the results of Analysis 3c.iii suggest that the linear credibility framework fulfilled
all three criteria for a useful credibility model when applied to judgments from Study 3c.

Analysis 3c.iv: typical effects of recalibration on reliability (PHL recal.,
reliability). Finally, in Analysis 3c.iv, I examined the typical effects of recalibration on
reliability (see: Murphy, 1973). As with ALE, a systematic improvement in reliability
due to recalibration would suggest that shrinking SPJs towards estimated optima had
reduced errors and biases in judgment. In principle, this analysis was conceptually
parallel to the analysis carried-out in Analysis 3c.ii (PHL recal., AJE vs. baserates),
though the baserates observed here were those that were observed in-sample, rather than
over the past ten years.
As a final test of the linear credibility framework, therefore, Analysis 3c.iv
examined the typical effects of credibility-based recalibration on reliability, across
forecasters. The results of this analysis can be seen in the figures and tables below.
Figures 57 and 58 show the empirical distributions of the two reliability-based DVs
across forecasters. Table 41 provides descriptive statistics for each of the distributions
represented in Figures 57 and 58, and Table 42 shows the results of Wilcoxon signedrank tests examining the null hypothesis that the median of each distribution does not
differ from chance (represented by red dotted lines in Figures 57 and 58).
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Figure 57
[PHL data]: Proportion of samples in which recalibration improved (reduced)
reliability.

Figure 58
[PHL data]: Typical pairwise change in reliability (pre – post), due to recalibration.

Note: positive values indicate an improvement (reduction) in reliability.

Table 41
[PHL data]: Typical effects of credibility-based recalibration on reliability, summarized
across forecasters.
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Between-Subjects Summary Statistics
Outcome Measure
Proportion of samples in which
recalibration improved reliability
Typical pairwise change in reliability
(pre - post), due to recalibration

Mean

Mdn.

SD

Min.

Max.

94%

100%

17%

23%

100%

4.54
× 10-2

2.60
× 10-2

5.33
× 10-2

-0.27
× 10-2

28.62
× 10-2

Table 42
[PHL data]: Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, assessing whether credibility-based
recalibration typically improved judgments (i.e., reduced reliability) beyond chance.
Prop.
Outcome Measure
H0
Stat. (V) p-value
Mass > H0
Proportion of samples in which
Mdn.
93%
2613
<.001***
recalibration improved reliability
= 0.5
Typical pairwise change in reliability
(pre - post), due to recalibration

Mdn.
=0

92%

2675

<.001***

Significance levels: * p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001

Discussion. Consistent with the other findings in Study 3c (PHL recalibration),
the results of Analysis 3c.iv demonstrate that credibility-based recalibration had a
typically beneficial effect on reliability in the Philadelphia air temperature data. Indeed,
for an average participant in Study 3c, recalibration was expected to improve (reduce)
reliability in a massive 94% of each forecaster’s bootstrap trials, on average (and 100%
of trials at the median). As expected, this effect was accompanied by an average pairwise
improvement (reduction) in reliability across samples. In both cases, the typical effects of
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recalibration on reliability were greater than chance for more than 92% of forecasters,
both of which corresponded to significant statistical trends. In general, therefore, the
results of Analysis 3c.iv provide strong evidence to suggest that credibility-based
recalibration improved both judgmental accuracy and calibration in Study 3c.

General Discussion
Taken together, the results of Study 3c demonstrate that the linear credibility
framework can be a useful model of credibility and is able to help decision makers
effectively identify and ameliorate errors and biases in judgment. Furthermore, because
Study 3c employed amateur participants making judgments in a domain of moderate
difficulty, there is no reason to suspect that these results would not generalize to other
contexts. Thus, the successes of the linear credibility framework in improving air
temperature judgments suggest that even simple models of credibility may often be useful
to decision makers. As discussed in Analysis 3c.ii (PHL recal., AJE vs. baserates), a
particularly noteworthy finding from Study 3c is that recalibrating SPJs relative to
intersubjective estimated optima (i.e., optimized crowd aggregates) can improve the
accuracy of judgments relative to normative benchmarks such as historical baserates. As
such, Study 3c is a definitive example of a case where the underlying theory of credibility
is sound.
In other words, by examining the relationship between an individual’s judgments
and simple, crowdsourced approximations of “optimal” judgments, a decision maker can
gain insight into how and why an individual’s judgments tend to err. Though this sort of
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examination is unlikely to provide a complete picture of such tendencies — especially
when one’s method for estimating credibility is relatively unsophisticated — it can still
provide empirical traction on such questions in the absence of normative criteria.
Consequently, if credibility can be modeled successfully, it can help narrow the gap
between the judgments of an unaided individual and those of a rational observer. In Study
3c, the fact that a simple credibility model could be applied to a decidedly ordinary dataset and narrow this gap by a non-trivial degree provides grounds for optimism that the
linear credibility framework — and perhaps models of credibility, more generally — may
be useful in a wide variety of domains.

Conclusions
Studies 3a-3c demonstrate that the linear credibility framework can be useful to
decision makers by (a) identifying stable, generalizable relationships between an
individual’s SPJs and optimized crowd aggregates; and (b) improving the accuracy and
calibration of an individual’s SPJs by correcting for these tendencies; thereby (c)
improving subjective probability judgments for a large majority of individuals (using
ecologically realistic amounts of data). Strictly speaking, this was not the unanimous
finding of Studies 3a-3c. In Study 3b, the linear credibility framework failed to meet two
of the three criteria of a useful model of credibility. However, the results of Analysis 3b.ii
(MM recal., ALE) suggests that these results can be largely attributed to the fact that
estimated optima in Study 2b (MM recalibration) were not particularly accurate as
“model” judgments, rather than because the linear credibility framework was an
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(especially) ill-suited model of credibility. Consequently, the results of all three studies
provide evidence to suggest that the linear credibility framework can be useful, and the
results of two provide direct evidence to this effect.
In general, these results warrant two conclusions. First, in at least some situations,
the linear credibility framework can be useful as a model of credibility and can help
decision makers identify and ameliorate errors and biases in judgment. Second, because it
is generally unlikely that the “true” relationship between an individual’s judgments and
any set of estimated optima is a simple, atheoretical line, it is reasonable to assume that
the usefulness of the linear credibility framework represents an empirical lower bound for
the usefulness of credibility models, more generally. In a wide variety of contexts,
therefore, decision makers may find that credibility is worth examining.
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CHAPTER 4

ON THE ROBUSTNESS OF EMPIRICAL MODELS OF CREDIBILITY

Abstract:
Modeling credibility represents an attempt to evaluate subjective probability judgments
using simple, practical procedures. However, the absence of normative criteria makes it
difficult to carry-out these evaluations rigorously and places constraints on the validity of
empirical credibility models. Fortunately, as I have shown in previous chapters, decision
makers can use exploratory research methods to examine the robustness of their models.
To demonstrate this principle, Chapter 4 will revisit the weakest analyses from Chapters
2 & 3 and demonstrate how basic applications of the scientific method can be used to
improve the performance of the linear credibility framework. In Study 4, I demonstrate
that the reliability of credibility estimates can be improved by separately examining
heterogeneous question types in the Philadelphia air temperature study. In Study 5, I
demonstrate that improving the accuracy of estimated optima can improve the effects of
credibility-based recalibration on absolute linear error in the March Madness study.

Introduction
Despite the successes of the linear credibility framework, examining credibility is
a messy business. In large part, this is because modeling credibility represents an
extraordinarily difficult task: i.e., reducing the evaluation of subjective probability
judgments (SPJs) to a simple, generalizable, and above all, practical set of empirical
procedures, often in the absence of normative criteria. From a utilitarian perspective,
developing tools for this type of assessment is essential to decision making in domains
such as medicine (e.g., Kinnear & Jackson, 2016), public health (e.g., Cooke, Wilson,
Tuomisto, Morales, Tainio, & Evans, 2007), law (e.g., Wells, 1992), finance (e.g., Jeffrey
& Putnam, 2015), climate science (e.g., Budescu, Por, Broomell, & Smithson, 2014),
politics (e.g., Gill & Walker, 2005; Tetlock & Lebow, 2001), and military intelligence
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(e.g., Johnston, 2005; Kent, 1964). Yet, from a scientific perspective, the difficulty of
identifying “objective” probabilities places severe constraints on the rigor with which
SPJs can be evaluated. As a result, there will always be limits to the validity of empirical
models of credibility, and even the most well-fitted model is unlikely to be a panacea.
To be a productive exercise, therefore, examining credibility requires a decision
maker to understand (a) the conditions under which credibility estimates are likely to be
informative; and (b) the extent to which such estimates should be interpreted as measures
of error and bias in judgment vs. predictors or correlates of the same. In other words,
gleaning insight from empirical models of credibility requires decision makers to have a
firm grasp on the conditions under which a given model is expected to be robust and the
conditions under which it is not. In the case of the linear credibility framework, for
example, interpreting credibility estimates requires a variety of inferences about the fit
and appropriateness of the model, including (but not limited to):


The extent to which a pool of judges can be expected to possess diagnostic
information about the events in question;



The validity of Baron and colleague’s method for identifying estimated optima
(Baron, Mellers, Tetlock, Stone & Ungar, 2014);



The likely agreement between estimated optima and “objective” probabilities in a
given domain (or, perhaps more clearly, the degree of irreducible uncertainty in
the decision environment; see: Baron et al., 2014);



The descriptive fit of main-effects linear regression to the relationship between an
individual’s judgments and estimated optima;
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The generalizability of this fit to other judgments (out-of-sample, but withinperson);



The stability of this relationship over time;



And the construct-validity of this fit when decomposed into components of bias,
expertise, and consistency.

Fortunately, the research presented in Chapters 1-3 demonstrates that it is possible
for empirical models of credibility to achieve a reasonable degree of “fit” or
“appropriateness” on all of the items listed above. Indeed, given that the linear credibility
framework was designed to undercut several of these factors, I have argued that models
of credibility— and especially those that take care to provide a reasonable descriptive fit
to the data at hand— may often be robust to departures from ideal conditions. In general,
therefore, the ill-specified nature of any empirical model of credibility is both its greatest
strength and its greatest weakness. On the one hand, by relaxing the rigorous inferential
standards demanded by research on judgment under uncertainty, models like the linear
credibility framework can allow decision makers to probe subjective knowledge and
draw weak (although generally useful) inferences about the ways in which an individual’s
judgments tend to err. On the other hand, by relying on weak inferential standards such as
intersubjective agreement and average (i.e., historical) tendencies toward error, models
such as the linear credibility framework can come at the cost of certainty in one’s
evaluations. Thus, while often informative, examining credibility requires a decision
maker to put a substantial degree of faith in her model.
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At first glance, it is tempting to conclude that these strengths and weaknesses are
typical of the “useful, but risky” types of tradeoffs associated with heuristic modes of
evaluation (for a summary, see: Kahneman & Slovic, 2005). As I have demonstrated in
Chapters 2 and 3, however, decision makers can use exploratory research methods to
evaluate the reliability, validity, and utility of a given model of credibility (in a given
context). Thus, in many cases, it is reasonable to assume that the risks associated with
empirical models of credibility can be reduced (or at the very least, characterized) with a
little bit of planning and some thoughtful calibration. For example, because the
performance of credibility estimates is contingent on a variety of factors (including latent
properties of the decision environment), it may often be advisable for decision makers to
compare the performance of several models of credibility, and to be well-versed in the
weakness, assumptions, and boundary conditions of the model that they ultimately
choose. If this is done ahead of time, then when a decision maker encounters difficulty
with her model (as I did at several points throughout this dissertation), she can leverage
her familiarity with its strengths and weaknesses to begin diagnosing how and why it is
not living-up to expectations.
To demonstrate how this sort of diagnosis might occur, Studies 4 and 5 will
present variations on two of the weakest analyses from Chapters 2 and 3. In both cases,
the purpose of these analyses will be to (a) follow-up on my suppositions about how and
why the linear credibility framework failed to meet my expectations; and (b) demonstrate
how these issues might be ameliorated. Because these analyses were both conducted
post-hoc, they should not be taken as evidence for the value or applicability of the linear
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credibility framework. Instead, I present these studies for the sole purpose of
demonstrating that— while models of credibility are necessarily imperfect— they can
also be tested, tailored, and improved with a little bit of exploration. In Study 4, therefore,
I will reexamine Analysis 2c.i (PHL reliability) and demonstrate that the reliability of
credibility estimates derived from the Philadelphia air temperature study can be improved
by considering different subsets of judgments separately. Then, in Study 5, I will return
to Analysis 3b.ii to demonstrate that the typical effects of credibility-based recalibration
on absolute linear error (ALE) can be dramatically improved in the March Madness data
by identifying a more strongly defensible set of estimated optima.

Study 4: The Effect of Question Heterogeneity on Reliability (PHL reliability redux)
In Analysis 2c.i (PHL reliability), non-bootstrapped estimates of bias and
expertise from the Philadelphia air temperature study were less reliable that one might
have hoped. As shown in Figure 14 (reported in Analysis 2c.i), intraclass correlations for
these estimates never surpassed the conventional thresholds for “poor” (ICC < 0.40) and
“fair” (0.40 ≤ ICC ≤ 0.59), respectively (Ciccetti, 1994). Fortunately, these shortcomings
were not sufficient to undermine the results of Study 2c (PHL reliabilility/validity), as the
bootstrapping process was able to compensate for the observed lack of reliability. In
principle, however, a lack of reliability in non-bootstrapped estimates of bias and
expertise has important implications for the linear credibility framework. Specifically,
this shortcoming is likely to produce an unnecessary degree of variance in credibility
estimates from one trial to the next. Thus, in cases where a decision maker does not have
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the luxury of bootstrapping, estimates of bias and expertise are unlikely likely to provide
an accurate indication of an individual’s “skill” or “proficiency” in subjective probability
judgment and could result in ineffective or detrimental recalibration.
Following Study 2c, my best guess as to why the reliabilities of non-bootstrapped
estimates of bias and expertise were suboptimal was that individuals were prone to
different degrees of error and bias across different types of questions (e.g., predictions
about temperatures in January vs. predictions about temperatures in July). The decision to
include three types of questions in the Philadelphia air temperature study was intended to
increase the speed with which data could be gathered. However, in hindsight, it is
apparent that this was a risky methodological choice. Thus, to follow-up on whether
credibility varied across question types, I conducted a series of post-hoc analyses in
which I examined the reliabilities of different subsets of the Philadelphia air temperature
data separately.

Method
Procedure. In Study 4, data from the Philadelphia air temperature study were
divided into five non-mutually-exclusive29 categories: (a) predictions concerning probe
temperatures from the month of January; (b) predictions concerning probe temperatures
from the month of July; (c) predictions concerning the probability of observing a

29

In the ideal case, predictions would have been divided into six mutually exclusive categories according to
a 2 × 3 factorial design — i.e., month = {January, July} × question type = {plus five, minus five, more
extreme}. However, because this would have yielded only 40 SPJs per participant per cell, this design
would have made it impossible to replicate the procedure used in Analysis 2c.i (PHL reliability).
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temperature five degrees warmer than the probe temperature; (d) predictions concerning
the probability of observing a temperature five degrees cooler than the probe temperature;
and (e) predictions concerning the probability of observing a temperature more extreme
than the probe temperature (i.e., colder in January, warmer in July). For each subset of
SPJs, I then evaluated the reliability of linear credibility estimates using the same
procedure as Analysis 2c.i (PHL reliability).
As a reminder, this procedure examined the reliability (i.e., intraclass correlation)
of non-bootstrapped credibility estimates at five levels of calibration sample size: ncal =
{10, 20, …, 50}. At each level, reliability was estimated across 30 bootstrap trials. As
described above, the purpose of this analysis was to determine whether the reliability of
non-bootstrapped estimates would be higher when data were divided according to
question type (vs. pooled), presumably because individuals exhibited inconsistent
tendencies towards error and bias across different types of questions.

Results
The results of Study 4 are presented below. In Figures 59-61, reliabilities of nonbootstrapped estimates of bias, expertise, and consistency are graphed in separate plots.
Figure 59 shows the reliability of non-bootstrapped estimates of bias (
shows the reliability of non-bootstrapped estimates of expertise (

∗

shows the reliability of non-bootstrapped estimates of consistency (

∗

); Figure 60

); and Figure 61
∗

). In each of these

plots, the y-axis represents reliability (i.e., intraclass correlation, or ICC); the x-axis
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represents calibration sample size (ncal); and separate curves represent different subsets of
the Philadelphia air temperature data.

Figure 59
[PHL data]: Reliability of non-bootstrapped estimates of bias (
calibration sample size (ncal) and data subset.

∗

), varying by

Figure 60
[PHL data]: Reliability of non-bootstrapped estimates of expertise (
calibration sample size (ncal) and data subset.

∗

), varying by
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Figure 61
[PHL data]: Reliability of non-bootstrapped estimates of consistency (
calibration sample size (ncal) and data subset.

∗

), varying by

Discussion
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As expected, the results of Study 4 demonstrate that the reliability of nonbootstrapped estimates of bias and expertise were heterogeneous across question types. In
general, these results suggest that the poor performance of the linear credibility
framework in Analysis 2c.i (PHL reliability) can be attributed to the fact that individuals’
bias and expertise tended to vary across question types (rather than the alternative, which
would suggest that the linear credibility framework was fundamentally ill-suited to
modeling credibility in these data). As can be seen in in Figures 59-61, this explanation is
further supported by the fact that the reliabilities of estimates derived from subsets of the
Philadelphia air temperature data were typically higher than those derived from the
pooled set of all questions.
In the case of both bias and expertise, however, the reliability of estimates derived
from SPJs pertaining to January probe temperatures do not follow this trend. Fortunately,
there is a plausible explanation for this pattern of results. In general, winter air
temperatures in the North-Eastern United States tend to be less consistent with
temperatures experienced elsewhere in the United States (on the same dates) than
summer temperatures. Thus, it is conceivable that participants in the Philadelphia air
temperature study may have varied widely in their domain knowledge of January air
temperatures in Philadelphia, but not July air temperatures. In this case, one would expect
errors and biases associated with January SPJs to be less consistent than those associated
with July (or those associated with subsets that pool across both months)— and thus, for
the reliability of January credibility estimates to be lower. Broadly speaking, therefore,
the results of Study 4 are consistent with the explanation that reliabilities in Analysis 2c.i
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(PHL reliability) were suppressed by the fact that individuals’ relative tendencies towards
error and bias (i.e., credibility) were inconsistent across question types.

Study 5: The Impact of Estimated Optima Accuracy on the Effects of Recalibration
(MM recalibration, ALE redux)
In Analysis 3b.ii (MM recal., ALE), credibility-based recalibration of SPJs in the
March Madness study failed to produce significant improvements in outcomes defined in
terms of absolute linear error (ALE). Indeed, regardless of how outcomes were
operationalized, the typical effects of recalibration tended to be detrimental to ALE in
this analysis (see: Figures 35-39 and Tables 31-32, reported in Chapter 3). In principle,
these results can be explained in one of two ways. First, it is conceivable that maineffects linear regression provided a prohibitively poor fit to data in the March Madness
study. Second, it is possible that recalibration did not improve ALE in Analysis 3b.ii
(MM recal., ALE) because recalibration tended to shrink individuals’ judgments towards
estimated optima that were not particularly accurate. Because the results of Analyses 3b.i
(MM recal., AJE) and 3b.iii (MM recal., reliability) both indicated that recalibration
tended to have a positive effect on outcomes related to absolute judgment error (AJE) and
reliability (i.e., a measure similar to what the forecasting literature calls calibration;
Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1982), my general conclusion from Study 3b (MM
recalibration) was that the latter explanation was more likely— especially given the
difficulty of March Madness predictions.
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In line with this explanation, a post-hoc examination of estimated optima in Study
3b revealed that Baron et al.’s (2014) procedure for optimized aggregation did not
dramatically improve ALE, relative to individual judgments. To put this in perspective,
consider the performance of individual forecasters. Across all 143 participants in the
March Madness study, mean ALEs ranged from 0.65 to 0.25 (where lower values
indicate smaller errors, on average), with a study-wide mean of 0.39 and a standard
deviation of 0.06. In contrast to this distribution, the mean ALE associated with Study
3b’s estimated optima was 0.37— a value that represents an improvement of only 0.47
standard deviations over the average individual forecaster, and which was outperformed
by a full 31% of individuals (i.e., 44/143 participants). From a statistical perspective, this
difference corresponds to a significant improvement in mean ALE (t(142) = 5.67, p <
0.001). However, upon closer inspection, it is apparent that (a) the practical effect-size of
this improvement is small; and (b) that while Baron et al.’s (2014) procedure provided an
improvement in ALE at the average, there is a substantial proportion of forecasters for
whom optimized aggregation would have reduced accuracy (i.e., increased mean ALE).
Critically, however, the results of these post-hoc analyses also revealed that the
predictive signal in the March Madness data could be amplified by deriving estimated
optima from top-performing forecasters. For example, by limiting the optimized
aggregation procedure to SPJs provided by the top 10% of forecasters (as measured by
average Brier scores), the mean ALE of estimated optima could be improved to 0.31— a
value which represents an improvement of 1.46 standard deviations over the average
individual, and which was outperformed by only 4% of forecasters (i.e., 6/143
246

participants). Though I would not have known to limit Baron et al’s (2014) procedure in
this way ex ante, the results of these exploratory analyses provided an opportunity to
reexamine the performance of the linear credibility framework when fit to a more
informative set of estimated optima. Thus, in Study 5 I reexamined the results of Analysis
3b.ii (MM recal., ALE) when credibility functions are fit to estimated optima derived
from top-performing forecasters (i.e., the top 10% of participants, as measured by
average Brier scores).

Method
Procedure. The procedure for Study 5 was identical to that used in Analysis 3b.ii
(MM recal., ALE), with the single exception that estimated optima were derived from
only those SPJs provided by the top 10% of participants, as measured by forecast
accuracy (average Brier scores). For simplicity, I will refer to this group of forecasters as
top performers. To refresh the reader’s memory, the procedure used in Analysis 3b.ii
consisted of a single iteration of the general credibility estimation procedure. As in
Analysis 3b.ii, the analytic parameters for this procedure were a calibration sample size
of ncal = 50; a minimum prediction sample size of npred = 1 (to maximize statistical
power); and nboot = 100 bootstrap trials.

Results
The results of Study 5 are shown in Figures 62-65, below. In all cases, Figures 6265 contrast the typical effects of recalibration when credibility functions were fit to
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estimated optima derived from all forecasters (represented by the pink bars) to the typical
effects of recalibration when credibility functions were fit to estimated optima derived
from top performers. Figure 62 contrasts distributions of the typical proportion of
judgments for which recalibration improved (reduced) ALE; Figure 63 contrasts
distributions of the typical pairwise change in ALE (pre – post), due to recalibration;
Figure 64 contrasts distributions of the typical effect-size (Cohen’s d) of recalibration on
ALE; and Figure 65 contrasts distributions of the proportion of samples in which
recalibration improved (reduced) mean ALE. In all cases, I opt not to report statistical
tests concerning these distributions, as analyses were post-hoc and intended to be
illustrative rather than explanatory. However, I do include a representation of the typical
effect-size that would be expected by chance (as indicated by the red dotted-line in each
figure).

Figure 62
[MM data]: Comparison of the typical proportion of judgments for which recalibration
improved (reduced) ALE when estimated optima are derived from the SPJs of all
forecasters vs. top performers.
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Figure 63
[MM data]: Comparison of the typical pairwise change in ALE (pre – post), due to
recalibration when estimated optima are derived from the SPJs of all forecasters vs. top
performers.

Note: positive values indicate an improvement (reduction) in ALE.
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Figure 64
[MM data]: Comparison of the typical effect-size (Cohen’s d) of recalibration on ALE
when estimated optima are derived from the SPJs of all forecasters vs. top performers.

Note: positive values indicate an improvement (reduction) in ALE.

Figure 65
[MM data]: Comparison of the proportion of samples in which recalibration improved
(reduced) mean ALE when estimated optima are derived from the SPJs of all forecasters
vs. top performers.
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Discussion
As predicted, the results of Study 5 demonstrate that the principal reason
credibility-based recalibration did not typically improve ALE in Analysis 3b.ii (MM
recal., ALE) is that estimated optima in the March Madness study were not particularly
informative. As can be seen in Figures 62-65, fitting credibility functions to estimated
optima derived from top performers improved the typical effects of recalibration on all
four outcomes associated with ALE. In principle, of course, this pattern of results is not
surprising. By shrinking individuals’ SPJs toward more accurate estimated optima in
Study 5, one might assume that it is a foregone conclusion that recalibration would yield
more accurate results in Study 5 than it did in Analysis 3b.ii (MM recal., ALE).
Critically, however, while it is tempting to dismiss these results as a case where I have
sampled on the dependent variable, it is instructive to remember that all results presented
in Study 5 (and elsewhere in this dissertation) reflect improvements in ALE out-of251

sample. As such, the results of Study 5 cannot be accurately summarized by saying that
shrinking SPJs towards accurate judgments makes them more accurate. Instead, the
results above demonstrate that individuals’ SPJs tend to be less accurate than estimated
optima for predictable, generalizable reasons. Thus, the better a decision maker can
identify these reasons (e.g., by fine-tuning her model of credibility), the more effectively
she can account for them in the future.

Summary
If there is one thing that this research makes clear, it is that there is unlikely to be
a one-size-fits-all approach to modeling credibility. Thus, in many cases, it may be
prudent for decision makers to use exploratory research methods to examine the
robustness of empirical models of credibility. Though far from an exhaustive treatment of
the subject, this dissertation demonstrates that even simple models of credibility can be
reasonably robust to violations of the (often unrealistic) assumptions that are necessary to
operationalize credibility as an empirical construct. In addition, the present chapter
argues that simple exploratory methods can help a decision maker test and observe a
model’s robustness in cases where there is reason to suspect it may be weak, vulnerable,
or prone to fail. Using specific examples drawn from Chapters 2 and 3, Studies 4 and 5
demonstrate how such methods might be applied to empirical models of credibility and
suggest that models such as the linear credibility framework can be tailored and improved
with basic applications of the scientific method. Thus, while I refrain from drawing
formal conclusions about the studies presented in Chapter 4, these studies provide reason
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for optimism about the robustness, utility, and applicability of empirical models of
credibility.
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

Across nine studies, I have demonstrated that the linear credibility framework is a
robust (albeit imperfect) model of credibility that can provide reliable, valid, and useful
estimates of an individual’s tendencies towards error and bias in judgment. By design,
these studies reflect the performance of a relatively weak model of credibility that can be
implemented with ecologically realistic types (and amounts) of data across a wide variety
of decision environments. As a result, I argue that these results represent a lower-bound
for the performance of empirical models of credibility, more generally. Consequently, I
conclude that (a) examining credibility may often provide decision makers with a
practical method for evaluating the “quality” or relative validity of subjective probability
judgments (SPJs); and (b) that even simple models of credibility can often allow them to
do so in a “cost-effective” (i.e., net-beneficial) way. In practice, of course, the
assumptions underlying the linear credibility framework (and other, similar models of
credibility) make the examination of credibility an imperfect science. However, as I have
demonstrated, the risks associated with credibility information can often be anticipated
and examined, thereby mitigating their impact on decision making.
Following from these conclusions, it stands to reason that decision makers may
often benefit from examining credibility. Indeed, while the scope and magnitude of such
benefits are likely to vary from one decision environment to the next, the theoretical
foundations of credibility suggest that credibility information should be useful for at least
two broad purposes: (a) identifying high- and low-performing judges with relatively little
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up-front costs; and (b) assessing the “quality” or relative validity of the information that
such judges provide. When considered in the context of real-world decision making,
therefore, the success of the linear credibility framework suggests a broad range of
applications.
When used to identify high- and low-performing judges, for example, credibility
information is likely to allow decision makers to accomplish a variety of desirable tasks
(or, at the very least, to improve their performance on such tasks). Though far from an
exhaustive list, these tasks include: identifying expert judges and/or those individuals
with the most informative judgments30 (perhaps for the purposes of reducing the number
of judges necessary for a given task); evaluating the performance of judges and/or
decision makers in public and private spheres (e.g., medicine, finance, public policy,
intelligence analysis, etc.); holding decision makers accountable for their judgments; and
targeting underperforming individuals for training, debiasing, or other remedial
interventions. Indeed, in principle, credibility information ought to be useful in any
context where a decision maker would benefit from making concrete claims about the
relative skill of various judges. Given the performance of the linear credibility framework
in the present research, I argue that empirical models of credibility may often be able to
live up to this standard, in practice.

30

Note that the most “informative” judgements are not necessary the “best” judgments, as measured by
conventional means (e.g., accuracy). Consider, for example, a judge whose SPJs are highly biased and
inexpert, but perfectly consistent with respect to estimated optima. Though the SPJs provided by such a
judge are unlikely to be informative in their own right, a decision maker with knowledge of her credibility
would be able to use her SPJs to perfectly reproduce estimated optima. Thus, a decision maker might gain
more information by examining the SPJs of this “poor” (but highly consistent) judge than those provided
by a more accurate (but less consistent) alternative.
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Furthermore, when used to assess the “quality” or relative validity of the
judgements at one’s disposal, credibility information is likely to help decision makers
make substantive claims about (or, at the very least, place meaningful constraints on) the
degree of uncertainty associated with a subjective belief. When used for this purpose,
credibility information might allow decision makers to accomplish tasks such as:
recalibrating SPJs by “correcting for” historical tendencies towards error and bias in
judgment (as was done in this dissertation); estimating credible intervals around an
individual’s SPJs (i.e., expressing SPJs as a point estimate ± an individual’s “expected
degree of error”); combining this type of interval-based SPJ across individuals to identify
an informative posterior distribution of beliefs; and eliminating (or reducing) individuallevel errors and biases prior to aggregation. From a statistical perspective, that is,
credibility information ought to provide decision makers with information about the
reliability and validity of an individual’s SPJs as measures of “optimal” judgments. And
once again, given the performance of the linear credibility framework, the results of the
present research suggest that — while imperfect — empirical models of credibility can
deliver this type of information in a useful, real-world capacity.
When considered in general, therefore, the results of this research suggest that
examining credibility is likely to provide decision makers with a wealth of information
about what they know (and what they don’t know) about the “quality” or relative validity
of an individual’s subjective probability judgments. Furthermore, the results of this
research suggest that such information can be extracted by decision makers with a
relatively small degree of investment and effort. From the perspective of a real-world
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decision maker, both findings are cause for optimism. Thus, there is strong scientific
basis for additional research on empirical models of credibility and their applications to
forecasting, risk assessment, and decision analysis.
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APPENDIX A
Appendix A contains plain-text printouts of the R code used to conduct the GJP
analyses reported in this dissertation. Similar scripts were used to conduct the parallel
analyses for the March Madness study and the Philadelphia air-temperature study. To
prevent the accidental introduction of errors, these scripts have been minimally altered
from the versions used by the author in his original analyses. As a result, the organization
of these scripts does not match the organization of the research presented in Chapters 2 &
3 precisely. Also, in some cases, the terminology used in these scripts is altered from that
used in the main body of this dissertation (e.g., consistency is represented by the name
“xi” in these scripts, whereas it is designated by the Greek letter sigma, σ, elsewhere).
Finally, there are some analyses that appear in these scripts that are not reported in
Chapters 2 & 3 (these discrepancies are most prominent in the “SPJ Recalibration”
script). In general, these analyses were not reported because there were redundant with
those presented in the main body of this dissertation and/or because they represented a
less defensible approach to answering the research question at hand. In the author’s
judgment, these rejected analyses do not substantively change, weaken, or otherwise
contradict the results reported therein.
Notably, to meet the necessary formatting constraints, the following scripts
include automatic text-wrapping, and can be difficult read in some places. In addition, the
often refer to (.csv or .dat) data files that could not be included in this appendix. For
copies of the original (.R) script documents or to request permission to use the associated
data files, please contact the author directly.
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################################################################
#
#
# Assessing Credibility in Subjective Probability Judgment
#
# Reliability Experiments, Good Judgment Data
#
#
#
# Josh Baker
#
# jbak@sas.upenn.edu
#
#
#
################################################################

####################################################################################################
#############
#
DATA CLEANING AND PREPARATION
#
####################################################################################################
#############

############ Set Working directory and load relevant libraries
##################################################
library(psych)
library(plotrix)
setwd("~yourPath")

####################################################################################################
#############

############ Import and Prepare Good Judgment Data for Use in Recalibration
#####################################
fcasts <- read.csv("fcasts_small.file.csv")
## Convert factors to numeric or character data types (and trim last two characters from each
element of "ifp_id")
fcasts$ifp_id <- as.numeric(substr(as.character(fcasts$ifp_id),1,4))
fcasts$answer_option <- as.character(fcasts$answer_option)
fcasts$date <- as.character(fcasts$date)
fcasts$timestamp <- as.character(fcasts$timestamp)
fcasts$outcome <- as.character(fcasts$outcome)
fcasts$g.tnt <- as.character(fcasts$g.tnt)
fcasts$mod.tag <- as.character(fcasts$mod.tag)
fcasts$date.closed <- as.character(fcasts$date.closed)
fcasts$time.horiz <- as.character(fcasts$time.horiz)
## Subset fcasts to answer_option=="a" (only forecasts for focal outcomes, not complements)
fcasts <- subset(fcasts, answer_option=="a")
## Set aside fcasts metadata that are irrelevant to recalibration analyses
fcasts_w.metadata <- fcasts
fcasts <- fcasts[which(is.element(colnames(fcasts),c("ifp_id",
"user_id",
"outcome",
"val.unrounded",
"bs.unrounded")))]
## Rename some columns for consistency/expediency
colnames(fcasts)[which(colnames(fcasts)=="ifp_id")] <- "ifp.id"
colnames(fcasts)[which(colnames(fcasts)=="user_id")] <- "gjp.id"
colnames(fcasts)[which(colnames(fcasts)=="val.unrounded")] <- "prob"
colnames(fcasts)[which(colnames(fcasts)=="bs.unrounded")] <- "bs"
## Recode "outcome" to binary ("a" = 1; "b" = 0)
fcasts$outcome <- ifelse(fcasts$outcome=="a",1,0)
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## Round all prob values to two places to fix a floating point rounding issue
fcasts$prob <- round(fcasts$prob,2)
## Extract GJP IDs as a vector
gjp.ids <- unique(fcasts$gjp.id)
gjp.ids <- gjp.ids[order(gjp.ids)] #Sort in ascending order

############ Elementary Functions for credibility estimation
#################################

#################

## Function for calculating the number of unique elements in a vector ####
n.unique <- function(vector){length(unique(vector))}

## Create a data.frame for individual.difference data (here, only used to track n.ifps) ###
ind.diffs <- data.frame(gjp.id=gjp.ids)
ind.diffs$gjp.id <- gjp.ids
fcasts <- fcasts[order(fcasts$gjp.id),]
ind.diffs <- cbind(ind.diffs, n.ifps=as.vector(tapply(fcasts$ifp.id,fcasts$gjp.id,n.unique)))

### Brier score function, for optimization ###
bs.opt <- function(x,outcome){sum((temp.outcomes - ptrans(temp.probs,x))^2)}

### Brier score function, for scoring ###
calc.bs <- function(x,outcome){(x-outcome)^2}

## Function for converting a probability to log-odds
calc.logodds <- function(x){log(x/(1 - x))}

## Extremizing function used to correct for "Regression" towards 50% (see: Baron et al., 2014)
ptrans <- function(p,a){p^a/(p^a + (1 - p)^a)}

## General function for calculating sum of squared errors
calc.sse <- function(obj,est){sum((obj-est)^2)}

############ Function for generating optimized, aggrgegate judgments, given a sample size criterion
##############
gen.agg_gjp <- function(sample.size, method=c("mean","median"), log.odds=TRUE){
## Subset to only those forecasters who addressed a sufficient number of IFPs
keepers <- gjp.ids[which(ind.diffs$n.ifps >= (sample.size + 30))]
#Identify forecasters
with enough data to recalibrate 30+ out of sample judgments
working.data <- subset(fcasts, is.element(fcasts$gjp.id, keepers))
#Subset to only relevant
forecasters
working.data$prob <- ifelse(working.data$prob==0,0.01,working.data$prob) #Adjust extreme values
to prevent (-)Inf, once transformed to log-odds
working.data$prob <- ifelse(working.data$prob==1,0.99,working.data$prob) #Adjust extreme values
to prevent (-)Inf, once transformed to log-odds
working.data <<- working.data
#Save working data to
.GlobalEnv
temp.outcomes <<- as.vector(tapply(working.data$outcome, working.data$ifp.id, mean)) #Save
relevant outcomes to .GlobalEnv
## Aggregate judgments and save to .GolbalEnv
if(method=="mean"){
temp.probs <<- as.vector(tapply(working.data$prob, working.data$ifp.id, mean))
}
if(method=="median"){
temp.probs <<- as.vector(tapply(working.data$prob, working.data$ifp.id, median))
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}
## Calculate optimized extremizing coefficient
a <- as.numeric(optimize(bs.opt, interval=c(0,20)))[1]
## Apply extremizing coefficient to simple aggrgeates to calculate optimized aggregate estimates
agg.judge <- ptrans(temp.probs,a)
## If desired, transform agg.judge to log-odds
if(log.odds){
agg.judge <- calc.logodds(agg.judge)
}
return(agg.judge)
#rm(sample.size,method,log.odds,keepers,working.data,temp.outcomes,temp.probs,a,agg.judge)
}
####################################################################################################
##############

###### Function for credibility-based recalibration and out of sample prediction (oosp) using GJP
Data ###########
oosp_gjp <- function(user.id, sample.size, method=c("mean","median"), log.odds=TRUE, n.resample){
## Create an empty data.frame for results
data.out <- data.frame(gjp.id=0,
est.alpha=0,
est.beta=0,
est.ser=0)
(consistency)

#Unique identifier for each forecaster
#Estimated CF intercept (bias)
#Estimated CF slope (expertise)
#Standard error of the CF regression = "xi"

## Generate optimized aggregates
agg <- gen.agg_gjp(sample.size,method,log.odds)
agg_ifp.ids <- as.vector(tapply(working.data$ifp.id, working.data$ifp.id, mean)) #Identify IFPs
for which there exists an optimized aggregate
## Prepare individual forecaster's data
user.data <- subset(working.data, gjp.id==user.id)
user.data <- user.data[order(user.data$ifp.id),]
user.data$prob <- ifelse(user.data$prob==0,0.01,user.data$prob)
(-)Inf, once transformed to log-odds
user.data$prob <- ifelse(user.data$prob==1,0.99,user.data$prob)
(-)Inf, once transformed to log-odds
user.ifps <- unique(user.data$ifp.id)
responded to

#Subset to individual ("user")
#Sort user.obs by ifp.id
#Adjust extreme values to prevent
#Adjust extreme values to prevent
#Generate list of ifps that user

agg_user.matched.sample <- agg[which(is.element(agg_ifp.ids,user.ifps))]
#Select matching optimized aggregates
outcomes_user.matched.sample <- as.vector(tapply(user.data$outcome, user.data$ifp.id, mean))
#select matching outcomes
## Calculate mean or median individual judgments for each ifp
if(method=="mean"){
user.obs <- as.vector(tapply(user.data$prob, user.data$ifp.id, mean))
user.obs <- calc.logodds(user.obs)
}
if(method=="median"){
user.obs <- as.vector(tapply(user.data$prob, user.data$ifp.id, median))
user.obs <- calc.logodds(user.obs)
}
## Fit credibility function, and conduct recalibration n.resample times for each individual
i <- 1
#Resample index
while(i <= n.resample){
# Set/reset skip indicator for unusable loop iterations
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flag <- FALSE
# Split data into calibration sample and prediction sample
cal.sample.indices <- sample.int(length(user.obs), sample.size, replace=FALSE)
pred.sample.indices <- setdiff(c(1:length(user.obs)), cal.sample.indices)
user.obs_cal.sample <- user.obs[cal.sample.indices]
user.obs_pred.sample <- user.obs[pred.sample.indices]
agg_cal.sample <- agg_user.matched.sample[cal.sample.indices]
agg_pred.sample <- agg_user.matched.sample[pred.sample.indices]
outcomes_cal.sample <- outcomes_user.matched.sample[cal.sample.indices]
outcomes_pred.sample <- outcomes_user.matched.sample[pred.sample.indices]

# Estimate credibility function (re-fit on a new calibration sample each iteration)
cf <- lm(agg_cal.sample ~ user.obs_cal.sample)
# Check for inestimable credibility functions, and re-set loop if necessary
if(is.na(cf$coeff[1]) | is.na(cf$coeff[2])){
flag <- TRUE
i <- i-1
}
# If CF is usable, calculate effects of recalibration
if(!(flag)){

## Compile output into a new row and add to data.out
newrow <- data.frame(gjp.id=user.id,
est.alpha=cf$coeff[1],
est.beta=cf$coeff[2],
est.ser=summary(cf)$sigma)

data.out <- rbind(data.out,newrow)
flag <- FALSE
}
i <- i+1
}
## Clean-up and Return Results
data.out <- data.out[-1,]
rownames(data.out) <- seq.int(1:nrow(data.out))
data.out

#Remove dummy first row of data.out
#As a general precaution, reset rownames of

return(data.out)

#rm(user.id,sample.size,method,log.odds,n.reample,agg,agg_ifp.ids,user.data,user.ifps,agg_user.match
ed.sample,
#outcomes_user.matched.sample,user.obs,i,flag,cal.sample.indices,pred.sample.indices,user.obs_cal.sa
mple,
#user.obs_pred.sample,agg_cal.sample,agg_pred.sample,outcomes_cal.sample,outcomes_pred.sample,cf,cor
rected,
#mod,data.out,rmse.pre_lo,rmse.post_lo,rmse.impr,aje.pre_lo,aje.post_lo,aje.pre_p,aje.post_p,diffs.a
je_lo,
#diffs.aje_p,prop.aje.impr,mean.aje.pre_lo,mean.aje.post_lo,diff.mean.aje_lo,mean.aje.pre_p,mean.aje
.post_p,
#diff.mean.aje_p,mean.aje.impr,median.aje.pre_lo,median.aje.post_lo,diff.median.aje_lo,median.aje.pr
e_p,
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#median.aje.post_p,diff.median.aje_p,median.aje.impr,coh.d_aje.pre.post_lo,coh.d_aje.pre.post_p,mean
.diff.aje_lo,
#median.diff.aje_lo,mean.diff.aje_p,median.diff.aje_p,ale.pre,ale.post,diffs.ale,prop.ale.impr,mean.
ale.pre,
#mean.ale.post,diff.mean.ale,mean.ale.impr,median.ale.pre,median.ale.post,diff.median.ale,median.ale
.impr,
#coh.d_ale.pre.post,mean.diff.ale,median.diff.ale,bs.pre,bs.post,diffs.bs,prop.bs.impr,mean.bs.pre,m
ean.bs.post,
#diff.mean.bs,mean.bs.impr,median.bs.pre,median.bs.post,diff.median.bs,median.bs.impr,coh.d_bs.pre.p
ost,
#mean.diff.bs,median.diff.bs,rel.pre,rel.post,diff.rel,rel.impr,res.pre,res.post,diff.res,res.impr,u
ncertainty)
}
####################################################################################################
##############

##### Function to run oosp_gjp for all eligible forecasters, given a desired sample.size
#########################
run.oosp_gjp <- function(sample.size, method=c("mean","median"), log.odds=TRUE, n.resample){
data.out <- data.frame(gjp.id=0,
aos.alpha=0,
sd.alpha=0,
aos.beta=0,
sd.beta=0,
aos.xi=0,
sd.xi=0)

# AOS = average over samples

## Subset to only those forecasters with enough data to recalibrate 30+ out of sample predictions
keepers <- gjp.ids[which(ind.diffs$n.ifps >= (sample.size + 30))]
## Run oosp_gjp for each forecaster in keepers
n <- 1
while(n <= length(keepers)){
temp <- oosp_gjp(user.id=keepers[n],sample.size,method,log.odds,n.resample)
## Compile data in a new row and add to data.out
newrow <- data.frame(gjp.id=temp$gjp.id[1],
aos.alpha=mean(temp$est.alpha),
sd.alpha=sd(temp$est.alpha),
aos.beta=mean(temp$est.beta),
sd.beta=sd(temp$est.beta),
aos.xi=mean(temp$est.ser),
sd.xi=sd(temp$est.ser))
data.out <- rbind(data.out,newrow)
n <- n+1
}
data.out <- data.out[-1,]
return(data.out)
#rm(sample.size,method,log.odds,n.resample,data.out,keepers,n,temp,newrow)
}
####################################################################################################
###############
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##### Function to generate a reliability curve for non-bootstrapped credibility estimates
########################
gen.rc_non.boot <- function(method=c("mean","median"), log.odds=TRUE, n.resample){
require(psych)
sample.sizes <- c(10,20,30,40,50)
rel.curve.alpha <- vector()
rel.curve.beta <- vector()
rel.curve.xi <- vector()
n <- 1
while(n <= length(sample.sizes)){
keepers <- gjp.ids[which(ind.diffs$n.ifps >= (sample.sizes[n] + 30))]
alpha.out <- matrix(nrow=length(keepers),ncol=n.resample)
beta.out <- matrix(nrow=length(keepers),ncol=n.resample)
xi.out <- matrix(nrow=length(keepers),ncol=n.resample)
i <- 1
while(i <= length(keepers)){
temp <oosp_gjp(user.id=keepers[i],sample.size=sample.sizes[n],method="mean",log.odds=T,n.resample=n.resamp
le)
alpha.out[i,] <- temp$est.alpha
beta.out[i,] <- temp$est.beta
xi.out[i,] <- temp$est.ser
i <- i+1
}
icc.alpha <- ICC(alpha.out)
icc.beta <- ICC(beta.out)
icc.xi <- ICC(xi.out)
rel.curve.alpha <- append(rel.curve.alpha, icc.alpha[[1]]$ICC[1])
rel.curve.beta <- append(rel.curve.beta, icc.beta[[1]]$ICC[1])
rel.curve.xi <- append(rel.curve.xi, icc.xi[[1]]$ICC[1])
n <- n+1
}
data.out <- data.frame(n.cal=sample.sizes,
rel.curve.alpha=rel.curve.alpha,
rel.curve.beta=rel.curve.beta,
rel.curve.xi=rel.curve.xi)
return(data.out)
#rm(method,log.odds,sample.sizes,rel.curve.alpha,rel.curve.beta,rel.curve.xi,n,temp,alpha.out,
#beta.out,xi.out,i,data.out,icc.alpha,icc.beta,icc.xi)
}
####################################################################################################
##############

##### Function to generate a reliability curve for bootstrapped credibility estimates
############################
gen.rc_boot <- function(sample.size, method=c("mean","median"), log.odds=TRUE){
require(psych)
n.bootstraps <- c(10,20,30,40,50,60,70,80,90,100,200,250)
trials <- c("a","b","c")
n <- 1
t <- 1
while(n <= length(n.bootstraps)){
while(t <= length(trials)){
temp <- run.oosp_gjp(sample.size, method="mean", log.odds=TRUE, n.resample=n.bootstraps[n])
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colnames(temp) <- paste(colnames(temp), "_", n.bootstraps[n], trials[t], sep="")
if(n==1 & t==1){
data.out <- temp
} else{
data.out <- cbind(data.out, temp)
}
t <- t+1
}
t <- 1
n <- n+1
}
### Gather data for reliability calculations
aos.alphas_10 <- cbind(data.out$aos.alpha_10a,data.out$aos.alpha_10b,data.out$aos.alpha_10c)
aos.alphas_20 <- cbind(data.out$aos.alpha_20a,data.out$aos.alpha_20b,data.out$aos.alpha_20c)
aos.alphas_30 <- cbind(data.out$aos.alpha_30a,data.out$aos.alpha_30b,data.out$aos.alpha_30c)
aos.alphas_40 <- cbind(data.out$aos.alpha_40a,data.out$aos.alpha_40b,data.out$aos.alpha_40c)
aos.alphas_50 <- cbind(data.out$aos.alpha_50a,data.out$aos.alpha_50b,data.out$aos.alpha_50c)
aos.alphas_60 <- cbind(data.out$aos.alpha_60a,data.out$aos.alpha_60b,data.out$aos.alpha_60c)
aos.alphas_70 <- cbind(data.out$aos.alpha_70a,data.out$aos.alpha_70b,data.out$aos.alpha_70c)
aos.alphas_80 <- cbind(data.out$aos.alpha_80a,data.out$aos.alpha_80b,data.out$aos.alpha_80c)
aos.alphas_90 <- cbind(data.out$aos.alpha_90a,data.out$aos.alpha_90b,data.out$aos.alpha_90c)
aos.alphas_100 <- cbind(data.out$aos.alpha_100a,data.out$aos.alpha_100b,data.out$aos.alpha_100c)
aos.alphas_200 <- cbind(data.out$aos.alpha_200a,data.out$aos.alpha_200b,data.out$aos.alpha_200c)
aos.alphas_250 <- cbind(data.out$aos.alpha_250a,data.out$aos.alpha_250b,data.out$aos.alpha_250c)
aos.betas_10 <- cbind(data.out$aos.beta_10a,data.out$aos.beta_10b,data.out$aos.beta_10c)
aos.betas_20 <- cbind(data.out$aos.beta_20a,data.out$aos.beta_20b,data.out$aos.beta_20c)
aos.betas_30 <- cbind(data.out$aos.beta_30a,data.out$aos.beta_30b,data.out$aos.beta_30c)
aos.betas_40 <- cbind(data.out$aos.beta_40a,data.out$aos.beta_40b,data.out$aos.beta_40c)
aos.betas_50 <- cbind(data.out$aos.beta_50a,data.out$aos.beta_50b,data.out$aos.beta_50c)
aos.betas_60 <- cbind(data.out$aos.beta_60a,data.out$aos.beta_60b,data.out$aos.beta_60c)
aos.betas_70 <- cbind(data.out$aos.beta_70a,data.out$aos.beta_70b,data.out$aos.beta_70c)
aos.betas_80 <- cbind(data.out$aos.beta_80a,data.out$aos.beta_80b,data.out$aos.beta_80c)
aos.betas_90 <- cbind(data.out$aos.beta_90a,data.out$aos.beta_90b,data.out$aos.beta_90c)
aos.betas_100 <- cbind(data.out$aos.beta_100a,data.out$aos.beta_100b,data.out$aos.beta_100c)
aos.betas_200 <- cbind(data.out$aos.beta_200a,data.out$aos.beta_200b,data.out$aos.beta_200c)
aos.betas_250 <- cbind(data.out$aos.beta_250a,data.out$aos.beta_250b,data.out$aos.beta_250c)
aos.xis_10 <- cbind(data.out$aos.xi_10a,data.out$aos.xi_10b,data.out$aos.xi_10c)
aos.xis_20 <- cbind(data.out$aos.xi_20a,data.out$aos.xi_20b,data.out$aos.xi_20c)
aos.xis_30 <- cbind(data.out$aos.xi_30a,data.out$aos.xi_30b,data.out$aos.xi_30c)
aos.xis_40 <- cbind(data.out$aos.xi_40a,data.out$aos.xi_40b,data.out$aos.xi_40c)
aos.xis_50 <- cbind(data.out$aos.xi_50a,data.out$aos.xi_50b,data.out$aos.xi_50c)
aos.xis_60 <- cbind(data.out$aos.xi_60a,data.out$aos.xi_60b,data.out$aos.xi_60c)
aos.xis_70 <- cbind(data.out$aos.xi_70a,data.out$aos.xi_70b,data.out$aos.xi_70c)
aos.xis_80 <- cbind(data.out$aos.xi_80a,data.out$aos.xi_80b,data.out$aos.xi_80c)
aos.xis_90 <- cbind(data.out$aos.xi_90a,data.out$aos.xi_90b,data.out$aos.xi_90c)
aos.xis_100 <- cbind(data.out$aos.xi_100a,data.out$aos.xi_100b,data.out$aos.xi_100c)
aos.xis_200 <- cbind(data.out$aos.xi_200a,data.out$aos.xi_200b,data.out$aos.xi_200c)
aos.xis_250 <- cbind(data.out$aos.xi_250a,data.out$aos.xi_250b,data.out$aos.xi_250c)

## Run ICC function for each data.frame
icc_aos.alphas_10 <- ICC(aos.alphas_10)
icc_aos.alphas_20 <- ICC(aos.alphas_20)
icc_aos.alphas_30 <- ICC(aos.alphas_30)
icc_aos.alphas_40 <- ICC(aos.alphas_40)
icc_aos.alphas_50 <- ICC(aos.alphas_50)
icc_aos.alphas_60 <- ICC(aos.alphas_60)
icc_aos.alphas_70 <- ICC(aos.alphas_70)
icc_aos.alphas_80 <- ICC(aos.alphas_80)
icc_aos.alphas_90 <- ICC(aos.alphas_90)
icc_aos.alphas_100 <- ICC(aos.alphas_100)
icc_aos.alphas_200 <- ICC(aos.alphas_200)
icc_aos.alphas_250 <- ICC(aos.alphas_250)
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icc_aos.betas_10 <- ICC(aos.betas_10)
icc_aos.betas_20 <- ICC(aos.betas_20)
icc_aos.betas_30 <- ICC(aos.betas_30)
icc_aos.betas_40 <- ICC(aos.betas_40)
icc_aos.betas_50 <- ICC(aos.betas_50)
icc_aos.betas_60 <- ICC(aos.betas_60)
icc_aos.betas_70 <- ICC(aos.betas_70)
icc_aos.betas_80 <- ICC(aos.betas_80)
icc_aos.betas_90 <- ICC(aos.betas_90)
icc_aos.betas_100 <- ICC(aos.betas_100)
icc_aos.betas_200 <- ICC(aos.betas_200)
icc_aos.betas_250 <- ICC(aos.betas_250)
icc_aos.xis_10 <- ICC(aos.xis_10)
icc_aos.xis_20 <- ICC(aos.xis_20)
icc_aos.xis_30 <- ICC(aos.xis_30)
icc_aos.xis_40 <- ICC(aos.xis_40)
icc_aos.xis_50 <- ICC(aos.xis_50)
icc_aos.xis_60 <- ICC(aos.xis_60)
icc_aos.xis_70 <- ICC(aos.xis_70)
icc_aos.xis_80 <- ICC(aos.xis_80)
icc_aos.xis_90 <- ICC(aos.xis_90)
icc_aos.xis_100 <- ICC(aos.xis_100)
icc_aos.xis_200 <- ICC(aos.xis_200)
icc_aos.xis_250 <- ICC(aos.xis_250)

## Tabulate ICCs for reliability curves
rel.curve_aos.alpha <- data.frame(n.resample=n.bootstraps,
icc_aos.alpha=c(icc_aos.alphas_10[[1]]$ICC[1],
icc_aos.alphas_20[[1]]$ICC[1],
icc_aos.alphas_30[[1]]$ICC[1],
icc_aos.alphas_40[[1]]$ICC[1],
icc_aos.alphas_50[[1]]$ICC[1],
icc_aos.alphas_60[[1]]$ICC[1],
icc_aos.alphas_70[[1]]$ICC[1],
icc_aos.alphas_80[[1]]$ICC[1],
icc_aos.alphas_90[[1]]$ICC[1],
icc_aos.alphas_100[[1]]$ICC[1],
icc_aos.alphas_200[[1]]$ICC[1],
icc_aos.alphas_250[[1]]$ICC[1]))

rel.curve_aos.beta <- data.frame(icc_aos.beta=c(icc_aos.betas_10[[1]]$ICC[1],
icc_aos.betas_20[[1]]$ICC[1],
icc_aos.betas_30[[1]]$ICC[1],
icc_aos.betas_40[[1]]$ICC[1],
icc_aos.betas_50[[1]]$ICC[1],
icc_aos.betas_60[[1]]$ICC[1],
icc_aos.betas_70[[1]]$ICC[1],
icc_aos.betas_80[[1]]$ICC[1],
icc_aos.betas_90[[1]]$ICC[1],
icc_aos.betas_100[[1]]$ICC[1],
icc_aos.betas_200[[1]]$ICC[1],
icc_aos.betas_250[[1]]$ICC[1]))

rel.curve_aos.xi <- data.frame(icc_aos.xi=c(icc_aos.xis_10[[1]]$ICC[1],
icc_aos.xis_20[[1]]$ICC[1],
icc_aos.xis_30[[1]]$ICC[1],
icc_aos.xis_40[[1]]$ICC[1],
icc_aos.xis_50[[1]]$ICC[1],
icc_aos.xis_60[[1]]$ICC[1],
icc_aos.xis_70[[1]]$ICC[1],
icc_aos.xis_80[[1]]$ICC[1],
icc_aos.xis_90[[1]]$ICC[1],
icc_aos.xis_100[[1]]$ICC[1],
icc_aos.xis_200[[1]]$ICC[1],
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icc_aos.xis_250[[1]]$ICC[1]))
out <- cbind(rel.curve_aos.alpha, rel.curve_aos.beta, rel.curve_aos.xi)
return(out)
#rm(sample.size,method,log.odds,n.resample,n.bootstraps,trials,n,t,temp,data.out,aos.alphas_10,
#aos.alphas_20,aos.alphas_30,aos.alphas_40,aos.alphas_50,aos.alphas_60,aos.alphas_70,aos.alphas_80,
#aos.alphas_90,aos.alphas_100,aos.alphas_200,aos.alphas_250,aos.betas_10,aos.betas_20,aos.betas_30,
#aos.betas_40,aos.betas_50,aos.betas_60,aos.betas_70,aos.betas_80,aos.betas_90,aos.betas_100,
#aos.betas_200,aos.betas_250,aos.xi_10,aos.xi_20,aos.xi_30,aos.xi_40,aos.xi_50,aos.xi_60,aos.xi_70,
#aos.xi_80,aos.xi_90,aos.xi_100,aos.xi_200,aos.xi_250,rel.curve_aos.alpha,rel.curve_aos.beta,
#rel.curve_aos.xi)
}
####################################################################################################
###############

##### Calculate reliability curves for non-bootstrapped cred. estimates
##########################################
## Set seed to ensure replicability
## Number of trials == 10
set.seed(826)
rc.nonboot_nt.10 <- gen.rc_non.boot("mean", TRUE, n.resample=10)

## Number of trials == 20
set.seed(826)
rc.nonboot_nt.20 <- gen.rc_non.boot("mean", TRUE, n.resample=20)

## Number of trials == 30
set.seed(826)
rc.nonboot_nt.30 <- gen.rc_non.boot("mean", TRUE, n.resample=30)

##### Calculate reliability curves for bootstrapped cred. estimates
#############################################
## Sample size == 10
set.seed(826)
rc.boot_ss.10 <- gen.rc_boot(10, "mean", TRUE)

## Sample size == 20
set.seed(826)
rc.boot_ss.20 <- gen.rc_boot(20, "mean", TRUE)

## Sample size == 30
set.seed(826)
rc.boot_ss.30 <- gen.rc_boot(30, "mean", TRUE)

## Sample size == 40
set.seed(826)
rc.boot_ss.40 <- gen.rc_boot(40, "mean", TRUE)

## Sample size == 50
set.seed(826)
rc.boot_ss.50 <- gen.rc_boot(50, "mean", TRUE)
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####################################################################################################
##############

##### Plot Non-Bootstrapped Reliability Curves
###################################################################
par(mar=c(5,5,1.5,3))
plot(x=rc.nonboot_nt.30$n.cal, y=rc.nonboot_nt.30$rel.curve.alpha,
xlim=c(0,50), ylim=c(0,1), col="red", lty=1, lwd=2,
xlab=expression(paste("Calibration Sample Size (", n[cal], ")", sep="")),
ylab="Intraclass Correlation",
#main="Reliability of Non-Bootstrapped Credibility Estimates (GJP Data)",
cex.lab=1.4, cex.axis=1.2, cex.main=1.2, cex=1.5)
points(x=rc.nonboot_nt.30$n.cal, y=rc.nonboot_nt.30$rel.curve.beta,
xlim=c(0,50), ylim=c(0,1), col="blue", lwd=2, cex=1.5)
points(x=rc.nonboot_nt.30$n.cal, y=rc.nonboot_nt.30$rel.curve.xi,
xlim=c(0,50), ylim=c(0,1), col="green", lwd=2, cex=1.5)
lines(x=rc.nonboot_nt.30$n.cal, y=rc.nonboot_nt.30$rel.curve.alpha, col="red", lty=2, lwd=2)
lines(x=rc.nonboot_nt.30$n.cal, y=rc.nonboot_nt.30$rel.curve.beta, col="blue", lty=2, lwd=2)
lines(x=rc.nonboot_nt.30$n.cal, y=rc.nonboot_nt.30$rel.curve.xi, col="green", lty=2, lwd=2)
abline(h=0.75, col="black", lty=2, lwd=1)
legend(x=35, y=0.42, col=c("red","blue","green"), lty=2,lwd=2, cex=1.2, y.intersp=1.5,
legend=c(expression(paste("Est. Bias (", hat(alpha)["in"]^"*", ")", sep="")),
expression(paste("Est. Expertise (", hat(beta)["in"]^"*", ")", sep="")),
expression(paste("Est. Consistency (", hat(sigma)["in"]^"*", ")", sep=""))))

##### Plot Bootstrapped Reliability Curves
######################################################################
## AOS Alpha
par(mar=c(5,5,1.5,3))
plot(x=rc.boot_ss.10$n.resample, y=rc.boot_ss.10$icc_aos.alpha,
xlim=c(0,250), ylim=c(0.73,1), col="red", lty=1, lwd=2,
xlab=expression(paste("Number of Bootstrap Trials (", n[boot], ")", sep="")),
ylab="Intraclass Correlation",
#main=expression(paste("Reliability of Bootstrapped Estimates of Bias (", hat(alpha)[i], "),
GJP Data")),
cex.lab=1.4, cex.axis=1.2, cex.main=1.5, cex=1.5)
points(x=rc.boot_ss.20$n.resample, y=rc.boot_ss.20$icc_aos.alpha,
xlim=c(0,250), ylim=c(0.73,1), col="orange", lwd=2, cex=1.5)
points(x=rc.boot_ss.30$n.resample, y=rc.boot_ss.30$icc_aos.alpha,
xlim=c(0,250), ylim=c(0.73,1), col="green", lwd=2, cex=1.5)
points(x=rc.boot_ss.40$n.resample, y=rc.boot_ss.40$icc_aos.alpha,
xlim=c(0,250), ylim=c(0.73,1), col="blue", lwd=2, cex=1.5)
points(x=rc.boot_ss.50$n.resample, y=rc.boot_ss.50$icc_aos.alpha,
xlim=c(0,250), ylim=c(0.73,1), col="purple", lwd=2, cex=1.5)

lines(x=rc.boot_ss.10$n.resample,
lines(x=rc.boot_ss.20$n.resample,
lines(x=rc.boot_ss.30$n.resample,
lines(x=rc.boot_ss.40$n.resample,
lines(x=rc.boot_ss.50$n.resample,

y=rc.boot_ss.10$icc_aos.alpha,
y=rc.boot_ss.20$icc_aos.alpha,
y=rc.boot_ss.30$icc_aos.alpha,
y=rc.boot_ss.40$icc_aos.alpha,
y=rc.boot_ss.50$icc_aos.alpha,

col="red", lty=2, lwd=2)
col="orange", lty=2, lwd=2)
col="green", lty=2, lwd=2)
col="blue", lty=2, lwd=2)
col="purple", lty=2, lwd=2)
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abline(h=0.75, col="black", lty=2, lwd=1)
axis.break(axis=2, breakpos=0.73, style="slash", brw=0.02)
legend(x=155, y=0.87, col=c("red","orange","green","blue","purple"), lty=2, lwd=2, cex=1.2,
legend=c(expression(paste("Cal. sample size (", n[cal], ") = 10", sep="")),
expression(paste("Cal. sample size (", n[cal], ") = 20", sep="")),
expression(paste("Cal. sample size (", n[cal], ") = 30", sep="")),
expression(paste("Cal. sample size (", n[cal], ") = 40", sep="")),
expression(paste("Cal. sample size (", n[cal], ") = 50", sep=""))))

## AOS Beta
par(mar=c(5,5,1.5,3))
plot(x=rc.boot_ss.10$n.resample, y=rc.boot_ss.10$icc_aos.beta,
xlim=c(0,250), ylim=c(0.73,1), col="red", lty=1, lwd=2,
xlab=expression(paste("Number of Bootstrap Trials (", n[boot], ")", sep="")),
ylab="Intraclass Correlation",
#main=expression(paste("Reliability of Bootstrapped Estimates of Bias (", hat(beta)[i], "), GJP
Data")),
cex.lab=1.4, cex.axis=1.2, cex.main=1.5, cex=1.5)
points(x=rc.boot_ss.20$n.resample, y=rc.boot_ss.20$icc_aos.beta,
xlim=c(0,250), ylim=c(0.73,1), col="orange", lwd=2, cex=1.5)
points(x=rc.boot_ss.30$n.resample, y=rc.boot_ss.30$icc_aos.beta,
xlim=c(0,250), ylim=c(0.73,1), col="green", lwd=2, cex=1.5)
points(x=rc.boot_ss.40$n.resample, y=rc.boot_ss.40$icc_aos.beta,
xlim=c(0,250), ylim=c(0.73,1), col="blue", lwd=2, cex=1.5)
points(x=rc.boot_ss.50$n.resample, y=rc.boot_ss.50$icc_aos.beta,
xlim=c(0,250), ylim=c(0.73,1), col="purple", lwd=2, cex=1.5)

lines(x=rc.boot_ss.10$n.resample,
lines(x=rc.boot_ss.20$n.resample,
lines(x=rc.boot_ss.30$n.resample,
lines(x=rc.boot_ss.40$n.resample,
lines(x=rc.boot_ss.50$n.resample,

y=rc.boot_ss.10$icc_aos.beta,
y=rc.boot_ss.20$icc_aos.beta,
y=rc.boot_ss.30$icc_aos.beta,
y=rc.boot_ss.40$icc_aos.beta,
y=rc.boot_ss.50$icc_aos.beta,

col="red", lty=2, lwd=2)
col="orange", lty=2, lwd=2)
col="green", lty=2, lwd=2)
col="blue", lty=2, lwd=2)
col="purple", lty=2, lwd=2)

abline(h=0.75, col="black", lty=2, lwd=1)
axis.break(axis=2, breakpos=0.73, style="slash", brw=0.02)
legend(x=155, y=0.87, col=c("red","orange","green","blue","purple"), lty=2, lwd=2, cex=1.2,
legend=c(expression(paste("Cal. sample size (", n[cal], ") = 10", sep="")),
expression(paste("Cal. sample size (", n[cal], ") = 20", sep="")),
expression(paste("Cal. sample size (", n[cal], ") = 30", sep="")),
expression(paste("Cal. sample size (", n[cal], ") = 40", sep="")),
expression(paste("Cal. sample size (", n[cal], ") = 50", sep=""))))

## AOS Xi
par(mar=c(5,5,1.5,3))
plot(x=rc.boot_ss.10$n.resample, y=rc.boot_ss.10$icc_aos.xi,
xlim=c(0,250), ylim=c(0.73,1), col="red", lty=1, lwd=2,
xlab=expression(paste("Number of Bootstrap Trials (", n[boot], ")", sep="")),
ylab="Intraclass Correlation",
#main=expression(paste("Reliability of Bootstrapped Estimates of Bias (", hat(xi)[i], "), GJP
Data")),
cex.lab=1.4, cex.axis=1.2, cex.main=1.5, cex=1.5)
points(x=rc.boot_ss.20$n.resample, y=rc.boot_ss.20$icc_aos.xi,
xlim=c(0,250), ylim=c(0.73,1), col="orange", lwd=2, cex=1.5)
points(x=rc.boot_ss.30$n.resample, y=rc.boot_ss.30$icc_aos.xi,
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xlim=c(0,250), ylim=c(0.73,1), col="green", lwd=2, cex=1.5)
points(x=rc.boot_ss.40$n.resample, y=rc.boot_ss.40$icc_aos.xi,
xlim=c(0,250), ylim=c(0.73,1), col="blue", lwd=2, cex=1.5)
points(x=rc.boot_ss.50$n.resample, y=rc.boot_ss.50$icc_aos.xi,
xlim=c(0,250), ylim=c(0.73,1), col="purple", lwd=2, cex=1.5)

lines(x=rc.boot_ss.10$n.resample,
lines(x=rc.boot_ss.20$n.resample,
lines(x=rc.boot_ss.30$n.resample,
lines(x=rc.boot_ss.40$n.resample,
lines(x=rc.boot_ss.50$n.resample,

y=rc.boot_ss.10$icc_aos.xi,
y=rc.boot_ss.20$icc_aos.xi,
y=rc.boot_ss.30$icc_aos.xi,
y=rc.boot_ss.40$icc_aos.xi,
y=rc.boot_ss.50$icc_aos.xi,

col="red", lty=2, lwd=2)
col="orange", lty=2, lwd=2)
col="green", lty=2, lwd=2)
col="blue", lty=2, lwd=2)
col="purple", lty=2, lwd=2)

abline(h=0.75, col="black", lty=2, lwd=1)
axis.break(axis=2, breakpos=0.73, style="slash", brw=0.02)
legend(x=155, y=0.87, col=c("red","orange","green","blue","purple"), lty=2, lwd=2, cex=1.2,
legend=c(expression(paste("Cal. sample size (", n[cal], ") = 10", sep="")),
expression(paste("Cal. sample size (", n[cal], ") = 20", sep="")),
expression(paste("Cal. sample size (", n[cal], ") = 30", sep="")),
expression(paste("Cal. sample size (", n[cal], ") = 40", sep="")),
expression(paste("Cal. sample size (", n[cal], ") = 50", sep=""))))
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################################################################
#
#
# Assessing Credibility in Subjective Probability Judgment
#
# Correlates of Credibility, Good Judgment Data
#
# (GJP Validity; GJP enrichment vs. credibility)
#
#
#
# Josh Baker
#
# jbak@sas.upenn.edu
#
#
#
################################################################

####################################################################################################
#############
#
DATA CLEANING AND PREPARATION
#
####################################################################################################
#############

############ Set Working directory and load relevant libraries
##################################################
library(haven)
library(psych)
library(glmnet)
setwd("~yourPath")
####################################################################################################
#############

############ Import and Clean Forecast Data
#####################################################################
fcasts <- read.csv("fcasts_small.file.csv")
## Convert factors to numeric or character data types (and trim last two characters from each
element of "ifp_id")
fcasts$ifp_id <- as.numeric(substr(as.character(fcasts$ifp_id),1,4))
fcasts$answer_option <- as.character(fcasts$answer_option)
fcasts$date <- as.character(fcasts$date)
fcasts$timestamp <- as.character(fcasts$timestamp)
fcasts$outcome <- as.character(fcasts$outcome)
fcasts$g.tnt <- as.character(fcasts$g.tnt)
fcasts$mod.tag <- as.character(fcasts$mod.tag)
fcasts$date.closed <- as.character(fcasts$date.closed)
fcasts$time.horiz <- as.character(fcasts$time.horiz)
## Subset fcasts to answer_option=="a" (only forecasts for focal outcomes, not complements)
fcasts <- subset(fcasts, answer_option=="a")
## Subset to columns that are relevant to correlational analyses
fcasts <- fcasts[which(is.element(colnames(fcasts),c("ifp_id",
"user_id",
"date",
"g.tnt",
"mod.tag",
"outcome",
"val.unrounded",
"bs.unrounded")))]
## Rename some columns for consistency/expediency
colnames(fcasts)[which(colnames(fcasts)=="ifp_id")] <- "ifp.id"
colnames(fcasts)[which(colnames(fcasts)=="user_id")] <- "gjp.id"
colnames(fcasts)[which(colnames(fcasts)=="val.unrounded")] <- "prob"
colnames(fcasts)[which(colnames(fcasts)=="bs.unrounded")] <- "bs"
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## Recode "outcome" to binary ("a" = 1; "b" = 0)
fcasts$outcome <- ifelse(fcasts$outcome=="a",1,0)
## Round all prob values to two places to fix a floating point rounding issue
fcasts$prob <- round(fcasts$prob,2)
## Reorder fcasts by gjp.id
fcasts <- fcasts[order(fcasts$gjp.id),]
## Re-order columns, for clarity
fcasts <- fcasts[c(2,5,3,1,7,8,4,6)]
## Extract GJP IDs as a vector
gjp.ids <- unique(fcasts$gjp.id)
gjp.ids <- gjp.ids[order(gjp.ids)] #Sort in ascending order

############ Import Recal_50 Data
###############################################################################
recal_50 <- read.csv("recal_50.csv")
## Extract recal_50 IDs as a vector
r50.ids <- unique(recal_50$gjp.id)
r50.ids <- r50.ids[order(r50.ids)] #Sort in ascending order
############ Import and Clean Individual Differences Data (recovered from Jeff)
#################################
ind.diffs_jeff <- read_dta("ind.diffs.dta")
## Subset to only those columns that are relevant to correlates of credibility analyses
ind.diffs_jeff <- ind.diffs_jeff[which(is.element(colnames(ind.diffs_jeff), c("gjpid",
"nifpsaddressed",
"avgnfcastsperifp",
"granscore",
"ed_yr3",
"ed_yr1_yr2",
"y4education",
"numeracy_score_yr3",
"numeracy_score_yr1_yr2",
"y4numeracyscore",
"raven_adjusted_score",
"y4ravenscore",
"crt_score_yr3",
"y4crtscore",
"foxhedge_single",
"nfcog_score_yr1_yr2",
"y4nfcogscore",
"thresh")))]

## Rename ind.diffs_jeff columns for clarity/consistency
colnames(ind.diffs_jeff)[which(colnames(ind.diffs_jeff)=="gjpid")] <- "gjp.id"
colnames(ind.diffs_jeff)[which(colnames(ind.diffs_jeff)=="nifpsaddressed")] <- "n.ifps"
colnames(ind.diffs_jeff)[which(colnames(ind.diffs_jeff)=="avgnfcastsperifp")] <- "avg.n.updates"
colnames(ind.diffs_jeff)[which(colnames(ind.diffs_jeff)=="granscore")] <- "prop.fine.grained"
colnames(ind.diffs_jeff)[which(colnames(ind.diffs_jeff)=="ed_yr3")] <- "ed.y3"
colnames(ind.diffs_jeff)[which(colnames(ind.diffs_jeff)=="ed_yr1_yr2")] <- "ed.y1.y2"
colnames(ind.diffs_jeff)[which(colnames(ind.diffs_jeff)=="y4education")] <- "ed.y4"
colnames(ind.diffs_jeff)[which(colnames(ind.diffs_jeff)=="numeracy_score_yr3")] <- "numeracy.y3"
colnames(ind.diffs_jeff)[which(colnames(ind.diffs_jeff)=="numeracy_score_yr1_yr2")] <"numeracy.y1.y2"
colnames(ind.diffs_jeff)[which(colnames(ind.diffs_jeff)=="y4numeracyscore")] <- "numeracy.y4"
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colnames(ind.diffs_jeff)[which(colnames(ind.diffs_jeff)=="raven_adjusted_score")] <- "adj.ravens.y3"
colnames(ind.diffs_jeff)[which(colnames(ind.diffs_jeff)=="y4ravenscore")] <- "ravens.y4"
colnames(ind.diffs_jeff)[which(colnames(ind.diffs_jeff)=="crt_score_yr3")] <- "crt.y3"
colnames(ind.diffs_jeff)[which(colnames(ind.diffs_jeff)=="y4crtscore")] <- "crt.y4"
colnames(ind.diffs_jeff)[which(colnames(ind.diffs_jeff)=="foxhedge_single")] <- "fox.hedgehog"
colnames(ind.diffs_jeff)[which(colnames(ind.diffs_jeff)=="nfcog_score_yr1_yr2")] <- "nfcog.y1.y2"
colnames(ind.diffs_jeff)[which(colnames(ind.diffs_jeff)=="y4nfcogscore")] <- "nfcog.y4"
colnames(ind.diffs_jeff)[which(colnames(ind.diffs_jeff)=="thresh")] <- "b.star"
## Subset to only those forecasters in recal_50
ind.diffs_jeff <- subset(ind.diffs_jeff, is.element(ind.diffs_jeff$gjp.id, recal_50$gjp.id))
## Sort by gjp.id
ind.diffs_jeff <- ind.diffs_jeff[order(ind.diffs_jeff$gjp.id),]
## Convert ind.diffs_jeff to a simple data frame (vs. a multi-class tibble object)
ind.diffs_jeff <- as.data.frame(ind.diffs_jeff)

############ Import and Clean Individual Differences Data from GJP
###############################################
ind.diffs_gjp <- read.csv("individual.diffs_across.yrs.csv", stringsAsFactors=F)
## Subset to only those columns that are relevant to correlates of credibility analyses
ind.diffs_gjp <- ind.diffs_gjp[which(is.element(colnames(ind.diffs_gjp), c("user_id",
"age",
"gender",
"aomt_score")))]

## Rename ind.diffs_gjp columns for clarity/consistency
colnames(ind.diffs_gjp)[which(colnames(ind.diffs_gjp)=="user_id")] <- "gjp.id"
colnames(ind.diffs_gjp)[which(colnames(ind.diffs_gjp)=="gender")] <- "male"
colnames(ind.diffs_gjp)[which(colnames(ind.diffs_gjp)=="aomt_score")] <- "aomt.y3"
## Subset to only those forecasters in recal_50
ind.diffs_gjp <- subset(ind.diffs_gjp, is.element(ind.diffs_gjp$gjp.id, recal_50$gjp.id))
## Sort by gjp.id
ind.diffs_gjp <- ind.diffs_gjp[order(ind.diffs_gjp$gjp.id),]

############ Elementary Functions for merging, subsetting, and extracting individual difference data
##############
## Function for calculating the number of unique elements in a vector ####
n.unique <- function(vector){length(unique(vector))}
## Function for returning the first element in a vector ####
first <- function(vector){vector[1]}
## Function for identifying complete data.frame rows (i.e., rows without missingness)
is.complete <- function(data.in){
i <- 1
out <- vector()
while(i <= nrow(data.in)){
out[i] <- 1 - (as.numeric(NA %in% as.matrix(data.in[i,])))
i <- i + 1
}
return(out)
#rm(data.in,i,out)
}
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## Function to mimic the functionality of excel's vlookup
vlookup <- function(source.df, target.df, match.col.name, return.col.name){
source_match.col.num <- as.integer(which(colnames(source.df)==match.col.name))
target_match.col.num <- as.integer(which(colnames(target.df)==match.col.name))
target_return.col.num <- as.integer(which(colnames(target.df)==return.col.name))
i <- 1
out <- vector()
while(i <= nrow(source.df)){
if(is.element(source.df[i,source_match.col.num],target.df[,target_match.col.num])){
out[i] <target.df[which(target.df[,target_match.col.num]==source.df[i,source_match.col.num]),target_return.c
ol.num]
} else{
out[i] <- NA
}
i <- i+1
}
return(out)

#rm(source.df,target.df,match.col.name,return.col.name,source_match.col.num,target_match.col.num,tar
get_return.col.num,i,out)
}
## Function for effects coding categorical variables
ec.expand <- function(data.in, category.name, ref=NULL){
levels <- levels(as.factor(data.in))

if(is.null(ref)){
ref <- levels[1]
}
ec.levels <- setdiff(levels, ref)
data.out <- matrix(nrow=length(data.in),ncol=length(ec.levels))
i <- 1
while(i <= length(ec.levels)){
data.out[,i] <- ifelse(data.in==ec.levels[i],1,ifelse(data.in==ref,-1,0))
i <- i+1
}
data.out <- as.data.frame(data.out)
colnames(data.out) <- paste(category.name, ec.levels, "ec", sep=".")
return(data.out)
#rm(data.in,category.name,ref,levels,ec.levels,data.out,i)
}
## Function for conducting mean imputation on data.frame columns
impute.means <- function(data.in){
data.out <- as.matrix(data.in)
i <- 1
while(i <= ncol(data.out)){
data.out[,i] <- ifelse(is.na(data.out[,i]),mean(data.out[,i], na.rm=T), data.out[,i])
i <- i+1
}
data.out <- as.data.frame(data.out)
return(data.out)
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#rm(data.in,data.out)
}

############ Create a raw, master version of ind.diffs
###########################################################
## Combine data from ind.diffs_jeff and ind.diffs_gjp
ind.diffs_raw <- ind.diffs_jeff
ind.diffs_raw <- cbind(ind.diffs_raw, aomt.y3=vlookup(ind.diffs_jeff, ind.diffs_gjp, "gjp.id",
"aomt.y3"))
ind.diffs_raw <- cbind(ind.diffs_raw, age=vlookup(ind.diffs_jeff, ind.diffs_gjp, "gjp.id", "age"))
ind.diffs_raw <- cbind(ind.diffs_raw, male=vlookup(ind.diffs_jeff, ind.diffs_gjp, "gjp.id", "male"))
## Calculate mean and median brier scores for each person, and merge into ind.diffs_raw
sub <- subset(fcasts, is.element(fcasts$gjp.id, recal_50$gjp.id))
i <- 1
avg.bs <- vector()
med.bs <- vector()
while(i <= length(r50.ids)){
sub.fc <- subset(sub, gjp.id==r50.ids[i])
sub.fc <- sub.fc[order(sub.fc$ifp.id),]
user.ifps <- unique(sub.fc$ifp.id)
j <- 1
ifp.agg <- vector()
while(j <= length(user.ifps)){
sub.ifp <- subset(sub.fc, ifp.id==user.ifps[j])
ifp.agg[j] <- mean(as.vector(by(sub.ifp$bs, sub.ifp$date, mean)))
j <- j+1
}
avg.bs[i] <- mean(ifp.agg)
med.bs[i] <- median(ifp.agg)
i <- i+1
}
ind.diffs_raw <- cbind(ind.diffs_raw, avg.bs=avg.bs, med.bs=med.bs)
rm(i,avg.bs,med.bs,sub.fc,user.ifps,j,ifp.agg,sub.ifp)

## Merge-in and effects code teaming, training, and super data from fcasts
ind.diffs_raw <- cbind(ind.diffs_raw, g.tnt=as.vector(by(sub$g.tnt, sub$gjp.id, first)))
ind.diffs_raw$g.tnt <- levels(as.factor(fcasts$g.tnt))[ind.diffs_raw$g.tnt]
ind.diffs_raw$g.tnt <- sub("\\.", "", ind.diffs_raw$g.tnt)
ind.diffs_raw <- cbind(ind.diffs_raw, ec.expand(ind.diffs_raw$g.tnt, category.name="condition",
ref="int"))

## Merge education data across years to reduce missingness, and recode
temp <as.vector(apply(ind.diffs_raw[which(is.element(colnames(ind.diffs_raw),c("ed.y3","ed.y1.y2","ed.y4")
))], 1, max, na.rm=T))
temp <- ifelse(temp==-Inf,0,temp)
temp <- as.character(temp)
temp <- ifelse(temp=="0","other",temp)
temp <- ifelse(temp=="1","bachelors",temp)
temp <- ifelse(temp=="2","masters",temp)
temp <- ifelse(temp=="3","doctorate",temp)
ind.diffs_raw <- cbind(ind.diffs_raw, educ=temp)
## Effects code education
ind.diffs_raw <- cbind(ind.diffs_raw, ec.expand(ind.diffs_raw$educ, category.name="educ",
ref="other"))
## Merge-in credibility data
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ind.diffs_raw <- cbind(aos.alpha=vlookup(ind.diffs_raw, recal_50, "gjp.id", "aos.alpha"),
sd.alpha=vlookup(ind.diffs_raw, recal_50, "gjp.id", "sd.alpha"),
aos.beta=vlookup(ind.diffs_raw, recal_50, "gjp.id", "aos.beta"),
sd.beta=vlookup(ind.diffs_raw, recal_50, "gjp.id", "sd.beta"),
aos.xi=vlookup(ind.diffs_raw, recal_50, "gjp.id", "aos.xi"),
sd.xi=vlookup(ind.diffs_raw, recal_50, "gjp.id", "sd.xi"),
ind.diffs_raw)
## Adjust mos.alpha and mos.beta to reflect difference from normative values
ind.diffs_raw$aos.alpha <- abs(ind.diffs_raw$aos.alpha - 0)
ind.diffs_raw$aos.beta <- abs(ind.diffs_raw$aos.beta - 1)
colnames(ind.diffs_raw)[which(colnames(ind.diffs_raw)=="aos.alpha")] <- "ane.aos.alpha" #ANE =
absolute normative error
colnames(ind.diffs_raw)[which(colnames(ind.diffs_raw)=="aos.beta")] <- "ane.aos.beta"
#ANE =
absolute normative error
## Cleanup and reorganize
rm(sub,temp)
ind.diffs_raw <ind.diffs_raw[c(7,1:6,28:29,33,31,32,34,24,8:10,14,13,20,15,21,16,22,17,18,23,25:27,12,11,19,35,36,3
8,37)]

############ Create four versions of ind.diffs, varying mean imputation and averaging across years
###############
##### No averaging
ind.diffs_na.ni <ind.diffs_na.ni <ind.diffs_na.ni <ind.diffs_na.ni <-

(primarily y3 data), no mean imputation #####
ind.diffs_raw[c(1:17,19,21,23,25,26,28:30,35:37)]
cbind(ind.diffs_na.ni, complete=is.complete(ind.diffs_na.ni))
subset(ind.diffs_na.ni, complete==1)
ind.diffs_na.ni[-which(colnames(ind.diffs_na.ni)=="complete")]

##### No averaging (primarily y3 data), with mean imputation #####
ind.diffs_na.wi <- ind.diffs_raw[c(1:17,19,21,23,25,26,28:30,35:37)]
ind.diffs_na.wi <- impute.means(ind.diffs_na.wi)

##### Averaging across data feom all available years, no mean imputation #####
ind.diffs_wa.ni <- ind.diffs_raw
# Average numeracy scores across years
temp <as.vector(apply(ind.diffs_wa.ni[which(is.element(colnames(ind.diffs_wa.ni),c("numeracy.y1.y2","numer
acy.y3","numeracy.y4")))], 1, mean, na.rm=T))
temp <- ifelse(is.nan(temp),NA,temp)
ind.diffs_wa.ni <- cbind(ind.diffs_wa.ni, avg.numeracy=temp)
# Adjust y4 Raven's scores and average across years
ind.diffs_wa.ni$ravens.y4 <- ind.diffs_wa.ni$ravens.y4 / 12
colnames(ind.diffs_wa.ni)[which(colnames(ind.diffs_wa.ni)=="ravens.y4")] <- "adj.ravens.y4"
temp <as.vector(apply(ind.diffs_wa.ni[which(is.element(colnames(ind.diffs_wa.ni),c("adj.ravens.y3","adj.ra
vens.y4")))], 1, mean, na.rm=T))
temp <- ifelse(is.nan(temp),NA,temp)
ind.diffs_wa.ni <- cbind(ind.diffs_wa.ni, avg.adj.ravens=temp)
# Average CRT scores across years (y2 excluded because not extended CRT)
temp <as.vector(apply(ind.diffs_wa.ni[which(is.element(colnames(ind.diffs_wa.ni),c("crt.y3","crt.y4")))],
1, mean, na.rm=T))
temp <- ifelse(is.nan(temp),NA,temp)
ind.diffs_wa.ni <- cbind(ind.diffs_wa.ni, avg.crt=temp)
# Average nfcog scores across years
temp <as.vector(apply(ind.diffs_wa.ni[which(is.element(colnames(ind.diffs_wa.ni),c("nfcog.y1.y2","nfcog.y4
")))], 1, mean, na.rm=T))
temp <- ifelse(is.nan(temp),NA,temp)
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ind.diffs_wa.ni <- cbind(ind.diffs_wa.ni, avg.nfcog=temp)
# Subset to final, merged/averaged data
ind.diffs_wa.ni <- ind.diffs_wa.ni[c(1:17,38:40,25,41,28:30,35:37)]
# Subset to only complete cases
ind.diffs_wa.ni <- cbind(ind.diffs_wa.ni, complete=is.complete(ind.diffs_wa.ni))
ind.diffs_wa.ni <- subset(ind.diffs_wa.ni, complete==1)
ind.diffs_wa.ni <- ind.diffs_wa.ni[-which(colnames(ind.diffs_wa.ni)=="complete")]

##### Averaging
ind.diffs_wa.wi
ind.diffs_wa.wi
ind.diffs_wa.wi

across data from all available years, with mean imputation #####
<- ind.diffs_raw
<- ind.diffs_wa.wi[c(1:30,35:37)]
<- impute.means(ind.diffs_wa.wi)

# Average numeracy scores across years
temp <as.vector(apply(ind.diffs_wa.wi[which(is.element(colnames(ind.diffs_wa.wi),c("numeracy.y1.y2","numer
acy.y3","numeracy.y4")))], 1, mean, na.rm=T))
temp <- ifelse(is.nan(temp),NA,temp)
ind.diffs_wa.wi <- cbind(ind.diffs_wa.wi, avg.numeracy=temp)
# Adjust y4 Raven's scores and average across years
ind.diffs_wa.wi$ravens.y4 <- ind.diffs_wa.wi$ravens.y4 / 12
colnames(ind.diffs_wa.wi)[which(colnames(ind.diffs_wa.wi)=="ravens.y4")] <- "adj.ravens.y4"
temp <as.vector(apply(ind.diffs_wa.wi[which(is.element(colnames(ind.diffs_wa.wi),c("adj.ravens.y3","adj.ra
vens.y4")))], 1, mean, na.rm=T))
temp <- ifelse(is.nan(temp),NA,temp)
ind.diffs_wa.wi <- cbind(ind.diffs_wa.wi, avg.adj.ravens=temp)
# Average CRT scores across years (y2 excluded because not extended CRT)
temp <as.vector(apply(ind.diffs_wa.wi[which(is.element(colnames(ind.diffs_wa.wi),c("crt.y3","crt.y4")))],
1, mean, na.rm=T))
temp <- ifelse(is.nan(temp),NA,temp)
ind.diffs_wa.wi <- cbind(ind.diffs_wa.wi, avg.crt=temp)
# Average nfcog scores across years
temp <as.vector(apply(ind.diffs_wa.wi[which(is.element(colnames(ind.diffs_wa.wi),c("nfcog.y1.y2","nfcog.y4
")))], 1, mean, na.rm=T))
temp <- ifelse(is.nan(temp),NA,temp)
ind.diffs_wa.wi <- cbind(ind.diffs_wa.wi, avg.nfcog=temp)
# Subset to final, merged/averaged data
ind.diffs_wa.wi <- ind.diffs_wa.wi[c(1:17,34:37,25,28:33)]
rm(temp)

############ Standardize all non-categorical variables in each set of ind.diffs
##################################
## ind.diffs_na.ni (no averaging, no imputation)
ind.diffs_na.ni$ane.aos.alpha <- scale(ind.diffs_na.ni$ane.aos.alpha)
ind.diffs_na.ni$sd.alpha <- scale(ind.diffs_na.ni$sd.alpha)
ind.diffs_na.ni$ane.aos.beta <- scale(ind.diffs_na.ni$ane.aos.beta)
ind.diffs_na.ni$sd.beta <- scale(ind.diffs_na.ni$sd.beta)
ind.diffs_na.ni$aos.xi <- scale(ind.diffs_na.ni$aos.xi)
ind.diffs_na.ni$sd.xi <- scale(ind.diffs_na.ni$sd.xi)
ind.diffs_na.ni$avg.bs <- scale(ind.diffs_na.ni$avg.bs)
ind.diffs_na.ni$med.bs <- scale(ind.diffs_na.ni$med.bs)
ind.diffs_na.ni$b.star <- scale(ind.diffs_na.ni$b.star)
ind.diffs_na.ni$n.ifps <- scale(ind.diffs_na.ni$n.ifps)
ind.diffs_na.ni$avg.n.updates <- scale(ind.diffs_na.ni$avg.n.updates)
ind.diffs_na.ni$prop.fine.grained <- scale(ind.diffs_na.ni$prop.fine.grained)
ind.diffs_na.ni$numeracy.y3 <- scale(ind.diffs_na.ni$numeracy.y3)
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ind.diffs_na.ni$adj.ravens.y3 <- scale(ind.diffs_na.ni$adj.ravens.y3)
ind.diffs_na.ni$crt.y3 <- scale(ind.diffs_na.ni$crt.y3)
ind.diffs_na.ni$fox.hedgehog <- scale(ind.diffs_na.ni$fox.hedgehog)
ind.diffs_na.ni$nfcog.y1.y2 <- scale(ind.diffs_na.ni$nfcog.y1.y2)
ind.diffs_na.ni$aomt.y3 <- scale(ind.diffs_na.ni$aomt.y3)
ind.diffs_na.ni$age <- scale(ind.diffs_na.ni$age)
## ind.diffs_na.wi (no averaging, with imputation)
ind.diffs_na.wi$ane.aos.alpha <- scale(ind.diffs_na.wi$ane.aos.alpha)
ind.diffs_na.wi$sd.alpha <- scale(ind.diffs_na.wi$sd.alpha)
ind.diffs_na.wi$ane.aos.beta <- scale(ind.diffs_na.wi$ane.aos.beta)
ind.diffs_na.wi$sd.beta <- scale(ind.diffs_na.wi$sd.beta)
ind.diffs_na.wi$aos.xi <- scale(ind.diffs_na.wi$aos.xi)
ind.diffs_na.wi$sd.xi <- scale(ind.diffs_na.wi$sd.xi)
ind.diffs_na.wi$avg.bs <- scale(ind.diffs_na.wi$avg.bs)
ind.diffs_na.wi$med.bs <- scale(ind.diffs_na.wi$med.bs)
ind.diffs_na.wi$b.star <- scale(ind.diffs_na.wi$b.star)
ind.diffs_na.wi$n.ifps <- scale(ind.diffs_na.wi$n.ifps)
ind.diffs_na.wi$avg.n.updates <- scale(ind.diffs_na.wi$avg.n.updates)
ind.diffs_na.wi$prop.fine.grained <- scale(ind.diffs_na.wi$prop.fine.grained)
ind.diffs_na.wi$numeracy.y3 <- scale(ind.diffs_na.wi$numeracy.y3)
ind.diffs_na.wi$adj.ravens.y3 <- scale(ind.diffs_na.wi$adj.ravens.y3)
ind.diffs_na.wi$crt.y3 <- scale(ind.diffs_na.wi$crt.y3)
ind.diffs_na.wi$fox.hedgehog <- scale(ind.diffs_na.wi$fox.hedgehog)
ind.diffs_na.wi$nfcog.y1.y2 <- scale(ind.diffs_na.wi$nfcog.y1.y2)
ind.diffs_na.wi$aomt.y3 <- scale(ind.diffs_na.wi$aomt.y3)
ind.diffs_na.wi$age <- scale(ind.diffs_na.wi$age)
## ind.diffs_wa.ni (with averaging, no imputation)
ind.diffs_wa.ni$ane.aos.alpha <- scale(ind.diffs_wa.ni$ane.aos.alpha)
ind.diffs_wa.ni$sd.alpha <- scale(ind.diffs_wa.ni$sd.alpha)
ind.diffs_wa.ni$ane.aos.beta <- scale(ind.diffs_wa.ni$ane.aos.beta)
ind.diffs_wa.ni$sd.beta <- scale(ind.diffs_wa.ni$sd.beta)
ind.diffs_wa.ni$aos.xi <- scale(ind.diffs_wa.ni$aos.xi)
ind.diffs_wa.ni$sd.xi <- scale(ind.diffs_wa.ni$sd.xi)
ind.diffs_wa.ni$avg.bs <- scale(ind.diffs_wa.ni$avg.bs)
ind.diffs_wa.ni$med.bs <- scale(ind.diffs_wa.ni$med.bs)
ind.diffs_wa.ni$b.star <- scale(ind.diffs_wa.ni$b.star)
ind.diffs_wa.ni$n.ifps <- scale(ind.diffs_wa.ni$n.ifps)
ind.diffs_wa.ni$avg.n.updates <- scale(ind.diffs_wa.ni$avg.n.updates)
ind.diffs_wa.ni$prop.fine.grained <- scale(ind.diffs_wa.ni$prop.fine.grained)
ind.diffs_wa.ni$avg.numeracy <- scale(ind.diffs_wa.ni$avg.numeracy)
ind.diffs_wa.ni$avg.adj.ravens <- scale(ind.diffs_wa.ni$avg.adj.ravens)
ind.diffs_wa.ni$avg.crt <- scale(ind.diffs_wa.ni$avg.crt)
ind.diffs_wa.ni$avg.nfcog <- scale(ind.diffs_wa.ni$avg.nfcog)
ind.diffs_wa.ni$fox.hedgehog <- scale(ind.diffs_wa.ni$fox.hedgehog)
ind.diffs_wa.ni$aomt.y3 <- scale(ind.diffs_wa.ni$aomt.y3)
ind.diffs_wa.ni$age <- scale(ind.diffs_wa.ni$age)
## ind.diffs_wa.wi (with averaging, with imputation)
ind.diffs_wa.wi$ane.aos.alpha <- scale(ind.diffs_wa.wi$ane.aos.alpha)
ind.diffs_wa.wi$sd.alpha <- scale(ind.diffs_wa.wi$sd.alpha)
ind.diffs_wa.wi$ane.aos.beta <- scale(ind.diffs_wa.wi$ane.aos.beta)
ind.diffs_wa.wi$sd.beta <- scale(ind.diffs_wa.wi$sd.beta)
ind.diffs_wa.wi$aos.xi <- scale(ind.diffs_wa.wi$aos.xi)
ind.diffs_wa.wi$sd.xi <- scale(ind.diffs_wa.wi$sd.xi)
ind.diffs_wa.wi$avg.bs <- scale(ind.diffs_wa.wi$avg.bs)
ind.diffs_wa.wi$med.bs <- scale(ind.diffs_wa.wi$med.bs)
ind.diffs_wa.wi$b.star <- scale(ind.diffs_wa.wi$b.star)
ind.diffs_wa.wi$n.ifps <- scale(ind.diffs_wa.wi$n.ifps)
ind.diffs_wa.wi$avg.n.updates <- scale(ind.diffs_wa.wi$avg.n.updates)
ind.diffs_wa.wi$prop.fine.grained <- scale(ind.diffs_wa.wi$prop.fine.grained)
ind.diffs_wa.wi$avg.numeracy <- scale(ind.diffs_wa.wi$avg.numeracy)
ind.diffs_wa.wi$avg.adj.ravens <- scale(ind.diffs_wa.wi$avg.adj.ravens)
ind.diffs_wa.wi$avg.crt <- scale(ind.diffs_wa.wi$avg.crt)
ind.diffs_wa.wi$avg.nfcog <- scale(ind.diffs_wa.wi$avg.nfcog)
ind.diffs_wa.wi$fox.hedgehog <- scale(ind.diffs_wa.wi$fox.hedgehog)
ind.diffs_wa.wi$aomt.y3 <- scale(ind.diffs_wa.wi$aomt.y3)
ind.diffs_wa.wi$age <- scale(ind.diffs_wa.wi$age)
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####################################################################################################
#############
#
PAIRWISE CORRELATIONS
#
####################################################################################################
#############
############ Elementary functions for constructing correlation tables
###########################################
## Function for assigning stars on the basis of statistical significance
assign.stars <- function(p.value,include.ns=TRUE){
if(p.value > 0.05){
if(include.ns){
out <- "n.s."
} else{
out <- ""
}
}
if(p.value <= 0.05 & p.value > 0.01){
out <- "*"
}
if(p.value <= 0.01 & p.value > 0.001){
out <- "**"
}
if(p.value <= 0.001){
out <- "***"
}
return(out)
}

## Function for building a correlation table
gen.cor.table <- function(data, print.p=TRUE, include.ns=TRUE){
require(psych)
out <- matrix(nrow=ncol(data), ncol=ncol(data))
rownames(out) <- colnames(data)
colnames(out) <- colnames(data)
i <- 1
j <- 1
while(i <= ncol(data)){
while(j <= i){
temp <- corr.test(as.matrix(data[,i]), as.matrix(data[,j]))
est <- round(temp$r,3)
p <- round(temp$p,4)
sig <- assign.stars(p, include.ns=include.ns)
p.sig <- paste(p,sig,sep=", ")
if(print.p){
out[i,j] <- paste(est, p.sig, sep=", ")
} else{
out[i,j] <- paste(est, sig, sep="")
}
j <- j+1
}
j <- 1
i <- i+1
}
return(out)
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#rm(data,print.p,include.ns,out,i,j,temp,est,p,sig,p.sig,out)
}

############ Generate and export correlation tables for each set of ind.diffs
####################################
## No averaging, no imputation
cor.table_na.ni <- gen.cor.table(ind.diffs_na.ni, print.p=TRUE, include.ns=TRUE)
write.csv(cor.table_na.ni, "cor.table_na.ni.csv")
## No averaging, with imputation
cor.table_na.wi <- gen.cor.table(ind.diffs_na.wi, print.p=TRUE, include.ns=TRUE)
write.csv(cor.table_na.wi, "cor.table_na.wi.csv")
## With averaging, no imputation
cor.table_wa.ni <- gen.cor.table(ind.diffs_wa.ni, print.p=TRUE, include.ns=TRUE)
write.csv(cor.table_wa.ni, "cor.table_wa.ni.csv")
## With averaging, with imputation
cor.table_wa.wi <- gen.cor.table(ind.diffs_wa.wi, print.p=TRUE, include.ns=TRUE)
write.csv(cor.table_wa.wi, "cor.table_wa.wi.csv")

####################################################################################################
#############
#
EXPLORATORY REGRESSIONS
#
####################################################################################################
#############

############ Elementary functions for exploratory regression analyses
###########################################
## Function to condense lm output ##
condense.lm <- function(mod){
summ <- summary(mod)
out <- paste(round(as.vector(summ$coefficients[,1]),2), "
(",round(as.vector(summ$coefficients[,2]),2), ")
",lapply(as.vector(summ$coefficients[,4]),assign.stars,include.ns=FALSE),sep="")
out <- append(out, c(round(summ$r.squared,3), round(summ$adj.r.squared,3),
round(sqrt(mean(summ$residuals^2)),3), round(AIC(mod),2), round(BIC(mod),2)))
return(out)
#rm(mod,summ,out)
}

## Function to create three-model table ("tmt") comparinf kitchen-sink, reduced, and redge
regression approaches
tmt <- function(data.all,mod.ks,mod.red,mod.ridge){
## Extract coefficients from each model ##
coeffs.all <- append(colnames(data.all), c("mult.r2","adj.r2","RMSE","AIC","BIC"))
coeffs.all[1] <- "(Intercept)"
coeffs.ks <- append(rownames(summary(mod.ks)$coefficients),
c("mult.r2","adj.r2","RMSE","AIC","BIC"))
coeffs.red <- append(rownames(summary(mod.red)$coefficients),
c("mult.r2","adj.r2","RMSE","AIC","BIC"))
coeffs.ridge <- append(rownames(summary(mod.ridge)$coefficients),
c("mult.r2","adj.r2","RMSE","AIC","BIC"))
## Create spine for output ##
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out <- data.frame(coeff=coeffs.all)
## Create contents for each table cell ##
items.ks <- condense.lm(mod.ks)
items.red <- condense.lm(mod.red)
items.ridge <- condense.lm(mod.ridge)
## Identify which table rows should be full for each model ##
slots.ks <- which(is.element(coeffs.all,coeffs.ks))
slots.red <- which(is.element(coeffs.all,coeffs.red))
slots.ridge <- which(is.element(coeffs.all,coeffs.ridge))
i <- 1
ks <- 1
red <- 1
ridge <- 1
col.ks <- vector()
col.red <- vector()
col.ridge <- vector()

while(i <= nrow(out)){
## Fill kitchen sink model
if(is.element(i,slots.ks)){
col.ks[i] <- items.ks[ks]
ks <- ks+1
} else{
col.ks[i] <- "-----"
}
## Fill reduced model
if(is.element(i,slots.red)){
col.red[i] <- items.red[red]
red <- red+1
} else{
col.red[i] <- "-----"
}
## Fill ridge model
if(is.element(i,slots.ridge)){
col.ridge[i] <- items.ridge[ridge]
ridge <- ridge+1
} else{
col.ridge[i] <- "-----"
}
i <- i+1
}
out <- cbind(out,
kitchen.sink=col.ks,
reduced=col.red,
ridge.best_lambda.1se=col.ridge)
return(out)

#rm(data.all,mod.ks,mod.red,mod.ridge,coeffs.all,coeffs.ks,coeffs.red,coeffs.ridge,out,items.ks,item
s.red,
#items.ridge,slots.ks,slots.red,slots.ridge,i,ks,red,ridge,col.ks,col.red,col.ridge)
}

## Function to fit baseline, kitchen sink, reduced, and ridge models, and generate a tmt table
gen.tmt <- function(dv, data.in, predictor.cols){
require(glmnet)
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if(is.numeric(dv)){
outcome.col <- dv
}
if(is.character(dv)){
outcome.col <- which(colnames(data.in)==dv)
}
## Gather kitchen sink data ##
data.ks <- data.in[c(outcome.col,predictor.cols)]
## Check for dv as duplicate in predictor columns, and remove if necessary
if(is.element(paste(colnames(data.ks)[1],".1",sep=""),colnames(data.ks)[2:ncol(data.ks)])){
dupe <- which(colnames(data.ks)==paste(colnames(data.ks)[1],".1",sep=""))
data.ks <- data.ks[-dupe]
}
## Fit kitchen sink model ##
mod.ks <- lm(as.formula(paste(eval(colnames(data.ks)[1]), "~ .", sep="")), data=data.ks)

## Gather ridge model data ##
cv <- cv.glmnet(as.matrix(data.ks[c(2:ncol(data.ks))]),as.vector(data.ks[,1]))
data.ridge <- data.ks[which(coef(cv,s="lambda.1se")[2:length(coef(cv,s="lambda.1se"))]!=0) + 1]
data.ridge <- cbind(data.ks[c(1)],data.ridge)
## Fit ridge regression model ##
mod.ridge <- lm(as.formula(paste(eval(colnames(data.ks)[1]), "~ .", sep="")), data=data.ridge)

## Gather reduced model data ##
data.red <data.ks[which(as.vector(summary(mod.ks)$coefficients[2:nrow(summary(mod.ks)$coefficients),][,4])<=0.
05) + 1]
data.red <- cbind(data.ks[c(1)],data.red)
## Fit reduced model ##
mod.red <- lm(as.formula(paste(eval(colnames(data.ks)[1]), "~ .", sep="")), data=data.red)

## Generate Output ##
out <- tmt(data.ks,mod.ks,mod.red,mod.ridge)
return(out)
#rm(dv,data.in,predictor.cols,data.ks,mod.ks,data.red,mod.red,data.ridge,mod.ridge)
}

###### Generate and save tmt tables for credibility estimates (ind.diffs_wa.wi)
#########################
tmt_ane.aos.alpha_wa.wi <- gen.tmt(dv="ane.aos.alpha", data.in=ind.diffs_wa.wi,
predictor.cols=c(8,10:28))
write.csv(tmt_ane.aos.alpha_wa.wi, "tmt_ane.aos.alpha_wa.wi.csv")
tmt_ane.aos.beta_wa.wi <- gen.tmt(dv="ane.aos.beta", data.in=ind.diffs_wa.wi,
predictor.cols=c(8,10:28))
write.csv(tmt_ane.aos.beta_wa.wi, "tmt_ane.aos.beta_wa.wi.csv")
tmt_aos.xi_wa.wi <- gen.tmt(dv="aos.xi", data.in=ind.diffs_wa.wi, predictor.cols=c(8,10:28))
write.csv(tmt_aos.xi_wa.wi, "tmt_aos.xi_wa.wi.csv")

###### Generate and save tmt tables for avg.bs (ind.diffs_wa.wi)
#########################################
tmt_avg.bs_wa.wi <- gen.tmt(dv="avg.bs", data.in=ind.diffs_wa.wi, predictor.cols=c(2,4,6,10:28))
write.csv(tmt_avg.bs_wa.wi, "tmt_avg.bs_wa.wi.csv")
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####################################################################################################
######
#
Linear Hypothesis Testing: Overlap Between Enhanced Environment and Credibility
#
####################################################################################################
######
##### Estimate the relevant models for comparison
########################################################
mod.b <- lm(avg.bs ~ ., data=ind.diffs_wa.wi[c(8,14:28)])
mod.e <- lm(avg.bs ~ ., data=ind.diffs_wa.wi[c(8,10:28)])
mod.c <- lm(avg.bs ~ ., data=ind.diffs_wa.wi[c(2,4,6,8,14:28)])
mod.f <- lm(avg.bs ~ ., data=ind.diffs_wa.wi[c(2,4,6,8,10:28)])

#Baseline model
#Environmental vars only
#Credibility vars only
#Full model

##### Construct a table to compare the various models
####################################################
## Manually assign ind.diffs_wa.wi to data.all (to minimize departures from tmt code)
data.all <- ind.diffs_wa.wi
## Extract coefficients from each model ##
coeffs.all <- append(colnames(data.all), c("mult.r2","adj.r2","RMSE","AIC","BIC"))
coeffs.all[1] <- "(Intercept)"
coeffs.b <- append(rownames(summary(mod.b)$coefficients), c("mult.r2","adj.r2","RMSE","AIC","BIC"))
coeffs.e <- append(rownames(summary(mod.e)$coefficients), c("mult.r2","adj.r2","RMSE","AIC","BIC"))
coeffs.c <- append(rownames(summary(mod.c)$coefficients), c("mult.r2","adj.r2","RMSE","AIC","BIC"))
coeffs.f <- append(rownames(summary(mod.f)$coefficients), c("mult.r2","adj.r2","RMSE","AIC","BIC"))
## Create spine for output ##
env.vs.cred.table <- data.frame(coeff=coeffs.all)
## Create contents for each table cell ##
items.b <- condense.lm(mod.b)
items.e <- condense.lm(mod.e)
items.c <- condense.lm(mod.c)
items.f <- condense.lm(mod.f)
## Identify which table rows should be full for each model ##
slots.b <- which(is.element(coeffs.all,coeffs.b))
slots.e <- which(is.element(coeffs.all,coeffs.e))
slots.c <- which(is.element(coeffs.all,coeffs.c))
slots.f <- which(is.element(coeffs.all,coeffs.f))
i <- 1
b <- 1
e <- 1
c <- 1
f <- 1
col.b <col.e <col.c <col.f <-

vector()
vector()
vector()
vector()

while(i <= nrow(env.vs.cred.table)){
## Fill baseline model
if(is.element(i,slots.b)){
col.b[i] <- items.b[b]
b <- b+1
} else{
col.b[i] <- "-----"
}
## Fill environment model
if(is.element(i,slots.e)){
col.e[i] <- items.e[e]
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e <- e+1
} else{
col.e[i] <- "-----"
}
## Fill credibility model
if(is.element(i,slots.c)){
col.c[i] <- items.c[c]
c <- c+1
} else{
col.c[i] <- "-----"
}
## Fill full model
if(is.element(i,slots.f)){
col.f[i] <- items.f[f]
f <- f+1
} else{
col.f[i] <- "-----"
}

i <- i+1
}
env.vs.cred.table <- cbind(env.vs.cred.table,
baseline=col.b,
environment.only=col.e,
credibility.only=col.c,
full.model=col.f)

rm(data.all,coeffs.all,coeffs.b,coeffs.e,coeffs.c,coeffs.f,items.b,items.e,items.c,items.f,slots.b,s
lots.e,
slots.c,slots.f,i,b,e,c,f,col.b,col.e,col.c,col.f)
write.csv(env.vs.cred.table, "env.vs.cred.table.csv")

##### Formal hypothesis tests
#############################################################################
## Baseline vs. Environment
anova(mod.b,mod.e)
#Res.Df
RSS Df Sum of Sq
F
Pr(>F)
#1
738 528.35
#2
734 454.28 4
74.065 29.917 < 2.2e-16 ***
# --# Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

## Baseline vs. Credibility
anova(mod.b,mod.c)
#Res.Df
RSS Df Sum of Sq
F
Pr(>F)
#1
738 528.35
#2
735 234.84 3
293.51 306.21 < 2.2e-16 ***
# --# Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

## Environment vs. Full
anova(mod.e,mod.f)
#Res.Df
RSS Df Sum of Sq
#1
734 454.28

F

Pr(>F)
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#2
731 227.10 3
227.18 243.75 < 2.2e-16 ***
# --# Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

## Credibility vs. Full
anova(mod.c,mod.f)
#Res.Df
RSS Df Sum of Sq
F
Pr(>F)
#1
735 234.84
#2
731 227.10 4
7.7338 6.2234 6.304e-05 ***
# --# Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
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################################################################
#
#
# Assessing Credibility in Subjective Probability Judgment
#
# SPJ Recalibration Scripts, Good Judgment Data
#
# (GJP Recalibration)
#
#
#
# Josh Baker
#
# jbak@sas.upenn.edu
#
#
#
################################################################

####################################################################################################
#############
#
DATA CLEANING AND PREPARATION
#
####################################################################################################
#############

############ Set Working directory and load relevant libraries
##################################################
library(effsize)
setwd("~yourPath")
####################################################################################################
#############

############ Import and Prepare Good Judgment Data for Use in Recalibration
#####################################
fcasts <- read.csv("fcasts_small.file.csv")
## Convert factors to numeric or character data types (and trim last two characters from each
element of "ifp_id")
fcasts$ifp_id <- as.numeric(substr(as.character(fcasts$ifp_id),1,4))
fcasts$answer_option <- as.character(fcasts$answer_option)
fcasts$date <- as.character(fcasts$date)
fcasts$timestamp <- as.character(fcasts$timestamp)
fcasts$outcome <- as.character(fcasts$outcome)
fcasts$g.tnt <- as.character(fcasts$g.tnt)
fcasts$mod.tag <- as.character(fcasts$mod.tag)
fcasts$date.closed <- as.character(fcasts$date.closed)
fcasts$time.horiz <- as.character(fcasts$time.horiz)
## Subset fcasts to answer_option=="a" (only forecasts for focal outcomes, not complements)
fcasts <- subset(fcasts, answer_option=="a")
## Set aside fcasts metadata that are irrelevant to recalibration analyses
fcasts_w.metadata <- fcasts
fcasts <- fcasts[which(is.element(colnames(fcasts),c("ifp_id",
"user_id",
"outcome",
"val.unrounded",
"bs.unrounded")))]
## Rename some columns for consistency/expediency
colnames(fcasts)[which(colnames(fcasts)=="ifp_id")] <- "ifp.id"
colnames(fcasts)[which(colnames(fcasts)=="user_id")] <- "gjp.id"
colnames(fcasts)[which(colnames(fcasts)=="val.unrounded")] <- "prob"
colnames(fcasts)[which(colnames(fcasts)=="bs.unrounded")] <- "bs"
## Recode "outcome" to binary ("a" = 1; "b" = 0)
fcasts$outcome <- ifelse(fcasts$outcome=="a",1,0)
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## Round all prob values to two places to fix a floating point rounding issue
fcasts$prob <- round(fcasts$prob,2)
## Extract GJP IDs as a vector
gjp.ids <- unique(fcasts$gjp.id)
gjp.ids <- gjp.ids[order(gjp.ids)] #Sort in ascending order

############ Elementary Functions for credibility estimation and results calculation
#############################
## Function for calculating the number of unique elements in a vector ####
n.unique <- function(vector){length(unique(vector))}

## Create
ind.diffs
fcasts <ind.diffs

a data.frame for individual.difference data (here, only used to track n.ifps) ###
<- data.frame(gjp.id=gjp.ids)
fcasts[order(fcasts$gjp.id),]
<- cbind(ind.diffs, n.ifps=as.vector(tapply(fcasts$ifp.id,fcasts$gjp.id,n.unique)))

### BS function for optimization ###
bs.opt <- function(x,outcome){sum((temp.outcomes - ptrans(temp.probs,x))^2)}

### BS function for scoring ###
calc.bs <- function(x,outcome){(x-outcome)^2}

## Function for converting a probability to log-odds
calc.logodds <- function(x){log(x/(1 - x))}

## Extremizing function used to correct for "Regression" towards 50% (see: Baron et al., 2014)
ptrans <- function(p,a){p^a/(p^a + (1 - p)^a)}

## General function for calculating SSE
calc.sse <- function(obj,est){sum((obj-est)^2)}

## Function for calculating reliability (one component of Brier Score decomposition)
calc.rel <- function(probs,outcomes){
probs <- round(probs,2)
#Round probability values to fix
issues with floating point representation
rel.data <- data.frame(prob=probs,outcome=outcomes)
for use with "by()"
rel.data <- rel.data[order(rel.data$prob),]
order

#Arguments structured as data.frame

n <- as.numeric(nrow(rel.data))
fk <- unique(rel.data$prob,2)
nk <- as.vector(by(rel.data$prob, rel.data$prob, length))
with each "bin" (unique forecast value)
obark <- as.vector(by(rel.data$outcome, rel.data$prob, mean))
"bin" (unique forecast value)

#Total number of forecasts
#Vector of unique forecast values
#Number of forecasts associated

rel <- (1/n) * sum((nk * ((fk - obark)^2)))
and baserates across "bins"

#rel.data, sorted in ascending prob

#Baserate associated with each

#Reliability = mean weighted SSE between fcast values

return(rel)
#rm(probs,outcomes,probs.1,probs.0,out.1,out.0,rel.data,n,fk,nk,obark,rel)
}
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## Function for calculating resolution (one component of Brier Score decomposition)
calc.res <- function(probs,outcomes){
res.data <- data.frame(prob=probs,outcome=outcomes)
#Arguments structured as data.frame
for use with "by()"
res.data <- res.data[order(res.data$prob),]
#res.data, sorted in ascending prob
order
n <- nrow(res.data)
nk <- as.vector(by(res.data$prob, res.data$prob, length))
with each "bin" (unique forecast value)
obar <- mean(res.data$outcome)
obark <- as.vector(by(res.data$outcome, res.data$prob, mean))
"bin" (unique forecast value)

res <- (1/n) * sum((nk * ((obark - obar)^2)))
baserates and overall baserates across "bins"

#Total number of forecasts
#Number of forecasts associated
#Overall baserate
#Baserate associated with each

#Resolution = mean weighted SSE between "bin"

return(res)
#rm(probs,outcomes,probs.1,probs.0,out.1,out.0,res.data,n,nk,obar,obark,res)
}

## Function for calculating uncertainty (one component of Brier Score decomposition)
calc.unc <- function(outcomes){
obar <- mean(outcomes)
#Overall baserate for event occurrence
unc <- obar*(1-obar)
return(unc)
#rm(outcomes,obar)
}

############ Function for generating optimized, aggrgegate judgments, given a sample size criterion
##############
gen.agg_gjp <- function(sample.size, method=c("mean","median"), log.odds=TRUE){
## Subset to only those forecasters who addressed a sufficient number of IFPs
keepers <- gjp.ids[which(ind.diffs$n.ifps >= (sample.size + 30))]
#Identify forecasters
with enough data to recalibrate 30+ out of sample judgments
working.data <- subset(fcasts, is.element(fcasts$gjp.id, keepers))
#Subset to only relevant
forecasters
working.data$prob <- ifelse(working.data$prob==0,0.01,working.data$prob) #Adjust extreme values
to prevent (-)Inf, once transformed to log-odds
working.data$prob <- ifelse(working.data$prob==1,0.99,working.data$prob) #Adjust extreme values
to prevent (-)Inf, once transformed to log-odds
working.data <<- working.data
#Save working data to
.GlobalEnv
temp.outcomes <<- as.vector(tapply(working.data$outcome, working.data$ifp.id, mean)) #Save
relevant outcomes to .GlobalEnv
## Aggregate judgments and save to .GolbalEnv
if(method=="mean"){
temp.probs <<- as.vector(tapply(working.data$prob, working.data$ifp.id, mean))
}
if(method=="median"){
temp.probs <<- as.vector(tapply(working.data$prob, working.data$ifp.id, median))
}
## Calculate optimized extremizing coefficient
a <- as.numeric(optimize(bs.opt, interval=c(0,20)))[1]
## Apply extremizing coefficient to simple aggrgeates to calculate optimized aggregate estimates
agg.judge <- ptrans(temp.probs,a)
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## If desired, transform agg.judge to log-odds
if(log.odds){
agg.judge <- calc.logodds(agg.judge)
}
return(agg.judge)
#rm(sample.size,method,log.odds,keepers,working.data,temp.outcomes,temp.probs,a,agg.judge)
}
####################################################################################################
##############

###### Function for credibility-based recalibration and out of sample prediction using GJP Data
##################
oosp_gjp <- function(user.id, sample.size, method=c("mean","median"), log.odds=TRUE, n.resample){
## Load "effsize" package
require(effsize)
## Create an empty data.frame for results
data.out <- data.frame(gjp.id=0,
cal.sample.size=0,
sample
pred.sample.size=0,
(recalibrated) sample
est.alpha=0,
est.beta=0,
est.ser=0,
(consistency)
rmse.pre_lo=0,
before recalibration
rmse.post_lo=0,
after recalibration
rmse.impr=0,

#Unique identifier for each forecaster
#Number of observations in each CF calibration
#Number of observations in the prediction
#Estimated CF intercept (bias)
#Estimated CF slope (expertise)
#Standard error of the CF regression = "xi"
#Root mean squared error (judgements vs. opt.agg),
#Root mean squared error (judgements vs. opt.agg),
#Did recalibration reduce RMSE?

## AJE = Absolute Judgment Error = abs. diff. between judgments and
optimized aggregates
prop.aje.impr=0,

#Proportion of judgments for which recalibration

mean.aje.pre_lo=0,
mean.aje.post_lo=0,
diff.mean.aje_lo=0,

#Mean AJE before recalibration (log-odds)
#Mean AJE after recalibration (log-odds)
#Change in mean AJE as a result of recalibration

mean.aje.pre_p=0,
mean.aje.post_p=0,
diff.mean.aje_p=0,

#Mean AJE before recalibration (prob)
#Mean AJE after recalibration (prob)
#Change in mean AJE as a result of recalibration

mean.aje.impr=0,
median.aje.pre_lo=0,
median.aje.post_lo=0,
diff.median.aje_lo=0,

#Did recalibration reduce mean AJE?
#Median AJE before recalibration (log-odds)
#Median AJE after recalibration (log-odds)
#Change in median AJE as a result of recalibration

median.aje.pre_p=0,
median.aje.post_p=0,
diff.median.aje_p=0,

#Median AJE before recalibration (prob)
#Median AJE after recalibration (prob)
#Change in median AJE as a result of recalibration

reduced AJE

(pre-post; log-odds)

(pre-post; prob)

(pre-post; log-odds)

(pre-post; prob)
median.aje.impr=0,
#Did recalibration reduce median AJE?
coh.d_aje.pre.post_lo=0, #Effect size (cohen's D) of recalibration on AJE
(log-odds)
coh.d_aje.pre.post_p=0,

#Effect size (Cohen's D) of recalibration on AJE

mean.diff.aje_lo=0,

#Mean pairwise change in AJE as a result of

median.diff.aje_lo=0,

#Median pairwise change in AJE as a result of

mean.diff.aje_p=0,

#Mean pairwise change in AJE as a result of

(prob)
recalibration (log-odds)
recalibration (log-odds)
recalibration (prob)
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median.diff.aje_p=0,

#Mean pairwise change in AJE as a result of

recalibration (prob)
## ALE = Absolute Linear Error = abs. diff between judgments and observed
outcomes
prop.ale.impr=0,
above, but for ALE (vs. AJE)
mean.ale.pre=0,
mean.ale.post=0,
diff.mean.ale=0,
mean.ale.impr=0,
median.ale.pre=0,
median.ale.post=0,
diff.median.ale=0,
median.ale.impr=0,
coh.d_ale.pre.post=0,
mean.diff.ale=0,
median.diff.ale=0,

#All measures in this section as similar to those

## BS = Brier Score = squared difference between judgments and observed
outcomes
prop.bs.impr=0,

#All measures in this section as similar to those

above, but for BS
mean.bs.pre=0,
mean.bs.post=0,
diff.mean.bs=0,
mean.bs.impr=0,
median.bs.pre=0,
median.bs.post=0,
diff.median.bs=0,
median.bs.impr=0,
coh.d_bs.pre.post=0,
mean.diff.bs=0,
median.diff.bs=0,
## Brier score decomposition: REL = reliability; RES = resolution
rel.pre=0,
rel.post=0,
diff.rel=0,
rel.impr=0,
res.pre=0,
res.post=0,
diff.res=0,
res.impr=0,
uncertainty=0)

## Generate optimized aggregates
agg <- gen.agg_gjp(sample.size,method,log.odds)
agg_ifp.ids <- as.vector(tapply(working.data$ifp.id, working.data$ifp.id, mean)) #Identify IFPs
for which there exists an optimized aggregate
## Prepare individual forecaster's data
user.data <- subset(working.data, gjp.id==user.id)
user.data <- user.data[order(user.data$ifp.id),]
user.data$prob <- ifelse(user.data$prob==0,0.01,user.data$prob)
(-)Inf, once transformed to log-odds
user.data$prob <- ifelse(user.data$prob==1,0.99,user.data$prob)
(-)Inf, once transformed to log-odds
user.ifps <- unique(user.data$ifp.id)
responded to

#Subset to individual ("user")
#Sort user.obs by ifp.id
#Adjust extreme values to prevent
#Adjust extreme values to prevent
#Generate list of ifps that user

agg_user.matched.sample <- agg[which(is.element(agg_ifp.ids,user.ifps))]
#Select matching optimized aggregates
outcomes_user.matched.sample <- as.vector(tapply(user.data$outcome, user.data$ifp.id, mean))
#select matching outcomes
## Calculate mean or median individual judgments for each ifp
if(method=="mean"){

292

user.obs <- as.vector(tapply(user.data$prob, user.data$ifp.id, mean))
user.obs <- calc.logodds(user.obs)
}
if(method=="median"){
user.obs <- as.vector(tapply(user.data$prob, user.data$ifp.id, median))
user.obs <- calc.logodds(user.obs)
}
## Fit credibility function, and conduct recalibration n.resample times for each individual
i <- 1
#Resample index
flag <- FALSE #Skip indicator for unusable loop iterations
while(i <= n.resample){
# set/reset flag
flag <- FALSE
# Split data into calibration sample and prediction sample
cal.sample.indices <- sample.int(length(user.obs), sample.size, replace=FALSE)
pred.sample.indices <- setdiff(c(1:length(user.obs)), cal.sample.indices)
user.obs_cal.sample <- user.obs[cal.sample.indices]
user.obs_pred.sample <- user.obs[pred.sample.indices]
agg_cal.sample <- agg_user.matched.sample[cal.sample.indices]
agg_pred.sample <- agg_user.matched.sample[pred.sample.indices]
outcomes_cal.sample <- outcomes_user.matched.sample[cal.sample.indices]
outcomes_pred.sample <- outcomes_user.matched.sample[pred.sample.indices]

# Estimate credibility function (re-fit on a new calibration sample each iteration)
cf <- lm(agg_cal.sample ~ user.obs_cal.sample)
# Check for inestimable credibility functions, and re-set loop if necessary
if(is.na(cf$coeff[1]) | is.na(cf$coeff[2])){
flag <- TRUE
i <- i-1
}
# If CF is usable, calculate effects of recalibration
if(!(flag)){
#Apply CF to prediction sample
corrected <- (user.obs_pred.sample * cf$coeff[2]) + cf$coeff[1]

#Calculate RMSE outcomes
rmse.pre_lo <sqrt((calc.sse(agg_pred.sample,user.obs_pred.sample)/length(user.obs_pred.sample)))
rmse.post_lo <- sqrt((calc.sse(agg_pred.sample,corrected)/length(corrected)))
rmse.impr <- ifelse(rmse.post_lo < rmse.pre_lo, 1, 0)

#Calculate AJE outcomes
aje.pre_lo <- abs(agg_pred.sample - user.obs_pred.sample)
errors, before recalibration (log-odds)
aje.post_lo <- abs(agg_pred.sample - corrected)
errors, after recalibration (log-odds)
aje.pre_p <- abs(plogis(agg_pred.sample) - plogis(user.obs_pred.sample))
errors, before recalibration (prob)
aje.post_p <- abs(plogis(agg_pred.sample) - plogis(corrected))
errors, after recalibration (prob)
diffs.aje_lo <- aje.pre_lo - aje.post_lo
(log-odds)
diffs.aje_p <- aje.pre_p - aje.post_p
(prob)
prop.aje.impr <- mean(ifelse(diffs.aje_lo > 0,1,0))
for which recalibration reduced AJE

#Abs. judgment
#Abs. judgment
#Abs. judgment
#Abs. judgment
#Changes in AJE
#Changes in AJE

#Proportion of judgments
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mean.aje.pre_lo <- mean(aje.pre_lo)
recalibration (log-odds)
mean.aje.post_lo <- mean(aje.post_lo)
recalibration (log-odds)
diff.mean.aje_lo <- mean.aje.pre_lo - mean.aje.post_lo
result of recalibration (pre-post; log-odds)
mean.aje.pre_p <- mean(aje.pre_p)
recalibration (prob)
mean.aje.post_p <- mean(aje.post_p)
recalibration (prob)
diff.mean.aje_p <- mean.aje.pre_p - mean.aje.post_p
result of recalibration (pre-post; prob)
mean.aje.impr <- ifelse(diff.mean.aje_lo > 0,1,0)
mean AJE?
median.aje.pre_lo <- median(aje.pre_lo)
recalibration (log-odds)
median.aje.post_lo <- median(aje.post_lo)
recalibration (log-odds)
diff.median.aje_lo <- median.aje.pre_lo - median.aje.post_lo
a result of recalibration (pre-post; log-odds)
median.aje.pre_p <- median(aje.pre_p)
recalibration (prob)
median.aje.post_p <- median(aje.post_p)
recalibration (prob)
diff.median.aje_p <- median.aje.pre_p - median.aje.post_p
a result of recalibration (pre-post; prob)
median.aje.impr <- ifelse(diff.median.aje_lo > 0,1,0)
median AJE?
coh.d_aje.pre.post_lo <- cohen.d(aje.pre_lo, aje.post_lo, paired=T)
of recalibration on AJE (log-odds)
coh.d_aje.pre.post_lo <- as.numeric(coh.d_aje.pre.post_lo$estimate)
only
coh.d_aje.pre.post_p <- cohen.d(aje.pre_p, aje.post_p, paired=T)
of recalibration on AJE (prob)
coh.d_aje.pre.post_p <- as.numeric(coh.d_aje.pre.post_p$estimate)
only
mean.diff.aje_lo <- mean(diffs.aje_lo)
AJE as a result of recalibration (log-odds)
median.diff.aje_lo <- median(diffs.aje_lo)
in AJE as a result of recalibration (log-odds)
mean.diff.aje_p <- mean(diffs.aje_p)
AJE as a result of recalibration (prob)
median.diff.aje_p <- median(diffs.aje_p)
AJE as a result of recalibration (prob)

#Calculate ALE outcomes
ale.pre <- abs(outcomes_pred.sample - plogis(user.obs_pred.sample))
before recalibration (prob)
ale.post <- abs(outcomes_pred.sample - plogis(corrected))
after recalibration (prob)
diffs.ale <- ale.pre - ale.post

#Mean AJE before
#Mean AJE after
#Change in mean AJE as a
#Mean AJE before
#Mean AJE after
#Change in mean AJE as a
#Did recalibration reduce
#Median AJE before
#Median AJE after
#Change in median AJE as
#Median AJE before
#Median AJE after
#Change in median AJE as
#Did recalibration reduce
#Effect size (cohen's D)
#Extract estimate of D
#Effect size (Cohen's D)
#Extract estimate of D
#Mean pairwise change in
#Median pairwise change
#Mean pairwise change in
#Mean pairwise change in

#Abs. linear errors,
#Abs. linear errors,
#Changes in ALE (prob)

prop.ale.impr <- mean(ifelse(diffs.ale > 0,1,0))
#All measures in this
section as similar to those above, but for ALE (vs. AJE)
mean.ale.pre <- mean(ale.pre)
mean.ale.post <- mean(ale.post)
diff.mean.ale <- mean.ale.pre - mean.ale.post
mean.ale.impr <- ifelse(diff.mean.ale > 0,1,0)
median.ale.pre <- median(ale.pre)
median.ale.post <- median(ale.post)
diff.median.ale <- median.ale.pre - median.ale.post
median.ale.impr <- ifelse(diff.median.ale > 0,1,0)
coh.d_ale.pre.post <- cohen.d(ale.pre, ale.post, paired=T)
coh.d_ale.pre.post <- as.numeric(coh.d_ale.pre.post$estimate) #Extract estimate of D only
mean.diff.ale <- mean(diffs.ale)
median.diff.ale <- median(diffs.ale)
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#Calculate BS stats
bs.pre <- calc.bs(plogis(user.obs_pred.sample), outcomes_pred.sample)
bs.post <- calc.bs(plogis(corrected), outcomes_pred.sample)
diffs.bs <- bs.pre - bs.post
prop.bs.impr <- mean(ifelse(diffs.bs > 0,1,0))
section as similar to those above, but for BS
mean.bs.pre <- mean(bs.pre)
mean.bs.post <- mean(bs.post)
diff.mean.bs <- mean.bs.pre - mean.bs.post
mean.bs.impr <- ifelse(diff.mean.bs > 0,1,0)
median.bs.pre <- median(bs.pre)
median.bs.post <- median(bs.post)
diff.median.bs <- median.bs.pre - median.bs.post
median.bs.impr <- ifelse(diff.median.bs > 0,1,0)
coh.d_bs.pre.post <- cohen.d(bs.pre, bs.post, paired=T)
coh.d_bs.pre.post <- as.numeric(coh.d_bs.pre.post$estimate)
mean.diff.bs <- mean(diffs.bs)
median.diff.bs <- median(diffs.bs)

#All measures in this

#Extract estimate of D only

#Calculate Brier Score Decomposition Stats
rel.pre <- calc.rel(plogis(user.obs_pred.sample), outcomes_pred.sample)
rel.post <- calc.rel(plogis(corrected), outcomes_pred.sample)
diff.rel <- rel.pre - rel.post
rel.impr <- ifelse(diff.rel > 0,1,0)
#Smaller reliabilities indicate better performance
res.pre <- calc.res(plogis(user.obs_pred.sample), outcomes_pred.sample)
res.post <- calc.res(plogis(corrected), outcomes_pred.sample)
diff.res <- res.pre - res.post
res.impr <- ifelse(diff.res < 0,1,0)
#Larger reliabilities indiciate better performance
uncertainty <- calc.unc(outcomes_pred.sample)

## Compile output into a new row and add to data.out
newrow <- data.frame(gjp.id=user.id,
cal.sample.size=sample.size,
pred.sample.size=length(user.obs_pred.sample),
est.alpha=cf$coeff[1],
est.beta=cf$coeff[2],
est.ser=summary(cf)$sigma,
rmse.pre_lo=rmse.pre_lo,
rmse.post_lo=rmse.post_lo,
rmse.impr=rmse.impr,
prop.aje.impr=prop.aje.impr,
mean.aje.pre_lo=mean.aje.pre_lo,
mean.aje.post_lo=mean.aje.post_lo,
diff.mean.aje_lo=diff.mean.aje_lo,
mean.aje.pre_p=mean.aje.pre_p,
mean.aje.post_p=mean.aje.post_p,
diff.mean.aje_p=diff.mean.aje_p,
mean.aje.impr=mean.aje.impr,
median.aje.pre_lo=median.aje.pre_lo,
median.aje.post_lo=median.aje.post_lo,
diff.median.aje_lo=diff.median.aje_lo,
median.aje.pre_p=median.aje.pre_p,
median.aje.post_p=median.aje.post_p,
diff.median.aje_p=diff.median.aje_p,
median.aje.impr=median.aje.impr,
coh.d_aje.pre.post_lo=coh.d_aje.pre.post_lo,
coh.d_aje.pre.post_p=coh.d_aje.pre.post_p,
mean.diff.aje_lo=mean.diff.aje_lo,
median.diff.aje_lo=median.diff.aje_lo,
mean.diff.aje_p=mean.diff.aje_p,
median.diff.aje_p=median.diff.aje_p,
prop.ale.impr=prop.ale.impr,
mean.ale.pre=mean.ale.pre,
mean.ale.post=mean.ale.post,
diff.mean.ale=diff.mean.ale,
mean.ale.impr=mean.ale.impr,
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median.ale.pre=median.ale.pre,
median.ale.post=median.ale.post,
diff.median.ale=diff.median.ale,
median.ale.impr=median.ale.impr,
coh.d_ale.pre.post=coh.d_ale.pre.post,
mean.diff.ale=mean.diff.ale,
median.diff.ale=median.diff.ale,
prop.bs.impr=prop.bs.impr,
mean.bs.pre=mean.bs.pre,
mean.bs.post=mean.bs.post,
diff.mean.bs=diff.mean.bs,
mean.bs.impr=mean.bs.impr,
median.bs.pre=median.bs.pre,
median.bs.post=median.bs.post,
diff.median.bs=diff.median.bs,
median.bs.impr=median.bs.impr,
coh.d_bs.pre.post=coh.d_bs.pre.post,
mean.diff.bs=mean.diff.bs,
median.diff.bs=median.diff.bs,
rel.pre=rel.pre,
rel.post=rel.post,
diff.rel=diff.rel,
rel.impr=rel.impr,
res.pre=res.pre,
res.post=res.post,
diff.res=diff.res,
res.impr=res.impr,
uncertainty=uncertainty)

data.out <- rbind(data.out,newrow)
}
i <- i+1
}
## Clean-up and Return Results
data.out <- data.out[-1,]
rownames(data.out) <- seq.int(1:nrow(data.out))
data.out

#Remove dummy first row of data.out
#As a general precaution, reset rownames of

return(data.out)

#rm(user.id,sample.size,method,log.odds,n.reample,agg,agg_ifp.ids,user.data,user.ifps,agg_user.match
ed.sample,
#outcomes_user.matched.sample,user.obs,i,flag,cal.sample.indices,pred.sample.indices,user.obs_cal.sa
mple,
#user.obs_pred.sample,agg_cal.sample,agg_pred.sample,outcomes_cal.sample,outcomes_pred.sample,cf,cor
rected,
#data.out,rmse.pre_lo,rmse.post_lo,rmse.impr,aje.pre_lo,aje.post_lo,aje.pre_p,aje.post_p,diffs.aje_l
o,
#diffs.aje_p,prop.aje.impr,mean.aje.pre_lo,mean.aje.post_lo,diff.mean.aje_lo,mean.aje.pre_p,mean.aje
.post_p,
#diff.mean.aje_p,mean.aje.impr,median.aje.pre_lo,median.aje.post_lo,diff.median.aje_lo,median.aje.pr
e_p,
#median.aje.post_p,diff.median.aje_p,median.aje.impr,coh.d_aje.pre.post_lo,coh.d_aje.pre.post_p,mean
.diff.aje_lo,
#median.diff.aje_lo,mean.diff.aje_p,median.diff.aje_p,ale.pre,ale.post,diffs.ale,prop.ale.impr,mean.
ale.pre,
#mean.ale.post,diff.mean.ale,mean.ale.impr,median.ale.pre,median.ale.post,diff.median.ale,median.ale
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.impr,
#coh.d_ale.pre.post,mean.diff.ale,median.diff.ale,bs.pre,bs.post,diffs.bs,prop.bs.impr,mean.bs.pre,m
ean.bs.post,
#diff.mean.bs,mean.bs.impr,median.bs.pre,median.bs.post,diff.median.bs,median.bs.impr,coh.d_bs.pre.p
ost,
#mean.diff.bs,median.diff.bs,rel.pre,rel.post,diff.rel,rel.impr,res.pre,res.post,diff.res,res.impr,u
ncertainty)
}
####################################################################################################
##############

##### Function to run oosp_gjp for all eligible forecasters, given a desired sample.size
#########################
run.oosp_gjp <- function(sample.size, method=c("mean","median"), log.odds=TRUE, n.resample){
data.out <- data.frame(gjp.id=0,
# AOS = average over samples; MOS = median
over samples
cal.sample.size=0,
# Both refer to summary stats over each
forecaster's 100 resamples
pred.sample.size=0,
aos.alpha=0,
mos.alpha=0,
sd.alpha=0,
aos.beta=0,
mos.beta=0,
sd.beta=0,
aos.xi=0,
mos.xi=0,
sd.xi=0,
prop.samp.rmse.impr=0,
aos.prop.aje.impr=0,
aos.mean.aje.pre_lo=0,
aos.mean.aje.post_lo=0,
aos.diff.mean.aje_lo=0,
aos.mean.aje.pre_p=0,
aos.mean.aje.post_p=0,
aos.diff.mean.aje_p=0,
prop.samp.mean.aje.impr=0,
aos.median.aje.pre_lo=0,
aos.median.aje.post_lo=0,
aos.diff.median.aje_lo=0,
aos.median.aje.pre_p=0,
aos.median.aje.post_p=0,
aos.diff.median.aje_p=0,
prop.samp.median.aje.impr=0,
aos.coh.d_aje.pre.post_lo=0,
aos.coh.d_aje.pre.post_p=0,
aos.mean.diff.aje_lo=0,
aos.median.diff.aje_lo=0,
aos.mean.diff.aje_p=0,
aos.median.diff.aje_p=0,
aos.prop.ale.impr=0,
aos.mean.ale.pre=0,
aos.mean.ale.post=0,
aos.diff.mean.ale=0,
prop.samp.mean.ale.impr=0,
aos.median.ale.pre=0,
aos.median.ale.post=0,
aos.diff.median.ale=0,
prop.samp.median.ale.impr=0,
aos.coh.d_ale.pre.post=0,
aos.mean.diff.ale=0,
aos.median.diff.ale=0,
aos.prop.bs.impr=0,
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aos.mean.bs.pre=0,
aos.mean.bs.post=0,
aos.diff.mean.bs=0,
prop.samp.mean.bs.impr=0,
aos.median.bs.pre=0,
aos.median.bs.post=0,
aos.diff.median.bs=0,
prop.samp.median.bs.impr=0,
aos.coh.d_bs.pre.post=0,
aos.mean.diff.bs=0,
aos.median.diff.bs=0,
aos.rel.pre=0,
aos.rel.post=0,
aos.diff.rel=0,
prop.samp.rel.impr=0,
aos.res.pre=0,
aos.res.post=0,
aos.diff.res=0,
prop.samp.res.impr=0,
aos.uncertainty=0,
mos.prop.aje.impr=0,
mos.mean.aje.pre_lo=0,
mos.mean.aje.post_lo=0,
mos.diff.mean.aje_lo=0,
mos.mean.aje.pre_p=0,
mos.mean.aje.post_p=0,
mos.diff.mean.aje_p=0,
mos.median.aje.pre_lo=0,
mos.median.aje.post_lo=0,
mos.diff.median.aje_lo=0,
mos.median.aje.pre_p=0,
mos.median.aje.post_p=0,
mos.diff.median.aje_p=0,
mos.coh.d_aje.pre.post_lo=0,
mos.coh.d_aje.pre.post_p=0,
mos.mean.diff.aje_lo=0,
mos.median.diff.aje_lo=0,
mos.mean.diff.aje_p=0,
mos.median.diff.aje_p=0,
mos.prop.ale.impr=0,
mos.mean.ale.pre=0,
mos.mean.ale.post=0,
mos.diff.mean.ale=0,
mos.median.ale.pre=0,
mos.median.ale.post=0,
mos.diff.median.ale=0,
mos.coh.d_ale.pre.post=0,
mos.mean.diff.ale=0,
mos.median.diff.ale=0,
mos.prop.bs.impr=0,
mos.mean.bs.pre=0,
mos.mean.bs.post=0,
mos.diff.mean.bs=0,
mos.median.bs.pre=0,
mos.median.bs.post=0,
mos.diff.median.bs=0,
mos.coh.d_bs.pre.post=0,
mos.mean.diff.bs=0,
mos.median.diff.bs=0,
mos.rel.pre=0,
mos.rel.post=0,
mos.diff.rel=0,
mos.res.pre=0,
mos.res.post=0,
mos.diff.res=0,
mos.uncertainty=0)

## Subset to only those forecasters with enough data to recalibrate 30+ out of sample predictions
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keepers <- gjp.ids[which(ind.diffs$n.ifps >= (sample.size + 30))]
## Run oosp_gjp for each forecaster in keepers
n <- 1
while(n <= length(keepers)){
temp <- oosp_gjp(user.id=keepers[n],sample.size,method,log.odds,n.resample)
## Compile data in a new row and add to data.out
newrow <- data.frame(gjp.id=temp$gjp.id[1],
cal.sample.size=temp$cal.sample.size[1],
pred.sample.size=temp$pred.sample.size[1],
aos.alpha=mean(temp$est.alpha),
mos.alpha=median(temp$est.alpha),
sd.alpha=sd(temp$est.alpha),
aos.beta=mean(temp$est.beta),
mos.beta=median(temp$est.beta),
sd.beta=sd(temp$est.beta),
aos.xi=mean(temp$est.ser),
mos.xi=median(temp$est.ser),
sd.xi=sd(temp$est.ser),
prop.samp.rmse.impr=mean(temp$rmse.impr),
aos.prop.aje.impr=mean(temp$prop.aje.impr),
aos.mean.aje.pre_lo=mean(temp$mean.aje.pre_lo),
aos.mean.aje.post_lo=mean(temp$mean.aje.post_lo),
aos.diff.mean.aje_lo=mean(temp$diff.mean.aje_lo),
aos.mean.aje.pre_p=mean(temp$mean.aje.pre_p),
aos.mean.aje.post_p=mean(temp$mean.aje.post_p),
aos.diff.mean.aje_p=mean(temp$diff.mean.aje_p),
prop.samp.mean.aje.impr=mean(temp$mean.aje.impr),
aos.median.aje.pre_lo=mean(temp$median.aje.pre_lo),
aos.median.aje.post_lo=mean(temp$median.aje.post_lo),
aos.diff.median.aje_lo=mean(temp$diff.median.aje_lo),
aos.median.aje.pre_p=mean(temp$median.aje.pre_p),
aos.median.aje.post_p=mean(temp$median.aje.post_p),
aos.diff.median.aje_p=mean(temp$diff.median.aje_p),
prop.samp.median.aje.impr=mean(temp$median.aje.impr),
aos.coh.d_aje.pre.post_lo=mean(temp$coh.d_aje.pre.post_lo),
aos.coh.d_aje.pre.post_p=mean(temp$coh.d_aje.pre.post_p),
aos.mean.diff.aje_lo=mean(temp$mean.diff.aje_lo),
aos.median.diff.aje_lo=mean(temp$median.diff.aje_lo),
aos.mean.diff.aje_p=mean(temp$mean.diff.aje_p),
aos.median.diff.aje_p=mean(temp$median.diff.aje_p),
aos.prop.ale.impr=mean(temp$prop.ale.impr),
aos.mean.ale.pre=mean(temp$mean.ale.pre),
aos.mean.ale.post=mean(temp$mean.ale.post),
aos.diff.mean.ale=mean(temp$diff.mean.ale),
prop.samp.mean.ale.impr=mean(temp$mean.ale.impr),
aos.median.ale.pre=mean(temp$median.ale.pre),
aos.median.ale.post=mean(temp$median.ale.post),
aos.diff.median.ale=mean(temp$diff.median.ale),
prop.samp.median.ale.impr=mean(temp$median.ale.impr),
aos.coh.d_ale.pre.post=mean(temp$coh.d_ale.pre.post),
aos.mean.diff.ale=mean(temp$mean.diff.ale),
aos.median.diff.ale=mean(temp$median.diff.ale),
aos.prop.bs.impr=mean(temp$prop.bs.impr),
aos.mean.bs.pre=mean(temp$mean.bs.pre),
aos.mean.bs.post=mean(temp$mean.bs.post),
aos.diff.mean.bs=mean(temp$diff.mean.bs),
prop.samp.mean.bs.impr=mean(temp$mean.bs.impr),
aos.median.bs.pre=mean(temp$median.bs.pre),
aos.median.bs.post=mean(temp$median.bs.post),
aos.diff.median.bs=mean(temp$diff.median.bs),
prop.samp.median.bs.impr=mean(temp$median.bs.impr),
aos.coh.d_bs.pre.post=mean(temp$coh.d_bs.pre.post),
aos.mean.diff.bs=mean(temp$mean.diff.bs),
aos.median.diff.bs=mean(temp$median.diff.bs),
aos.rel.pre=mean(temp$rel.pre),
aos.rel.post=mean(temp$rel.post),
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aos.diff.rel=mean(temp$diff.rel),
prop.samp.rel.impr=mean(temp$rel.impr),
aos.res.pre=mean(temp$res.pre),
aos.res.post=mean(temp$res.post),
aos.diff.res=mean(temp$diff.res),
prop.samp.res.impr=mean(temp$res.impr),
aos.uncertainty=mean(temp$uncertainty),
mos.prop.aje.impr=median(temp$prop.aje.impr),
mos.mean.aje.pre_lo=median(temp$mean.aje.pre_lo),
mos.mean.aje.post_lo=median(temp$mean.aje.post_lo),
mos.diff.mean.aje_lo=median(temp$diff.mean.aje_lo),
mos.mean.aje.pre_p=median(temp$mean.aje.pre_p),
mos.mean.aje.post_p=median(temp$mean.aje.post_p),
mos.diff.mean.aje_p=median(temp$diff.mean.aje_p),
mos.median.aje.pre_lo=median(temp$median.aje.pre_lo),
mos.median.aje.post_lo=median(temp$median.aje.post_lo),
mos.diff.median.aje_lo=median(temp$diff.median.aje_lo),
mos.median.aje.pre_p=median(temp$median.aje.pre_p),
mos.median.aje.post_p=median(temp$median.aje.post_p),
mos.diff.median.aje_p=median(temp$diff.median.aje_p),
mos.coh.d_aje.pre.post_lo=median(temp$coh.d_aje.pre.post_lo),
mos.coh.d_aje.pre.post_p=median(temp$coh.d_aje.pre.post_p),
mos.mean.diff.aje_lo=median(temp$mean.diff.aje_lo),
mos.median.diff.aje_lo=median(temp$median.diff.aje_lo),
mos.mean.diff.aje_p=median(temp$mean.diff.aje_p),
mos.median.diff.aje_p=median(temp$median.diff.aje_p),
mos.prop.ale.impr=median(temp$prop.ale.impr),
mos.mean.ale.pre=median(temp$mean.ale.pre),
mos.mean.ale.post=median(temp$mean.ale.post),
mos.diff.mean.ale=median(temp$diff.mean.ale),
mos.median.ale.pre=median(temp$median.ale.pre),
mos.median.ale.post=median(temp$median.ale.post),
mos.diff.median.ale=median(temp$diff.median.ale),
mos.coh.d_ale.pre.post=median(temp$coh.d_ale.pre.post),
mos.mean.diff.ale=median(temp$mean.diff.ale),
mos.median.diff.ale=median(temp$median.diff.ale),
mos.prop.bs.impr=median(temp$prop.bs.impr),
mos.mean.bs.pre=median(temp$mean.bs.pre),
mos.mean.bs.post=median(temp$mean.bs.post),
mos.diff.mean.bs=median(temp$diff.mean.bs),
mos.median.bs.pre=median(temp$median.bs.pre),
mos.median.bs.post=median(temp$median.bs.post),
mos.diff.median.bs=median(temp$diff.median.bs),
mos.coh.d_bs.pre.post=median(temp$coh.d_bs.pre.post),
mos.mean.diff.bs=median(temp$mean.diff.bs),
mos.median.diff.bs=median(temp$median.diff.bs),
mos.rel.pre=median(temp$rel.pre),
mos.rel.post=median(temp$rel.post),
mos.diff.rel=median(temp$diff.rel),
mos.res.pre=median(temp$res.pre),
mos.res.post=median(temp$res.post),
mos.diff.res=median(temp$diff.res),
mos.uncertainty=median(temp$uncertainty))
data.out <- rbind(data.out,newrow)
n <- n+1
}
data.out <- data.out[-1,]
return(data.out)
#rm(sample.size,method,log.odds,n.resample,data.out,keepers,n,temp,newrow)
}
####################################################################################################
##############
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##### Run run.oosp_gjp for 20, 30,40,50,60,70,80,90,100 data points
##############################################
set.seed(826)
recal_20 <- run.oosp_gjp(20,method="mean",log.odds=TRUE,n.resample=100)
set.seed(826)
recal_30 <- run.oosp_gjp(30,method="mean",log.odds=TRUE,n.resample=100)
set.seed(826)
recal_40 <- run.oosp_gjp(40,method="mean",log.odds=TRUE,n.resample=100)
set.seed(826)
recal_50 <- run.oosp_gjp(50,method="mean",log.odds=TRUE,n.resample=100)

##### Write recalibration results to CSVs
########################################################################
write.csv(recal_20, "recal_20.csv", row.names=F)
write.csv(recal_30, "recal_30.csv", row.names=F)
write.csv(recal_40, "recal_40.csv", row.names=F)
write.csv(recal_50, "recal_50.csv", row.names=F)

####################################################################################################
##############

####################################################################################################
#############
#
EFFECTS OF CREDIBILITY-BASED RECALIBRATION
#
####################################################################################################
#############

############ Effects of recalibration on prop.samp.rmse.impr
####################################################
#### Q: In what proportion of samples did recalibration reduce RMSE (judgments vs. "truth")?
## Descriptive Stats (across "forecasters")
mean(recal_50$prop.samp.rmse.impr)
#mean = 0.9605 = 96.05%
sd(recal_50$prop.samp.rmse.impr)
#sd = 0.0745 = 7.45%
median(recal_50$prop.samp.rmse.impr)
#med = 0.99 = 99%
range(recal_50$prop.samp.rmse.impr)
#range = [0.32,1] = [32%, 100%]

## Visualization of Distribution (each observation is an individual "forecaster")
hist(recal_50$prop.samp.rmse.impr, xlim=c(0,1), breaks=50,
main="Prop. of Samples in which Recalibration Improved RMSE\n(Prop. Across Each Forecaster\'s
100 Resamples)",
xlab="Proportion of Resamples")
abline(v=0.5, col="red", lty=2, lwd=2)

## Hypothesis Tests
mean(ifelse(recal_50$prop.samp.rmse.impr > 0.5, 1, 0))
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#Mass of dist. > 0.5 = 0.9987 = 99.87%
wilcox.test(recal_50$prop.samp.rmse.impr - 0.5)
#Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test: V = 284620, p < 0.001***
####################################################################################################
##############

############ Effects of recalibration on aos.prop.aje.impr
#######################################################
#### Q: On average, what proportion of judgments saw reduced AJE as a result of recalibration?
## Descriptive Stats (across "forecasters")
mean(recal_50$aos.prop.aje.impr)
#mean = 0.6850 = 68.50%
sd(recal_50$aos.prop.aje.impr)
#sd = 0.0545 = 5.45%
median(recal_50$aos.prop.aje.impr)
#med = 0.6871 = 68.71%
range(recal_50$aos.prop.aje.impr)
#range = [0.4671,0.8164] = [46.71%, 81.64%]

## Visualization of Distribution (each observation is an individual "forecaster")
hist(recal_50$aos.prop.aje.impr, xlim=c(0,1), breaks=50,
main="Avg. Prop. of Judgments for which Recalibration Improved AJE\n(Prop. Across Each
Forecaster\'s 100 Resamples)",
xlab="Proportion of Judgments")
abline(v=0.5, col="red", lty=2, lwd=2)

## Hypothesis Tests
mean(ifelse(recal_50$aos.prop.aje.impr > 0.5, 1, 0))
#Mass of dist. > 0.5 = 0.9973 = 99.73%
wilcox.test(recal_50$aos.prop.aje.impr - 0.5)
#Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test: V = 284620, p < 0.001***
####################################################################################################
##############

############ Effects of recalibration on aos.diff.mean.aje_lo
####################################################
#### Q: What was the average change in mean AJE (log-odds) as result of recalibration?
#### Note: differences calculated as err.pre - err.post --> positive values indicate reduction in
error
## Descriptive Stats (across "forecasters")
mean(recal_50$aos.diff.mean.aje_lo)
#mean = 0.5439
sd(recal_50$aos.diff.mean.aje_lo)
#sd = 0.3347
median(recal_50$aos.diff.mean.aje_lo)
#med = 0.4939
range(recal_50$aos.diff.mean.aje_lo)
#range = [-0.0564,2.5436]
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## Visualization of Distribution (each observation is an individual "forecaster")
hist(recal_50$aos.diff.mean.aje_lo, xlim=c(-1,3), breaks=50,
main="Avg. Change in Mean AJE due to Recalibration (Pre - Post)\n(Avg. Across Each
Forecaster\'s 100 Resamples)",
xlab="Average Difference (log-odds)")
abline(v=0, col="red", lty=2, lwd=2)

## Hypothesis Tests
mean(ifelse(recal_50$aos.diff.mean.aje_lo > 0, 1, 0))
#Mass of dist. > 0 = 0.9894 = 98.94%
wilcox.test(recal_50$aos.diff.mean.aje_lo)
#Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test: V = 284540, p < 0.001***
####################################################################################################
##############

############ Effects of recalibration on aos.diff.mean.aje_p
#####################################################
#### Q: What was the average change in mean AJE (prob) as result of recalibration?
#### Note: differences calculated as err.pre - err.post --> positive values indicate reduction in
error
## Descriptive Stats (across "forecasters")
mean(recal_50$aos.diff.mean.aje_p)
#mean = 0.0684 = 6.84%
sd(recal_50$aos.diff.mean.aje_p)
#sd = 0.0500 = 5.00%
median(recal_50$aos.diff.mean.aje_p)
#med = 0.0584 = 5.84%
range(recal_50$aos.diff.mean.aje_p)
#range = [-0.0132,0.2898] = [-1.32%, 28.98%]

## Visualization of Distribution (each observation is an individual "forecaster")
hist(recal_50$aos.diff.mean.aje_p, xlim=c(-0.4,0.4), breaks=50,
main="Avg. Change in Mean AJE due to Recalibration (Pre - Post)\n(Avg. Across Each
Forecaster\'s 100 Resamples)",
xlab="Average Difference (Prob. Scale)")
abline(v=0, col="red", lty=2, lwd=2)

## Hypothesis Tests
mean(ifelse(recal_50$aos.diff.mean.aje_p > 0, 1, 0))
#Mass of dist. > 0 = 0.9801 = 98.01%
wilcox.test(recal_50$aos.diff.mean.aje_p)
#Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test: V = 284360, p < 0.001***

## Visualization of Mean AJE (prob) Pre vs. Post (each observation is an individual "forecaster")
hist(recal_50$aos.mean.aje.pre_p, xlim=c(0,0.6), ylim=c(0,50), breaks=50, col=rgb(1,0,0,1/4),
main="Mean AJE, Before and After Recalibration\n(Avg. Across Each Forecaster\'s 100
Resamples)",
xlab="Mean AJE (Probability Scale)")
hist(recal_50$aos.mean.aje.post_p, ylim=c(0,50), xlim=c(0,0.6), breaks=50, col=rgb(0,0,1,1/4),
add=T)
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legend(x=0.4,y=45,legend=c("Before Recalibration","After Recalibration"),
col=c(rgb(1,0,0,1/4),rgb(0,0,1,1/4)),
lwd=2, lty=1)
####################################################################################################
##############

############ Effects of recalibration on prop.samp.mean.aje.impr
#################################################
#### Q: In what proportion of samples did recalibration reduce mean AJE (judgments vs. "truth")?
## Descriptive Stats (across "forecasters")
mean(recal_50$prop.samp.mean.aje.impr)
#mean = 0.9803 = 98.03%
sd(recal_50$prop.samp.mean.aje.impr)
#sd = 0.0685 = 6.85%
median(recal_50$prop.samp.mean.aje.impr)
#med = 1 = 100%
range(recal_50$prop.samp.mean.aje.impr)
#range = [0.35,1] = [35%, 100%]

## Visualization of Distribution (each observation is an individual "forecaster")
hist(recal_50$prop.samp.mean.aje.impr, xlim=c(0,1), breaks=50,
main="Prop. of Samples in which Recalibration Improved Mean AJE\n(Prop. Across Each
Forecaster\'s 100 Resamples)",
xlab="Proportion of Resamples")
abline(v=0.5, col="red", lty=2, lwd=2)

## Hypothesis Tests
mean(ifelse(recal_50$prop.samp.mean.aje.impr > 0.5, 1, 0))
#Mass of dist. > 0.5 = 0.9934 = 99.34%
wilcox.test(recal_50$prop.samp.mean.aje.impr - 0.5)
#Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test: V = 283110, p < 0.001***
####################################################################################################
##############

############ Effects of recalibration on aos.diff.median.aje_lo
##################################################
#### Q: What was the average change in Median AJE (log-odds) as result of recalibration?
#### Note: differences calculated as err.pre - err.post --> positive values indicate reduction in
error
## Descriptive Stats (across "forecasters")
mean(recal_50$aos.diff.median.aje_lo)
#mean = 0.7310
sd(recal_50$aos.diff.median.aje_lo)
#sd = 0.4440
median(recal_50$aos.diff.median.aje_lo)
#med = 0.6855
range(recal_50$aos.diff.median.aje_lo)
#range = [-0.2482,2.8353]
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## Visualization of Distribution (each observation is an individual "forecaster")
hist(recal_50$aos.diff.median.aje_lo, xlim=c(-1,3), breaks=50,
main="Avg. Change in Median AJE due to Recalibration (Pre - Post)\n(Avg. Across Each
Forecaster\'s 100 Resamples)",
xlab="Average Difference (log-odds)")
abline(v=0, col="red", lty=2, lwd=2)

## Hypothesis Tests
mean(ifelse(recal_50$aos.diff.median.aje_lo > 0, 1, 0))
#Mass of dist. > 0 = 0.9735 = 97.35%
wilcox.test(recal_50$aos.diff.median.aje_lo)
#Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test: V = 284150, p < 0.001***
####################################################################################################
##############

############ Effects of recalibration on aos.diff.median.aje_p
###################################################
#### Q: What was the average change in median AJE (prob) as result of recalibration?
#### Note: differences calculated as err.pre - err.post --> positive values indicate reduction in
error
## Descriptive Stats (across "forecasters")
mean(recal_50$aos.diff.median.aje_p)
#mean = 0.1081 = 10.81%
sd(recal_50$aos.diff.median.aje_p)
#sd = 0.0811 = 8.11%
median(recal_50$aos.diff.median.aje_p)
#med = 0.0869 = 8.69%
range(recal_50$aos.diff.median.aje_p)
#range = [-0.0165,0.5178] = [-1.65%, 51.78%]

## Visualization of Distribution (each observation is an individual "forecaster")
hist(recal_50$aos.diff.median.aje_p, xlim=c(-0.1,0.6), breaks=50,
main="Avg. Change in Median AJE due to Recalibration (Pre - Post)\n(Avg. Across Each
Forecaster\'s 100 Resamples)",
xlab="Average Difference (prob. scale)")
abline(v=0, col="red", lty=2, lwd=2)

## Hypothesis Tests
mean(ifelse(recal_50$aos.diff.median.aje_p > 0, 1, 0))
#Mass of dist. > 0 = 0.9801 = 98.01%
wilcox.test(recal_50$aos.diff.median.aje_p)
#Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test: V = 284310, p < 0.001***

## Visualization of median AJE (prob) Pre vs. Post (each observation is an individual "forecaster")
hist(recal_50$aos.median.aje.pre_p, xlim=c(0,0.7), ylim=c(0,50), breaks=50, col=rgb(1,0,0,1/4),
main="Median AJE, Before and After Recalibration\n(Avg. Across Each Forecaster\'s 100
Resamples)",
xlab="Median AJE (Probability Scale)")
hist(recal_50$aos.median.aje.post_p, ylim=c(0,50), xlim=c(0,0.7), breaks=50, col=rgb(0,0,1,1/4),
add=T)
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legend(x=0.5,y=45,legend=c("Before Recalibration","After Recalibration"),
col=c(rgb(1,0,0,1/4),rgb(0,0,1,1/4)),
lwd=2, lty=1)
####################################################################################################
##############

############ Effects of recalibration on prop.samp.median.aje.impr
###############################################
#### Q: In what proportion of samples did recalibration reduce median AJE (judgments vs. "truth")?
## Descriptive Stats (across "forecasters")
mean(recal_50$prop.samp.median.aje.impr)
#mean = 0.9601 = 96.01%
sd(recal_50$prop.samp.median.aje.impr)
#sd = 0.1198 = 11.98%
median(recal_50$prop.samp.median.aje.impr)
#med = 1 = 100%
range(recal_50$prop.samp.median.aje.impr)
#range = [0.10,1] = [10%, 100%]

## Visualization of Distribution (each observation is an individual "forecaster")
hist(recal_50$prop.samp.median.aje.impr, xlim=c(0,1), breaks=50,
main="Prop. of Samples in which Recalibration Improved Median AJE\n(Prop. Across Each
Forecaster\'s 100 Resamples)",
xlab="Proportion of Resamples")
abline(v=0.5, col="red", lty=2, lwd=2)

## Hypothesis Tests
mean(ifelse(recal_50$prop.samp.median.aje.impr > 0.5, 1, 0))
#Mass of dist. > 0.5 = 0.9761 = 97.61%
wilcox.test(recal_50$prop.samp.median.aje.impr - 0.5)
#Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test: V = 283470, p < 0.001***
####################################################################################################
##############

############ Effects of recalibration on aos.coh.d_aje.pre.post_p
###############################################
#### Q: On average, what was the effect size (Cohen's D) of recalibration on AJE?
## Descriptive Stats (across "forecasters")
mean(recal_50$aos.coh.d_aje.pre.post_p)
#mean = 0.41
sd(recal_50$aos.coh.d_aje.pre.post_p)
#sd = 0.17
median(recal_50$aos.coh.d_aje.pre.post_p)
#med = 0.41
range(recal_50$aos.coh.d_aje.pre.post_p)
#range = [-0.11, 1.05]
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## Visualization of Distribution (each observation is an individual "forecaster")
hist(recal_50$aos.coh.d_aje.pre.post_p, xlim=c(-0.5,1.5), breaks=50,
main="Avg. Effect (Cohen's D) of Recalibration on AJE (Prob. Scale)\n(Avg. Across Each
Forecaster\'s 100 Resamples)",
xlab="Cohen's D")
abline(v=0, col="red", lty=2, lwd=2)

## Hypothesis Tests
mean(ifelse(recal_50$aos.coh.d_aje.pre.post_p > 0, 1, 0))
#Mass of dist. > 0 = 0.9920 = 99.20%
wilcox.test(recal_50$aos.coh.d_aje.pre.post_p)
#Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test: V = 284550, p < 0.001***
####################################################################################################
##############

############ Effects of recalibration on aos.mean.diff.aje_lo
####################################################
#### Q: On average, what was the median pairwise change in the AJE (log-odds), due to recalibration?
#### Note: differences calculated as err.pre - err.post --> positive values indicate reduction in
error
## Descriptive Stats (across "forecasters")
mean(recal_50$aos.mean.diff.aje_lo)
#mean = 0.5439
sd(recal_50$aos.mean.diff.aje_lo)
#sd = 0.3347
median(recal_50$aos.mean.diff.aje_lo)
#med = 0.4939
range(recal_50$aos.mean.diff.aje_lo)
#range = [-0.0564, 2.5436]

## Visualization of Distribution (each observation is an individual "forecaster")
hist(recal_50$aos.mean.diff.aje_lo, xlim=c(-1,3), breaks=50,
main="AOS, Avg. Pairwise Difference in AJE due to Recalibration (Pre - Post)\n(Avg. Across Each
Forecaster\'s 100 Resamples)",
xlab="Avg. Difference (log-odds)")
abline(v=0, col="red", lty=2, lwd=2)

## Hypothesis Tests
mean(ifelse(recal_50$aos.mean.diff.aje_lo > 0, 1, 0))
#Mass of dist. > 0 = 0.9894 = 98.94%
wilcox.test(recal_50$aos.mean.diff.aje_lo)
#Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test: V = 284540, p < 0.001***
####################################################################################################
##############

############ Effects of recalibration on aos.median.diff.aje_lo
##################################################
#### Q: On average, what was the median pairwise change in the AJE (log-odds), due to recalibration?
#### Note: differences calculated as err.pre - err.post --> positive values indicate reduction in
error
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## Descriptive Stats (across "forecasters")
mean(recal_50$aos.median.diff.aje_lo)
#mean = 1.0271
sd(recal_50$aos.median.diff.aje_lo)
#sd = 0.5287
median(recal_50$aos.median.diff.aje_lo)
#med = 0.9684
range(recal_50$aos.median.diff.aje_lo)
#range = [-0.0715, 2.9019]

## Visualization of Distribution (each observation is an individual "forecaster")
hist(recal_50$aos.median.diff.aje_lo, xlim=c(-1,3), breaks=50,
main="AOS, Med. Pairwise Difference in AJE due to Recalibration (Pre - Post)\n(Avg. Across Each
Forecaster\'s 100 Resamples)",
xlab="Avg. Difference (log-odds)")
abline(v=0, col="red", lty=2, lwd=2)

## Hypothesis Tests
mean(ifelse(recal_50$aos.median.diff.aje_lo > 0, 1, 0))
#Mass of dist. > 0 = 0.9947 = 99.47%
wilcox.test(recal_50$aos.median.diff.aje_lo)
#Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test: V = 284600, p < 0.001***
####################################################################################################
##############

############ Effects of recalibration on aos.mean.diff.aje_p
#####################################################
#### Q: On average, what was the median pairwise change in the AJE (prob), due to recalibration?
#### Note: differences calculated as err.pre - err.post --> positive values indicate reduction in
error
## Descriptive Stats (across "forecasters")
mean(recal_50$aos.mean.diff.aje_p)
#mean = 0.0684 = 6.84%
sd(recal_50$aos.mean.diff.aje_p)
#sd = 0.0500 = 5.00%
median(recal_50$aos.mean.diff.aje_p)
#med = 0.0584 = 5.84%
range(recal_50$aos.mean.diff.aje_p)
#range = [-0.0132, 0.2898] = [-1.32%, 28.98%]

## Visualization of Distribution (each observation is an individual "forecaster")
hist(recal_50$aos.mean.diff.aje_p, xlim=c(-0.1,0.3), breaks=50,
main="AOS, Avg. Pairwise Difference in AJE due to Recalibration (Pre - Post)\n(Avg. Across Each
Forecaster\'s 100 Resamples)",
xlab="Avg. Difference (Prob. Scale)")
abline(v=0, col="red", lty=2, lwd=2)

## Hypothesis Tests
mean(ifelse(recal_50$aos.mean.diff.aje_p > 0, 1, 0))
#Mass of dist. > 0 = 0.9801 = 98.01%
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wilcox.test(recal_50$aos.mean.diff.aje_p)
#Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test: V = 284360, p < 0.001***
####################################################################################################
##############

############ Effects of recalibration on aos.median.diff.aje_p
###################################################
#### Q: On average, what was the median pairwise change in the AJE (log-odds), due to recalibration?
#### Note: differences calculated as err.pre - err.post --> positive values indicate reduction in
error
## Descriptive Stats (across "forecasters")
mean(recal_50$aos.median.diff.aje_p)
#mean = 0.0896 = 8.96%
sd(recal_50$aos.median.diff.aje_p)
#sd = 0.0768 = 7.68%
median(recal_50$aos.median.diff.aje_p)
#med = 0.0699 = 6.99%
range(recal_50$aos.median.diff.aje_p)
#range = [-0.0012, 0.4126] = [-0.12%, 41.26%]

## Visualization of Distribution (each observation is an individual "forecaster")
hist(recal_50$aos.median.diff.aje_p, xlim=c(-0.1,0.5), breaks=50,
main="AOS, Med. Pairwise Difference in AJE due to Recalibration (Pre - Post)\n(Avg. Across Each
Forecaster\'s 100 Resamples)",
xlab="Avg. Difference (Prob. Scale)")
abline(v=0, col="red", lty=2, lwd=2)

## Hypothesis Tests
mean(ifelse(recal_50$aos.median.diff.aje_p > 0, 1, 0))
#Mass of dist. > 0 = 0.9907 = 99.07%
wilcox.test(recal_50$aos.median.diff.aje_p)
#Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test: V = 284580, p < 0.001***
####################################################################################################
##############

############ Effects of recalibration on aos.prop.ale.impr
#######################################################
#### Q: On average, what proportion of judgments saw reduced ALE as a result of recalibration?
## Descriptive Stats (across "forecasters")
mean(recal_50$aos.prop.ale.impr)
#mean = 0.7618 = 76.18%
sd(recal_50$aos.prop.ale.impr)
#sd = 0.0963 = 9.63%
median(recal_50$aos.prop.ale.impr)
#med = 0.7788 = 77.88%
range(recal_50$aos.prop.ale.impr)
#range = [0.2086, 0.9296] = [20.86%, 92.96%]
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## Visualization of Distribution (each observation is an individual "forecaster")
hist(recal_50$aos.prop.ale.impr, xlim=c(0,1), breaks=50,
main="Avg. Prop. of Judgments for which Recalibration Improved ALE\n(Prop. Across Each
Forecaster\'s 100 Resamples)",
xlab="Proportion of Judgments")
abline(v=0.5, col="red", lty=2, lwd=2)

## Hypothesis Tests
mean(ifelse(recal_50$aos.prop.ale.impr > 0.5, 1, 0))
#Mass of dist. > 0.5 = 0.9682 = 96.82%
wilcox.test(recal_50$aos.prop.ale.impr - 0.5)
#Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test: V = 282440, p < 0.001***
####################################################################################################
##############

############ Effects of recalibration on aos.diff.mean.ale
#######################################################
#### Q: What was the average change in mean ALE (prob) as result of recalibration?
#### Note: differences calculated as err.pre - err.post --> positive values indicate reduction in
error
## Descriptive Stats (across "forecasters")
mean(recal_50$aos.diff.mean.ale)
#mean = 0.0707 = 7.07%
sd(recal_50$aos.diff.mean.ale)
#sd = 0.0487 = 4.87%
median(recal_50$aos.diff.mean.ale)
#med = 0.0623 = 6.23%
range(recal_50$aos.diff.mean.ale)
#range = [-0.0284, 0.2636] = [-2.84%, 26.36%]

## Visualization of Distribution (each observation is an individual "forecaster")
hist(recal_50$aos.diff.mean.ale, xlim=c(-0.1,0.3), breaks=50,
main="Avg. Change in Mean ALE due to Recalibration (Pre - Post)\n(Avg. Across Each
Forecaster\'s 100 Resamples)",
xlab="Average Difference (Prob. Scale)")
abline(v=0, col="red", lty=2, lwd=2)

## Hypothesis Tests
mean(ifelse(recal_50$aos.diff.mean.ale > 0, 1, 0))
#Mass of dist. > 0 = 0.9695 = 96.95%
wilcox.test(recal_50$aos.diff.mean.ale)
#Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test: V = 283730, p < 0.001***

## Visualization of mean ALE (prob) Pre vs. Post (each observation is an individual "forecaster")
hist(recal_50$aos.mean.ale.pre, ylim=c(0,50), xlim=c(0,0.6), breaks=50, col=rgb(1,0,0,1/4),
main="Mean ALE, Before and After Recalibration\n(Avg. Across Each Forecaster\'s 100
Resamples)",
xlab="Mean ALE (Probability Scale)")
hist(recal_50$aos.mean.ale.post, ylim=c(0,50), xlim=c(0,0.6), breaks=50, col=rgb(0,0,1,1/4), add=T)
legend(x=0.4,y=45,legend=c("Before Recalibration","After Recalibration"),
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col=c(rgb(1,0,0,1/4),rgb(0,0,1,1/4)),
lwd=2, lty=1)
####################################################################################################
##############

############ Effects of recalibration on prop.samp.mean.ale.impr
#################################################
#### Q: In what proportion of samples did recalibration reduce mean ALE (judgments vs. outcomes)?
## Descriptive Stats (across "forecasters")
mean(recal_50$prop.samp.mean.ale.impr)
#mean = 0.9545 = 95.45%
sd(recal_50$prop.samp.mean.ale.impr)
#sd = 0.1367 = 13.67%
median(recal_50$prop.samp.mean.ale.impr)
#med = 1 = 100%
range(recal_50$prop.samp.mean.ale.impr)
#range = [0, 1] = [0%, 100%]

## Visualization of Distribution (each observation is an individual "forecaster")
hist(recal_50$prop.samp.mean.ale.impr, xlim=c(0,1), breaks=50,
main="Prop. of Samples in which Recalibration Improved Mean ALE\n(Prop. Across Each
Forecaster\'s 100 Resamples)",
xlab="Proportion of Resamples")
abline(v=0.5, col="red", lty=2, lwd=2)

## Hypothesis Tests
mean(ifelse(recal_50$prop.samp.mean.ale.impr > 0.5, 1, 0))
#Mass of dist. > 0.5 = 0.9761 = 97.61%
wilcox.test(recal_50$prop.samp.mean.ale.impr - 0.5)
#Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test: V = 282430, p < 0.001***
####################################################################################################
##############

############ Effects of recalibration on aos.diff.median.ale
#####################################################
#### Q: What was the average change in median ALE (prob) as result of recalibration?
#### Note: differences calculated as err.pre - err.post --> positive values indicate reduction in
error
## Descriptive Stats (across "forecasters")
mean(recal_50$aos.diff.median.ale)
#mean = 0.1376 = 13.76%
sd(recal_50$aos.diff.median.ale)
#sd = 0.0948 = 9.48%
median(recal_50$aos.diff.median.ale)
#med = 0.1217 = 12.17%
range(recal_50$aos.diff.median.ale)
#range = [-0.1231, 0.4604] = [-12.31%, 46.04%]
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## Visualization of Distribution (each observation is an individual "forecaster")
hist(recal_50$aos.diff.median.ale, xlim=c(-0.2,0.6), breaks=50,
main="Avg. Change in Median ALE due to Recalibration (Pre - Post)\n(Avg. Across Each
Forecaster\'s 100 Resamples)",
xlab="Average Difference (Prob. Scale)")
abline(v=0, col="red", lty=2, lwd=2)

## Hypothesis Tests
mean(ifelse(recal_50$aos.diff.median.ale > 0, 1, 0))
#Mass of dist. > 0 = 0.9668 = 96.68%
wilcox.test(recal_50$aos.diff.median.ale)
#Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test: V = 283260, p < 0.001***

## Visualization of median ALE (prob) Pre vs. Post (each observation is an individual "forecaster")
hist(recal_50$aos.median.ale.pre, ylim=c(0,50), xlim=c(0,0.7), breaks=50, col=rgb(1,0,0,1/4),
main="Median ALE, Before and After Recalibration\n(Avg. Across Each Forecaster\'s 100
Resamples)",
xlab="Median ALE (Probability Scale)")
hist(recal_50$aos.median.ale.post, ylim=c(0,50), xlim=c(0,0.7), breaks=50, col=rgb(0,0,1,1/4),
add=T)
legend(x=0.5,y=45,legend=c("Before Recalibration","After Recalibration"),
col=c(rgb(1,0,0,1/4),rgb(0,0,1,1/4)),
lwd=2, lty=1)
####################################################################################################
##############

############ Effects of recalibration on prop.samp.mean.ale.impr
#################################################
#### Q: In what proportion of samples did recalibration reduce median ALE (judgments vs. outcomes)?
## Descriptive Stats (across "forecasters")
mean(recal_50$prop.samp.median.ale.impr)
#mean = 0.9632 = 96.32%
sd(recal_50$prop.samp.median.ale.impr)
#sd = 0.1545 = 15.45%
median(recal_50$prop.samp.median.ale.impr)
#med = 1 = 100%
range(recal_50$prop.samp.median.ale.impr)
#range = [0,1] = [0%, 100%]

## Visualization of Distribution (each observation is an individual "forecaster")
hist(recal_50$prop.samp.median.ale.impr, xlim=c(0,1), breaks=50,
main="Prop. of Samples in which Recalibration Improved Median ALE\n(Prop. Across Each
Forecaster\'s 100 Resamples)",
xlab="Proportion of Resamples")
abline(v=0.5, col="red", lty=2, lwd=2)

## Hypothesis Tests
mean(ifelse(recal_50$prop.samp.median.ale.impr > 0.5, 1, 0))
#Mass of dist. > 0.5 = 0.9655 = 96.55%
wilcox.test(recal_50$prop.samp.median.ale.impr - 0.5)
#Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test: V = 281550, p < 0.001***
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####################################################################################################
##############

############ Effects of recalibration on aos.coh.d_ale.pre.post
##################################################
#### Q: On average, what was the effect size (Cohen's D) of recalibration on ALE?
## Descriptive Stats (across "forecasters")
mean(recal_50$aos.coh.d_ale.pre.post)
#mean = 0.43
sd(recal_50$aos.coh.d_ale.pre.post)
#sd = 0.21
median(recal_50$aos.coh.d_ale.pre.post)
#med = 0.42
range(recal_50$aos.coh.d_ale.pre.post)
#range = [-0.30, 1.51]

## Visualization of Distribution (each observation is an individual "forecaster")
hist(recal_50$aos.coh.d_ale.pre.post, xlim=c(-0.5,2), breaks=50,
main="Avg. Effect (Cohen's D) of Recalibration on ALE (Prob. Scale)\n(Avg. Across Each
Forecaster\'s 100 Resamples)",
xlab="Cohen's D")
abline(v=0, col="red", lty=2, lwd=2)

## Hypothesis Tests
mean(ifelse(recal_50$aos.coh.d_ale.pre.post > 0, 1, 0))
#Mass of dist. > 0 = 0.9775 = 97.75%
wilcox.test(recal_50$aos.coh.d_ale.pre.post)
#Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test: V = 283870, p < 0.001***
####################################################################################################
##############

############ Effects of recalibration on aos.mean.diff.ale
#######################################################
#### Q: On average, what was the mean pairwise change in the ALE (prob), due to recalibration?
#### Note: differences calculated as err.pre - err.post --> positive values indicate reduction in
error
## Descriptive Stats (across "forecasters")
mean(recal_50$aos.mean.diff.ale)
#mean = 0.0707 = 7.07%
sd(recal_50$aos.mean.diff.ale)
#sd = 0.0487 = 4.87%
median(recal_50$aos.mean.diff.ale)
#med = 0.0623 = 6.23%
range(recal_50$aos.mean.diff.ale)
#range = [-0.0284, 0.2636] = [-2.84%, 26.36%]

## Visualization of Distribution (each observation is an individual "forecaster")
hist(recal_50$aos.mean.diff.ale, xlim=c(-0.1,0.3), breaks=50,
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main="AOS, Avg. Pairwise Difference in ALE due to Recalibration (Pre - Post)\n(Avg. Across Each
Forecaster\'s 100 Resamples)",
xlab="Avg. Difference (Prob. Scale)")
abline(v=0, col="red", lty=2, lwd=2)

## Hypothesis Tests
mean(ifelse(recal_50$aos.mean.diff.ale > 0, 1, 0))
#Mass of dist. > 0 = 0.9695 = 96.95%
wilcox.test(recal_50$aos.mean.diff.ale)
#Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test: V = 283730, p < 0.001***
####################################################################################################
##############

############ Effects of recalibration on aos.median.diff.ale
#####################################################
#### Q: On average, what was the median pairwise change in the ALE (prob), due to recalibration?
#### Note: differences calculated as err.pre - err.post --> positive values indicate reduction in
error
## Descriptive Stats (across "forecasters")
mean(recal_50$aos.median.diff.ale)
#mean = 0.1010 = 10.10%
sd(recal_50$aos.median.diff.ale)
#sd = 0.0826 = 8.26%
median(recal_50$aos.median.diff.ale)
#med = 0.0787 = 7.87%
range(recal_50$aos.median.diff.ale)
#range = [-0.0424, 0.4151] = [-4.24%, 41.51%]

## Visualization of Distribution (each observation is an individual "forecaster")
hist(recal_50$aos.median.diff.ale, xlim=c(-0.1,0.5), breaks=50,
main="AOS, Med. Pairwise Difference in ALE due to Recalibration (Pre - Post)\n(Avg. Across Each
Forecaster\'s 100 Resamples)",
xlab="Avg. Difference (Prob. Scale)")
abline(v=0, col="red", lty=2, lwd=2)

## Hypothesis Tests
mean(ifelse(recal_50$aos.median.diff.ale > 0, 1, 0))
#Mass of dist. > 0 = 0.9629 = 96.29%
wilcox.test(recal_50$aos.median.diff.ale)
#Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test: V = 283140, p < 0.001***
####################################################################################################
##############

############ Effects of recalibration on aos.prop.bs.impr
########################################################
#### Q: On average, what proportion of judgments saw reduced BS as a result of recalibration?
## Descriptive Stats (across "forecasters")
mean(recal_50$aos.prop.bs.impr)
#mean = 0.7642 = 76.42%
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sd(recal_50$aos.prop.bs.impr)
#sd = 0.0963 = 9.63%
median(recal_50$aos.prop.bs.impr)
#med = 0.7788 = 77.88%
range(recal_50$aos.prop.bs.impr)
#range = [0.2086, 0.9296] = [20.86%, 92.96%]

## Visualization of Distribution (each observation is an individual "forecaster")
hist(recal_50$aos.prop.bs.impr, xlim=c(0,1), breaks=50,
main="Avg. Prop. of Judgments for which Recalibration Improved BS\n(Prop. Across Each
Forecaster\'s 100 Resamples)",
xlab="Proportion of Judgments")
abline(v=0.5, col="red", lty=2, lwd=2)

## Hypothesis Tests
mean(ifelse(recal_50$aos.prop.bs.impr > 0.5, 1, 0))
#Mass of dist. > 0.5 = 0.9682 = 96.82%
wilcox.test(recal_50$aos.prop.bs.impr - 0.5)
#Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test: V = 282440, p < 0.001***
####################################################################################################
##############

############ Effects of recalibration on aos.diff.mean.bs
########################################################
#### Q: What was the average change in mean BS as result of recalibration?
#### Note: differences calculated as err.pre - err.post --> positive values indicate reduction in
error
## Descriptive Stats (across "forecasters")
mean(recal_50$aos.diff.mean.bs)
#mean = 0.0142
sd(recal_50$aos.diff.mean.bs)
#sd = 0.0290
median(recal_50$aos.diff.mean.bs)
#med = 0.0064
range(recal_50$aos.diff.mean.bs)
#range = [-0.0260, 0.2703]

## Visualization of Distribution (each observation is an individual "forecaster")
hist(recal_50$aos.diff.mean.bs, xlim=c(-0.1,0.3), breaks=50,
main="Avg. Change in Mean BS due to Recalibration (Pre - Post)\n(Avg. Across Each Forecaster\'s
100 Resamples)",
xlab="Average Difference")
abline(v=0, col="red", lty=2, lwd=2)

## Hypothesis Tests
mean(ifelse(recal_50$aos.diff.mean.bs > 0, 1, 0))
#Mass of dist. > 0 = 0.6525 = 65.25%
wilcox.test(recal_50$aos.diff.mean.bs)
#Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test: V = 222130, p < 0.001***
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## Visualization of mean BS Pre vs. Post (each observation is an individual "forecaster")
hist(recal_50$aos.mean.bs.pre, ylim=c(0,70), xlim=c(0,0.6), breaks=50, col=rgb(1,0,0,1/4),
main="Mean BS, Before and After Recalibration\n(Avg. Across Each Forecaster\'s 100 Resamples)",
xlab="Mean BS")
hist(recal_50$aos.mean.bs.post, ylim=c(0,70), xlim=c(0,0.6), breaks=50, col=rgb(0,0,1,1/4), add=T)
legend(x=0.4,y=45,legend=c("Before Recalibration","After Recalibration"),
col=c(rgb(1,0,0,1/4),rgb(0,0,1,1/4)),
lwd=2, lty=1)
####################################################################################################
##############

############ Effects of recalibration on prop.samp.mean.bs.impr
##################################################
#### Q: In what proportion of samples did recalibration reduce mean BS (judgments vs. outcomes)?
## Descriptive Stats (across "forecasters")
mean(recal_50$prop.samp.mean.bs.impr)
#mean = 0.6663 = 66.63%
sd(recal_50$prop.samp.mean.bs.impr)
#sd = 0.2527 = 25.27%
median(recal_50$prop.samp.mean.bs.impr)
#med = 0.72 = 72%
range(recal_50$prop.samp.mean.bs.impr)
#range = [0, 1] = [0%, 100%]

## Visualization of Distribution (each observation is an individual "forecaster")
hist(recal_50$prop.samp.mean.bs.impr, xlim=c(0,1), breaks=50,
main="Prop. of Samples in which Recalibration Improved Mean BS\n(Prop. Across Each
Forecaster\'s 100 Resamples)",
xlab="Proportion of Resamples")
abline(v=0.5, col="red", lty=2, lwd=2)

## Hypothesis Tests
mean(ifelse(recal_50$prop.samp.mean.bs.impr > 0.5, 1, 0))
#Mass of dist. > 0.5 = 0.7268 = 72.68%
wilcox.test(recal_50$prop.samp.mean.bs.impr - 0.5)
#Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test: V = 227540, p < 0.001***
####################################################################################################
##############

############ Effects of recalibration on aos.diff.median.bs
######################################################
#### Q: What was the average change in median BS as result of recalibration?
#### Note: differences calculated as err.pre - err.post --> positive values indicate reduction in
error
## Descriptive Stats (across "forecasters")
mean(recal_50$aos.diff.median.bs)
#mean = 0.0530
sd(recal_50$aos.diff.median.bs)
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#sd = 0.0564
median(recal_50$aos.diff.median.bs)
#med = 0.0344
range(recal_50$aos.diff.median.bs)
#range = [-0.0474, 0.5271]

## Visualization of Distribution (each observation is an individual "forecaster")
hist(recal_50$aos.diff.median.bs, xlim=c(-0.2,0.6), breaks=50,
main="Avg. Change in Median BS due to Recalibration (Pre - Post)\n(Avg. Across Each
Forecaster\'s 100 Resamples)",
xlab="Average Difference")
abline(v=0, col="red", lty=2, lwd=2)

## Hypothesis Tests
mean(ifelse(recal_50$aos.diff.median.bs > 0, 1, 0))
#Mass of dist. > 0 = 0.9668 = 96.55%
wilcox.test(recal_50$aos.diff.median.bs)
#Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test: V = 283350, p < 0.001***

## Visualization of median BS Pre vs. Post (each observation is an individual "forecaster")
hist(recal_50$aos.median.bs.pre, ylim=c(0,150), xlim=c(0,0.6), breaks=50, col=rgb(1,0,0,1/4),
main="Median BS, Before and After Recalibration\n(Avg. Across Each Forecaster\'s 100
Resamples)",
xlab="Median BS")
hist(recal_50$aos.median.bs.post, ylim=c(0,150), xlim=c(0,0.6), breaks=30, col=rgb(0,0,1,1/4),
add=T)
legend(x=0.4,y=140,legend=c("Before Recalibration","After Recalibration"),
col=c(rgb(1,0,0,1/4),rgb(0,0,1,1/4)),
lwd=2, lty=1)
####################################################################################################
##############

############ Effects of recalibration on prop.samp.median.bs.impr
################################################
#### Q: In what proportion of samples did recalibration reduce median BS (judgments vs. outcomes)?
## Descriptive Stats (across "forecasters")
mean(recal_50$prop.samp.median.bs.impr)
#mean = 0.9633 = 96.33%
sd(recal_50$prop.samp.median.bs.impr)
#sd = 0.1541 = 15.41%
median(recal_50$prop.samp.median.bs.impr)
#med = 1 = 100%
range(recal_50$prop.samp.median.bs.impr)
#range = [0, 1] = [0%, 100%]

## Visualization of Distribution (each observation is an individual "forecaster")
hist(recal_50$prop.samp.median.bs.impr, xlim=c(0,1), breaks=50,
main="Prop. of Samples in which Recalibration Improved Median BS\n(Prop. Across Each
Forecaster\'s 100 Resamples)",
xlab="Proportion of Resamples")
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abline(v=0.5, col="red", lty=2, lwd=2)

## Hypothesis Tests
mean(ifelse(recal_50$prop.samp.median.bs.impr > 0.5, 1, 0))
#Mass of dist. > 0.5 = 0.9655 = 96.55%
wilcox.test(recal_50$prop.samp.median.bs.impr - 0.5)
#Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test: V = 281560, p < 0.001***
####################################################################################################
##############

############ Effects of recalibration on aos.coh.d_bs.pre.post
###################################################
#### Q: On average, what was the effect size (Cohen's D) of recalibration on BS?
## Descriptive Stats (across "forecasters")
mean(recal_50$aos.coh.d_bs.pre.post)
#mean = 0.07
sd(recal_50$aos.coh.d_bs.pre.post)
#sd = 0.11
median(recal_50$aos.coh.d_bs.pre.post)
#med = 0.07
range(recal_50$aos.coh.d_bs.pre.post)
#range = [-0.25, 0.53]

## Visualization of Distribution (each observation is an individual "forecaster")
hist(recal_50$aos.coh.d_bs.pre.post, xlim=c(-0.6,0.6), breaks=50,
main="Avg. Effect (Cohen's D) of Recalibration on BS\n(Avg. Across Each Forecaster\'s 100
Resamples)",
xlab="Cohen's D")
abline(v=0, col="red", lty=2, lwd=2)

## Hypothesis Tests
mean(ifelse(recal_50$aos.coh.d_bs.pre.post > 0, 1, 0))
#Mass of dist. > 0 = 0.7414 = 74.14%
wilcox.test(recal_50$aos.coh.d_bs.pre.post)
#Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test: V = 238460, p < 0.001***
####################################################################################################
##############

############ Effects of recalibration on aos.mean.diff.bs
########################################################
#### Q: On average, what was the mean pairwise change in BS, due to recalibration?
#### Note: differences calculated as err.pre - err.post --> positive values indicate reduction in
error
## Descriptive Stats (across "forecasters")
mean(recal_50$aos.mean.diff.bs)
#mean = 0.0142
sd(recal_50$aos.mean.diff.bs)
#sd = 0.0290
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median(recal_50$aos.mean.diff.bs)
#med = 0.0064
range(recal_50$aos.mean.diff.bs)
#range = [-0.0260, 0.2703]

## Visualization of Distribution (each observation is an individual "forecaster")
hist(recal_50$aos.mean.diff.bs, xlim=c(-0.1,0.3), breaks=50,
main="AOS, Avg. Pairwise Difference in BS due to Recalibration (Pre - Post)\n(Avg. Across Each
Forecaster\'s 100 Resamples)",
xlab="Avg. Difference")
abline(v=0, col="red", lty=2, lwd=2)

## Hypothesis Tests
mean(ifelse(recal_50$aos.mean.diff.bs > 0, 1, 0))
#Mass of dist. > 0 = 0.6525 = 65.25%
wilcox.test(recal_50$aos.mean.diff.bs)
#Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test: V = 222130, p < 0.001***
####################################################################################################
##############

############ Effects of recalibration on aos.median.diff.bs
######################################################
#### Q: On average, what was the median pairwise change in BS, due to recalibration?
#### Note: differences calculated as err.pre - err.post --> positive values indicate reduction in
error
## Descriptive Stats (across "forecasters")
mean(recal_50$aos.median.diff.bs)
#mean = 0.0278
sd(recal_50$aos.median.diff.bs)
#sd = 0.0375
median(recal_50$aos.median.diff.bs)
#med = 0.0132
range(recal_50$aos.median.diff.bs)
#range = [-0.0028, 0.2421]

## Visualization of Distribution (each observation is an individual "forecaster")
hist(recal_50$aos.median.diff.bs, xlim=c(-0.1,0.3), breaks=50,
main="AOS, Med. Pairwise Difference in BS due to Recalibration (Pre - Post)\n(Avg. Across Each
Forecaster\'s 100 Resamples)",
xlab="Avg. Difference")
abline(v=0, col="red", lty=2, lwd=2)

## Hypothesis Tests
mean(ifelse(recal_50$aos.median.diff.bs > 0, 1, 0))
#Mass of dist. > 0 = 0.9695 = 96.95%
wilcox.test(recal_50$aos.median.diff.bs)
#Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test: V = 283610, p < 0.001***
####################################################################################################
##############
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############ Effects of recalibration on aos.diff.rel
############################################################
#### Q: What was the average effect of recalibration on sample reliability (calibration)?
#### Note: differences calculated as rel.pre - rel.post --> positive values indicate reduction
(improvement) in reliability
## Descriptive Stats (across "forecasters")
mean(recal_50$aos.diff.rel)
#mean = 0.0237
sd(recal_50$aos.diff.rel)
#sd = 0.0356
median(recal_50$aos.diff.rel)
#med = 0.0129
range(recal_50$aos.diff.rel)
#range = [-0.0229, 0.2704]

## Visualization of Distribution (each observation is an individual "forecaster")
hist(recal_50$aos.diff.rel, xlim=c(-0.1,0.3), breaks=50,
main="Avg. Change in Sample Reliability due to Recalibration (Pre - Post)\n(Avg. Across Each
Forecaster\'s 100 Resamples)",
xlab="Avg. Difference")
abline(v=0, col="red", lty=2, lwd=2)

## Hypothesis Tests
mean(ifelse(recal_50$aos.diff.rel > 0, 1, 0))
#Mass of dist. > 0 = 0.8170 = 81.70%
wilcox.test(recal_50$aos.diff.rel)
#Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test: V = 260720, p < 0.001***
####################################################################################################
##############

############ Effects of recalibration on prop.samp.rel.impr
######################################################
#### Q: In what proportion of samples did recalibration improve reliability (calibration)?
## Descriptive Stats (across "forecasters")
mean(recal_50$prop.samp.rel.impr)
#mean = 0.7654 = 76.54%
sd(recal_50$prop.samp.rel.impr)
#sd = 0.2304 = 23.04%
median(recal_50$prop.samp.rel.impr)
#med = 0.84 = 84%
range(recal_50$prop.samp.rel.impr)
#range = [0.01, 1] = [1.00%, 100%]

## Visualization of Distribution (each observation is an individual "forecaster")
hist(recal_50$prop.samp.rel.impr, xlim=c(0,1), breaks=50,
main="Prop. of Samples in which Recalibration Improved Reliability\n(Prop. Across Each
Forecaster\'s 100 Resamples)",
xlab="Proportion of Resamples")
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abline(v=0.5, col="red", lty=2, lwd=2)

## Hypothesis Tests
mean(ifelse(recal_50$prop.samp.rel.impr > 0.5, 1, 0))
#Mass of dist. > 0.5 = 0.8448 = 84.48%
wilcox.test(recal_50$prop.samp.rel.impr - 0.5)
#Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test: V = 259910, p < 0.001***
####################################################################################################
##############

############ Effects of recalibration on aos.diff.res
############################################################
#### Q: What was the average effect of recalibration on sample resolution?
#### Note: differences calculated as res.pre - res.post --> positive values indicate reduction
(decline) in resolution
## Descriptive Stats (across "forecasters")
mean(recal_50$aos.diff.res)
#mean = -0.0001
sd(recal_50$aos.diff.res)
#sd = 0.0003
median(recal_50$aos.diff.res)
#med = 0
range(recal_50$aos.diff.res)
#range = [-1.933275e-03, 2.775558e-19]

## Visualization of Distribution (each observation is an individual "forecaster")
#hist(recal_50$aos.diff.res, xlim=c(-0.1,0.5), breaks=50,
#
main="Avg. Change in Sample Resolution due to Recalibration (Pre - Post)\n(Avg. Across Each
Forecaster\'s 100 Resamples)",
#
xlab="Avg. Difference")
#abline(v=0, col="red", lty=2, lwd=2)

## Hypothesis Tests
mean(ifelse(recal_50$aos.diff.res < 0, 1, 0))
#Mass of dist. < 0 = 0.4204 = 42.04%
wilcox.test(recal_50$aos.diff.res)
#Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test: V = 4.5, p < 0.001***

#NOTE: Effect is not in the expected direction

####################################################################################################
##############

############ Effects of recalibration on prop.samp.res.impr
######################################################
#### Q: In what proportion of samples did recalibration improve resolution?
## Descriptive Stats (across "forecasters")
mean(recal_50$prop.samp.res.impr)
#mean = 0.0446 = 4.46%
sd(recal_50$prop.samp.res.impr)
#sd = 0.0862 = 8.62%
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median(recal_50$prop.samp.res.impr)
#med = 0 = 0%
range(recal_50$prop.samp.res.impr)
#range = [0,0.77] = [0%, 77%]

## Visualization of Distribution (each observation is an individual "forecaster")
hist(recal_50$prop.samp.res.impr, xlim=c(0,1), breaks=50,
main="Prop. of Samples in which Recalibration Improved Resolution\n(Prop. Across Each
Forecaster\'s 100 Resamples)",
xlab="Proportion of Resamples")
abline(v=0.5, col="red", lty=2, lwd=2)

## Hypothesis Tests
mean(ifelse(recal_50$prop.samp.res.impr > 0.5, 1, 0))
#Mass of dist. > 0.5 = 0.0040 = 0.40%
wilcox.test(recal_50$prop.samp.res.impr - 0.5)
#Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test: V = 48, p < 0.001***

#NOTE: Effect is not in the expected direction

####################################################################################################
##############
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APPENDIX B
Appendix B contains PDF facsimiles of the 10 online surveys administered in the
March Madness Study. These surveys are presented in the sequence they were
administered to participants. The order of the surveys is as follows:


Consent and additional participation information (Survey 1).



Play-in game predictions (Survey 2; Field of 68).



First round predictions (Survey 3; March Madness Round 1; Field of 64).



Second round predictions A (Survey 4; March Madness Round 2; Field of 32).



Second round predictions B (Survey 5; March Madness Round 2; Field of 32).



Second round predictions C (Survey 6; March Madness Round 2; Field of 32).



Sweet Sixteen predictions (Survey 7; March Madness Round 3; Field of 16).



Elite Eight predictions (Survey 8; March Madness Round 4; Field of 8).



Final Four predictions (Survey 9; March Madness Round 6; Field of 4).



Championship game prediction (Survey 10; March Madness Round 7; Field of 2).

Within each survey, information about each game was presented using the Loop
& Merge feature of the Qualtrics online survey platform. This feature allows participants
to respond to the same set of questions several times, with each iteration containing
unique text piped-in from an associated spreadsheet (and responses from each iteration
recorded separately). In the case of the March Madness study, this feature was used to
pipe-in information about the games in each survey, and to ask a uniform set of questions
about each game. In the online version of each survey, this information was piped-in in
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place of the generic variable fields displayed in the survey printouts that follow. In these
printouts, Loop & Merge variable fields are indicated by the syntax “${lm://Field/[n]}”,
where [n] corresponds to the integer designation of one of the following fields:


Field 1: Name of Team A (displayed on the left-hand side of the screen).



Field 2: Regular season conference, Team A.



Field 3: Division-1 win/loss record, Team A.



Field 4: Strength of schedule, Team A (as reported by espn.com).



Field 5: Name of Team B (displayed on the right-hand side of the screen).



Field 6: Regular season conference, Team B.



Field 7: Division-1 win/loss record, Team B.



Field 8: Strength of schedule, Team B (as reported by espn.com).



Field 9: Tournament round in which game is being played.



Field 10: Tournament seeding, Team A.



Field 11: Tournament seeding, Team B.

For convenience, the Loop & Merge data used in each survey is provided as a
stand-alone spreadsheet. These spreadsheets are presented after the relevant survey
printout. In each of these spreadsheets, information about games is presented in bracket
order and/or play order. In the online version of each survey, all games were presented to
participants in a separate, random order. In all cases where surveys were completed,
participants were asked to make predictions about all games.
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325

326

327

328

329

330

331

332

333

334

335

336

337

Field 1
Mount St. Mary's
N.C. Central
Providence
Kansas St.

Field 2
Northeast
Mid-Eastern
Big East
Big 12

Field 3 Field 4
19-15
205
22-8
351
20-12
49
20-13
43

Field 5
New Orleans
UC Davis
USC
Wake Forest

Loop and Merge Data: Play-In Games (Survey 2)
Field 6
Southland
Big West
Pac-12
Atlantic Coast

Field 7 Field 8
17-11
292
20-12
322
24-9
76
19-13
21

Field 9
Field 10 Field 11
Play-In Game
16
16
Play-In Game
16
16
Play-In Game
11
11
Play-In Game
11
11

338

339

340

341

342

343

344

345

346

347

348

349

350

351

352

353

354

355

356

357

358

359

360

361

Field 1
Villanova
Wisconsin
Virginia
Florida
SMU
Baylor
So. Carolina
Duke
Gonzaga
Northwestern
Notre Dame
W. Virginia
Maryland
Florida St.
St. Mary's
Arizona
Kansas
Miami (Fla.)
Iowa St.
Purdue
Creighton
Oregon
Michigan
Louisville
N. Carolina
Arkansas
Minnesota
Butler
Cincinnati
UCLA
Dayton
Kentucky

Field 2
Big East
Big Ten
Atlantic Coast
Southeastern
AAC
Big 12
Southeastern
Atlantic Coast
West Coast
Big Ten
Atlantic Coast
Big 12
Big Ten
Atlantic Coast
West Coast
Pac-12
Big 12
Atlantic Coast
Big 12
Big Ten
Big East
Pac-12
Big Ten
Atlantic Coast
Atlantic Coast
Southeastern
Big Ten
Big East
AAC
Pac-12
Atlantic 10
Southeastern

Field 3 Field 4 Field 5
31-3
37 Mt. St. Mary's / N. Orleans
25-8
83 VA Tech
22-10
4 UNC Wilmington
24-8
8 ETSU
29-4
93 Providence / USC
24-7
5 New Mexico St.
21-10
47 Marquette
27-8
9 Troy
32-1
102 So. Dakota St.
23-11
64 Vanderbilt
25-9
34 Princeton
26-8
72 Bucknell
23-8
54 Xavier
25-8
20 FGCU
28-4
78 VCU
30-4
24 N. Dakota
28-4
35 N.C. Central / UC Davis
21-11
41 Michigan St.
23-10
28 Nevada
25-7
62 Vermont
24-9
50 Rhode Island
28-5
44 Iona
23-11
26 Oklahoma St.
24-8
2 Jacksonville St.
26-7
14 Texas Southern
25-8
58 Seton Hall
24-9
17 Middle Tenn.
23-8
13 Winthrop
29-4
66 Kans. St. / Wake Forest
29-4
106 Kent St.
23-7
71 Wichita St.
28-5
23 N. Kentucky

Loop and Merge Data: First Round (Survey 3)
Field 6
play-in
Atlantic Coast
Colonial
Southern
play-in
Western Athletic
Big East
Sun Belt
Summit League
Southeastern
Ivy League
Patriot
Big East
ASUN
Atlantic 10
Summit League
play-in
Big Ten
Mountain West
America East
Atlantic 10
Metro Atlantic
Big 12
OVC
Southwestern
Big East
Conference USA
Big South
play-in
Mid-American
Missouri Valley
Horizon

Field 7
play-in
22-10
27-5
25-7
play-in
25-5
19-12
20-14
16-16
19-15
21-6
26-8
21-13
23-7
26-7
19-9
play-in
19-14
28-6
28-5
23-9
22-12
19-12
18-14
23-11
21-11
29-4
24-6
play-in
21-13
29-4
22-10

Field 8
play-in
75
145
209
play-in
291
59
235
152
1
165
213
16
269
56
315
play-in
10
144
222
51
174
15
244
316
52
167
267
play-in
224
186
225

Field 9
Field 10 Field 11
First Round
1
16
First Round
8
9
First Round
5
12
First Round
4
13
First Round
6
11
First Round
3
14
First Round
7
10
First Round
2
15
First Round
1
16
First Round
8
9
First Round
5
12
First Round
4
13
First Round
6
11
First Round
3
14
First Round
7
10
First Round
2
15
First Round
1
16
First Round
8
9
First Round
5
12
First Round
4
13
First Round
6
11
First Round
3
14
First Round
7
10
First Round
2
15
First Round
1
16
First Round
8
9
First Round
5
12
First Round
4
13
First Round
6
11
First Round
3
14
First Round
7
10
First Round
2
15
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363

364

365

366

367

368

369

Field 1
Middle Tenn.
Northwestern
Virginia
Notre Dame

Field 2
Conference USA
Big Ten
Atlantic Coast
Atlantic Coast

Field 3 Field 4 Field 5
29-4
167 Butler
22-11
64 Gonzaga
22-10
4 Florida
25-9
34 W. Virginia

Loop and Merge Data: Second Round A (Survey 4)
Field 6
Big East
West Coast
Southeastern
Big 12

Field 7 Field 8 Field 9
Field 10 Field 11
23-8
13 Second Round
12
4
32-1
102 Second Round
8
1
24-8
8 Second Round
5
4
26-8
72 Second Round
5
4

370

371

372

373

374

375

376

377

Field 1
Wisconsin
Xavier
St. Mary's
Iowa St.

Field 2
Big Ten
Big East
West Coast
Big 12

Field 3 Field 4
25-8
83
21-13
16
28-4
78
23-10
28

Field 5
Villanova
Florida St.
Arizona
Purdue

Field 6
Big East
Atlantic Coast
Pac-12
Big Ten

Loop and Merge Data: Second Round B (Survey 5)
Field 7 Field 8
31-3
37
25-8
20
30-4
24
25-7
62

Field 9
Field 10 Field 11
Second Round
8
1
Second Round
11
3
Second Round
7
2
Second Round
5
4

378

379

380

381

382

383

384

385

Field 1
Rhode Island
Michigan
Michigan St.
USC
Arkansas
Duke
Kentucky
Cincinnati

Field 2
Atlantic 10
Big Ten
Big Ten
Pac-12
Southeastern
Atlantic Coast
Southeastern
AAC

Field 3 Field 4 Field 5
23-9
51 Oregon
23-11
26 Louisville
19-14
10 Kansas
24-9
76 Baylor
25-8
58 N. Carolina
27-8
9 So. Carolina
28-5
23 Wichita St.
29-4
66 UCLA

Field 6
Pac-12
Atlantic Coast
Big 12
Big 12
Atlantic Coast
Southeastern
Missouri Valley
Pac-12

Loop and Merge Data: Second Round C (Survey 6)
Field 7 Field 8 Field 9
Field 10 Field 11
28-5
44 Second Round
11
3
24-8
2 Second Round
7
2
28-4
35 Second Round
9
1
24-7
5 Second Round
11
3
26-7
14 Second Round
8
1
21-10
47 Second Round
2
7
29-4
186 Second Round
2
10
29-4
106 Second Round
6
3

386

387

388

389

390

391

392

393

Field 1
Butler
UCLA
So. Carolina
Wisconsin
Michigan
Purdue
W. Virginia
Xavier

Field 2
Big East
Pac-12
Southeastern
Big Ten
Big Ten
Big Ten
Big 12
Big East

Field 3 Field 4
23-8
13
29-4
106
21-10
47
25-8
83
23-11
26
25-7
62
26-8
72
21-13
16

Field 5
N. Carolina
Kentucky
Baylor
Florida
Oregon
Kansas
Gonzaga
Arizona

Field 6
Atlantic Coast
Southeastern
Big 12
Southeastern
Pac-12
Big 12
West Coast
Pac-12

Loop and Merge Data: Sweet Sixteen (Survey 7)
Field 7 Field 8 Field 9
Field 10 Field 11
26-7
14 Sweet Sixteen
4
1
28-5
23 Sweet Sixteen
3
2
24-7
5 Sweet Sixteen
7
3
24-8
8 Sweet Sixteen
8
4
28-5
44 Sweet Sixteen
7
3
28-4
35 Sweet Sixteen
4
1
32-1
102 Sweet Sixteen
4
1
30-4
24 Sweet Sixteen
11
2

394

395

396

397

398

399

400

401

Field 1
Kentucky
Xavier
Oregon
So. Carolina

Field 2
Southeastern
Big East
Pac-12
Southeastern

Field 3 Field 4
28-5
23
21-13
16
28-5
44
21-10
47

Field 5
N. Carolina
Gonzaga
Kansas
Florida

Loop and Merge Data: Elite Eight (Survey 8)
Field 6
Atlantic Coast
West Coast
Big 12
Southeastern

Field 7 Field 8
26-7
14
32-1
102
28-4
35
24-8
8

Field 9
Field 10 Field 11
Elite Eight
2
1
Elite Eight
11
1
Elite Eight
3
1
Elite Eight
7
4

402

403

404

405

406

407

408

409

Field 1
Field 2
Field 3 Field 4 Field 5
Field 6
Field 7 Field 8 Field 9
Field 10 Field 11
Oregon
Pac-12
28-5
44 N. Carolina Atlantic Coast 26-7
14 Final Four
2
3
So. Carolina Southeastern 21-10
47 Gonzaga
West Coast
32-1
102 Final Four
7
1

Loop and Merge Data: Final Four (Survey 9)

410

411

412

413

414

415

416

417

Field 1 Field 2
Field 3 Field 4 Field 5
Field 6
Field 7 Field 8 Field 9
Field 10 Field 11
Gonzaga West Coast 32-1
102 N. Carolina Atlantic Coast 26-7
14 Championship
1
1

Loop and Merge Data: Championship Game (Survey 10)

APPENDIX C
Appendix C contains PDF facsimiles of all materials administered in the
Philadelphia air-temperature study. These materials are presented in the sequence they
were administered to participants. Due to the way these materials were coded, the
appearance of items is likely to have varied slightly across web-browsers. The present
facsimiles were printed from the Google Chrome browser using the Foxit PDF printing
application. The only substantive difference between these materials and those seen by
participants is the inclusion of the subheading “(baker2)” on the first page of the survey.
This subheading was not included in the version of the survey administered to
participants.
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